182. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
9397. For EA Holbrooke, Cleveland and Ambassador Abramowitz. Subj: Kriangsak’s Resignation and Next Thai Government: Initial Analysis. Ref: Bangkok 9310.2
1. (S–Entire text–Wnintel/Noforn/Nocontract/Orcon)
2. Summary: Prime Minister Kriangsak’s resignation without Parliamentary fight caught everyone by surprise. It appears to have been precipitated by General Prem’s withdrawal of his support within last 24 hours. Kriangsak continues as caretaker PM under Constitution pending King’s nomination of successor. There are no indications that either military or student/labor groups will attempt to interfere with Constitutional procedures. National Legislative Assembly (NLA) meets March 3 and NLA President Harin is expected to forward nomination to King based on Assembly consensus which will almost certainly endorse General Prem if he expresses assent to taking the job. It is, however, possible that Prem could yet hold back in favor of neutral or civilian personality. Accession of Khukrit3 or return of Kriangsak is technically possible, but considered highly improbable. Given initial [Page 637] background of Kriangsak’s demise, whatever new Cabinet comes in will probably focus first on oil price rises and other economic issues; chances seem high for initial price rollback as show of response to popular demand. Most likely items on any new agenda for foreign policy are China, SRV and refugee issues which have been closely associated with Kriangsak personally. If Prem’s most obvious advisors play strong role, a right-wing, populist approach is probable on domestic affairs. In foreign policy, there is likely to be a more neutral stance toward both China and SRV and a tougher policy on Indochinese refugees. A generally close relationship with the US should continue, but chances are there will be problems on refugee matters, perhaps also on foreign investment. It is too early to speculate confidently since much depends on the intentions of the enigmatic General Prem, new personalities that may be installed in Ministries and the pace the new Cabinet sets for itself. The PM’s resignation came against the background of steadily eroding support for Kriangsak prompted in the first instance by popular discontent over recent energy price hikes and over the past few months by a growing feeling that his leadership talents weren’t up to the job and the country was drifting aimlessly while economic conditions deteriorated. Pot-shots at his liberal refugee policy didn’t help, but were not significant in bringing him down. Foreign policy wasn’t a factor. In resigning, the PM probably consciously decided to go down as a statesman rather than face the prospect of Parliamentary defeat or even a narrow victory which would have made his next two or three months hell with subsequent defeat inevitable.
Bangkok has remained calm in the wake of the resignation and is expected to continue so. No great social or ideological issues are at stake and the affair seems to be shaping up along more traditional Thai lines of elites changing hats.
End summary.
3. Kriangsak’s demise.
Kriangsak has been under growing political pressure for weeks and opposition, both civilian and military, exploited his economically sound but unpopular decision to raise oil prices. Despite pressures, Kriangsak was expected to hold military support for next few weeks. There are several theories in Bangkok about resignation decision, but we find most credible explanation [less than 1 line not declassified] that Army Commander and Minister of Defense, General Prem Tinsulanon advised Kriangsak on February 28 to resign in order to prevent civilian disturbances. Prem’s motives are almost impossible to read, but probably include concern for country’s unity, unwillingness to confront right-wing military activists supporting demonstrations against Kriangsak and decision—reluctant or calculated—that he himself should shape country’s fate. In any case, Prem has for months controlled military [Page 638] forces and enjoyed popular adulation, and, therefore, has been the one man who could singlehandedly determine the outcome of any point of his choosing.
4. Next steps.
Following Kriangsak’s resignation, NLA President Harin scheduled next Assembly session for 9 am March 3 to discuss successor, stating that Kriangsak would remain as caretaker PM in accordance with Constitution until he is replaced. No vote is technically required to name successor and King issues order which must be countersigned by Assembly President. If nominee does not have Assembly support however, he can be removed within days by no-confidence vote, so Harin is expected to seek consensus as basis for his nomination. (Septel being sent on details of constitutional procedures.)
5. Constitutionally, the field is open to anyone, including Kriangsak. Opposition parties have already called for Prem and he is obvious choice of vast majority of Thai military. Only question, therefore, is whether he himself wants the job or would opt to support another candidate. It is conceivable that Prem, who has long held back from a strong political role, could yet decide to install a civilian or elder statesman to promote civilian government and retain his military focus, or simply to leave the choice to others. He has not yet made public statement, but most are betting he will be next PM.
6. The only strong politician in contention is former PM Khukrit, but most observers believe he remains unacceptable to the military and the Palace. In any case, other parties have voiced strong preference for Prem and would follow his lead, leaving Khukrit with only relatively small numbers in Parliament. Some have also suggested that Kriangsak resigned as a ploy with hopes of being reappointed when Parliament recognizes inadequacies of alternatives, but we find this implausible in light of his unpopularity and political disabilities. Furthermore, Kriangsak’s resignation speech had the content and emotional twist of a man who is stepping down after having done his best.
7. Prospective policy changes.
It is too early to speculate confidently on the next government since so much depends upon the intentions of the enigmatic General Prem. He may choose to force the pace of events or, even if named Prime Minister, to take a cautious attitude toward major policy shifts. While much is known about several of his close military advisors who are generally right-wing, it is far from clear how heavily he would rely on them or to what other groups he might turn. Nonetheless, there are several likely directions in which the next Cabinet will point: First, given immediate background of Kriangsak’s demise, whatever new Cabinet comes in will probably focus first on the oil price rises and economic issues that underlay the widespread popular disapproval [Page 639] of Kriangsak. Chances seem high, therefore, that there will be initial rollbacks in oil production prices to demonstrate responsiveness to popular demand. In the coming months this could exacerbate Thailand’s economic problems. In the field of foreign policy, there will probably be early reviews of attitudes toward China, Vietnam and refugees, policies which have been very closely associated with Kriangsak personally.
8. If Prem’s most obvious military advisors play a strong role in the new government’s policy formulation, a right-wing popularism is probable on domestic affairs. In foreign policy, we would anticipate efforts to move away from the present special relationship with China, and a tougher policy on Indochina refugees, both reflections of a rightist, nationalistic bent. Whether they would be accompanied by a more neutral policy toward Vietnam is as yet too early to know. Prem, other than staunchly supporting the monarchy and standing for military professionalism, has not elaborated many political or economic thoughts. [less than 1 line not declassified] reports indicate, General Han Leelanan, General Rawi Wanphen, and General Sutsai Hatsadin, all associated with the rightist Internal Security Operations Command, have asserted influence on Prem in recent weeks. Prem, however, reportedly also has cordial relations with the Royalist leader of the Thai Citizen Party and with several in the Democrat Party, which is closer to the center.
9. Implications for US.
There is likely to be considerable continuity in the generally close relationship between Thailand and the US. Prem, who had a year in 1953 at the US Army Armored School, has been friendly and cooperative toward the US, but has taken care to avoid an overtly pro-American label. Assuming, as noted above, his circle asserts a nationalist influence, we would anticipate some bilateral problems over refugee issues and possibly foreign investment insofar as effort may be made to promote stronger Thai control of local industry. A more neutral stance could have implications for US efforts to preserve ASEAN unity against the Vietnamese and for possible US use of facilities here in support of Southwest Asian contingencies.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800104–1021. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Beijing, the White House, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC.↩
- Telegram 9310 from Bangkok, February 29, also discussed Kriangsak’s resignation and the constitutional processes that began as a result of the resignation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800104–0377)↩
- Khukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand from March 1975 to April 1976.↩