194. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
Malaysia: Security Situation
The internal security situation in Malaysia has improved markedly over the last year. There has been a decided drop in the number and severity of communist terrorist activities. The Malayan Communist Party (CPM) factions which in the past committed sabotage and assassinations inside Peninsular Malaysia have now been for the most part confined to their base areas along the Thai-Malaysian border. The current joint operations with Thailand aimed at eliminating the communist border sanctuaries will further reduce the threat to Malaysia.
East Malaysia is now also largely free from security problems. The communist guerillas there have been reduced to a negligible force through government mopping up operations and surrenders due to the difficult living conditions in the jungle. The border with Indonesia is tranquil, reflecting the good relations prevailing between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta.
Communal tension between the Malays and local Chinese populations, while never absent from the Malaysian scene has diminished since Hussein bin Onn became prime minister in January 1976. In contrast to the emotionally explosive Malay-first policies of previous Malaysian governments, Hussein has taken a balanced, moderate stance toward national development which has eased, if not submerged, Chinese resentment over the preference given Malays in government jobs and access to higher education.
Indonesia, Australia, and East Timor
Indonesia has not been able to consolidate its control in East Timor and presently controls only the major population centers and lines of communication. However, the resistance of Fretelin forces in the countryside now appears to be diminishing. Some atrocities have occurred, but these are not condoned by the central government and some disciplinary action has been taken.
The Indonesian government has been sensitive to international reactions to the Timor operations, particularly in the United States and [Page 671] Australia. Jakarta presumed Australian and American understanding of the need to integrate East Timor into Indonesia2 and is disturbed by the growing attention the public media of those two countries are devoting to the situation.
Renewed publicity by Australian political activists to alleged Indonesian excesses in East Timor has been particularly bothersome—complicating Australian relations with Indonesia. The recent testimony of the former Australian Consul in Timor, James Dunn, before the US Congress3 has further excited Indonesian concern about the potential growth of both American and Australian opposition. Jakarta professes not to understand why Canberra cannot put a damper on the activities of Dunn and others. Strong Australian public disapproval of the Indonesian takeover has been a recurring dilemma for Canberra, which—in the interest of good relations with its populous northern neighbor—had informally signaled to Jakarta that it would acquiesce in Indonesian absorption of the former Portuguese territory.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A: Production Case Files, Box 10, Folder 12: Malaysia: Security Situation. Secret.↩
- Reference is to the coup in East Timor in August 1975 and the December military intervention by Indonesia. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976.↩
- Dunn wrote a report alleging that Indonesia had killed thousands of civilians in East Timor. (“Indonesia Charged With Atrocities,” New York Times, March 13, 1977, p. 10)↩