Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

186. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 3, 1980, 4–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sitthi Savetsila of Thailand

PARTICIPANTS

• • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
  • Ambassador Morton Abramowitz
  • Mr. Donald Gregg, NSC Staff Member
  • Mr. Roger Sullivan, NSC Staff Member
• • Foreign Minister Sitthi Savetsila
  • Saktiep, Private Secretary
  • Nikorn, Chargé of Embassy of Thailand

Dr. Brzezinski and Sitthi were meeting for the first time. They exchanged greetings and noted that they had both studied in Cambridge. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski then moved to sketch the challenge which the US faces today. He stated that we face a strategic challenge of long-term duration. He noted that in the late 1940s and early 1950s the Soviet Union had pushed west and was stopped. A certain amount of detente then resulted in Europe. Subsequently the Soviets pushed east and wars in Korea and Viet Nam resulted, either directly or indirectly. Now the Soviets are pushing south in a two-pronged effort;

—In Afghanistan the Soviets are changing that state from a buffer to a wedge aimed at Iran and Pakistan

—In Cambodia the Soviets are using the Vietnamese as surrogates to try to secure a strategic foothold in Indochina. (C)

This two-pronged push will last well into the 80s, and has broader consequences. Dr. Brzezinski noted that if the drive to the Persian Gulf succeeds, great and immediate danger will result. He noted that there is a direct but related threat in SE Asia. To counter this, we must work closely with Thailand, ASEAN, Japan and the PRC. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the challenge of today is similar to that we faced in the late 1940s and early 1950s. How we respond will influence the next decade or two, just as did our responses in Berlin and Western Europe. (C)

Foreign Minister Sitthi stated that he felt very much the same about the two-pronged global strategy of the Soviets. He added that the PRC also hold to the same theory. Sitthi stated that during his recent visit to Bangkok, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach had taken a very hard line on Cambodia, saying that the situation was “irreversible.” Dr. Brzezinski noted that if it is “irreversible” the Vietnamese should pay a costly and protracted penalty for their attempt to occupy Cambodia. Sitthi said that he doubted that Viet Nam will invade Thailand directly, but said that if the Thais did not stand firm, Viet Nam would demand more concessions and would try to split ASEAN. He said that now ASEAN has a relatively united stand regarding Cambodia. (C)

Turning to Thailand’s relations with the PRC, Sitthi admitted that the former Thai Government had allowed the PRC to pass arms through Thailand to the Pol Pot forces. They had done this in an effort to help the PRC to prevent the Vietnamese from achieving a full domination of Cambodia. Sitthi stated that the Prem Government has stopped the PRC from passing weapons for the time being. Sitthi stated that Thailand needs to wait, “to be sincere,” and to try to push for a political solution in Cambodia. He commented that the fighting in Cambodia would go on, as Pol Pot launched limited attacks using weapons already passed to him. Sitthi believes that Soviet support to Viet Nam may be limited and that if the Vietnamese become weakened by prolonged fighting in Cambodia some political compromise may be possible. (C)

Sitthi then referred to the recent visit of Huang Hua to Thailand. Sitthi said he urged Huang Hua to have Pol Pot demonstrate in the next month or two that he still has the strength to attack Vietnamese forces. Huang Hua said he feels that Pol Pot would soon run out of ammunition, and asked the Thais once again to allow PRC arms shipments to be sent to Pol Pot through Thailand. Sitthi said that he replied that the shipments had been stopped but perhaps only temporarily. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski commented that if he were Huang Hua he would do just what Huang Hua had done, and that if he were a Thai leader he would allow the PRC to supply Pol Pot in secret while not admitting it publicly. Sitthi reacted to this comment with animation and said that Huang Hua would be coming to Bangkok again in July. Dr. Brzezinski said that it would be sad if the PRC were to feel that either the US or Thailand was intimidated by the Soviets. Sitthi agreed but said we must work for a political solution in Cambodia. Dr. Brzezinski assented, but added that while Pol Pot cannot be part of the political solution he can be an instrument to bring it about. Sitthi commented that some in ASEAN are worried that the Thais are getting too close to the PRC. He stated that he would tell Ambassador Abramowitz “if we do something.” (This appeared to be a reference to allowing resumption of PRC arms shipments to Pol Pot.) (C)

Sitthi described Thailand, Singapore and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines, as taking a tough line toward Viet Nam. He described Malaysia as rather weak and said that Indonesia was basically afraid of the PRC. Dr. Brzezinski asked for a fuller description of the Indonesian attitude. Sitthi responded that Suharto feels that Viet Nam is no threat to Indonesia, and that ASEAN should do all it can to try to get Viet Nam out of the Soviet orbit. Suharto feels that Viet Nam should act as a buffer against what he perceives to be a major threat from the PRC. Sitthi said that he had described Suharto’s attitude to Huang Hua and that the Chinese had stated that Indonesia has nothing to fear from his country. (C)

The talk turned to Sihanouk. Sitthi stated that following Sihanouk’s June visit to Singapore, the Thais will allow him to enter Thailand and to visit refugee camps at the Thai border. It was agreed that this would inject a new note of political leadership into the Cambodia scene. Dr. Brzezinski said that the PRC must also think in political terms regarding Cambodia. Sitthi agreed and stated that Huang Hua had promised to meet Sihanouk in Beijing. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked about Burma’s attitude. Sitthi responded that it has become more favorable, as Ne Win does not want Thailand to be destabilized. (C)

The meeting broke up at that point, with Sitthi expressing his great pleasure at the fact that he and Dr. Brzezinski held such similar views of the Soviet global challenge, and the more particular problems presented by Viet Nam’s occupation of Cambodia. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons, Brzezinski, 1–6/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office. An NSC correspondence profile indicates that Brzezinski “noted” the memorandum on August 25. (Ibid.)