Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

148. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, December 30, 1980, 0924Z

61499. Subj: Motivations of Vietnamese Boat Refugees. Ref: Bangkok 60186.²

The following message on Vietnamese refugees is from AmConsul Songkhla. Also transmitted is a comment and different perspective on the problem from the Embassy’s refugee section. Both are introduced by an Embassy comment.

A. Embassy Introduction

There are no sure answers to the question of what motivates the Vietnamese to flee their homeland for resettlement abroad. In most cases a complex set of factors are involved—some on the “push” side and others on the “pull” side. Views differ on the relative weight that should be attached to these two sides of the refugee equation. The Songkhla analysis presented below gives greater weight to the “pull” side. Though some will disagree with this finding, the report represents an effort to analyze the present refugee flow based on interviews at the Songkhla camp. In recounting the dreadful risks associated with the flight by boat, the report hints at the root cause of the problem—conditions and policies within Vietnam which produce sufficient unhappiness and desperation to lead large numbers of people to risk robbery, rape and death in a search for a new beginning. Also attached is a comment on the whole problem as the refugee section sees it over time. Whatever the various motivations of the boat refugees and our analysis of the composition of the flow, the central issue is that U.S. and third country resettlement programs remain the only way of preserving temporary asylum.

B. Text of Songkhla Message

1. Vietnamese refugee arrivals in southern Thailand over the past three months have been at approximately the same levels as a year ago with no indication of a slackening. Conversations with recently arrived refugees at the Songkhla camp confirm that many more Vietnamese are preparing to leave by boat for a new life in the West at their first opportunity. To make that journey, Vietnamese must undergo the hazardous boat crossing via the Gulf of Thailand to Songkhla or any other destination. Such a voyage means almost certain robbery, rape or worse at the hands of the hundreds of fishermen-pirates who prey upon Vietnamese refugees. Nature’s own risks compound the danger, as many boats and lives are lost to the sea itself. Despite these known risks, the flow of refugees seems destined to continue at its current level. Indeed, those closely associated with the refugee problem have told me they anticipate the refugee flow continuing at high levels for several years into the future. Given the importance of the Indochinese refugee program to U.S. foreign policy, it is essential to understand why this outpouring of Vietnamese boat refugees continues. To probe refugee motivation, I have spoken extensively with Vietnamese boat refugees, American and foreign government officials working with the refugees, members of private voluntary agencies closely associated with refugee assistance and resettlement, and with representatives of international organizations. The result of this examination is a snapshot view of the current Vietnamese boat arrivals in southern Thailand. As such it should not be used as a basis for extrapolation to other groups and/or time periods.

2. The motivations of those leaving Vietnam and coming to southern Thailand can be as varied and complex as the individuals themselves, making categorizations difficult. Perhaps this was not so in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam war, when fears of the new rulers of the south provided a clear impetus to the mass exodus of those associated with the old regime or its American allies. While the chaos in South Vietnam has not subsided entirely, it does seem to have reached a level where we can now look somewhat more discerningly at the question of motivation. In so doing, one finds the spectrum of motivation ranges from those who are truly fleeing from obvious and intense political persecution at the hands of the new Vietnamese Government to those who simply want to leave for what they perceive as a more prosperous life in the United States. Between these two extremes there remain many refugees whose motives are mixed and less readily identifiable. With the above caveats in mind, certain general conclusions can be drawn about the relative strengths of specific considerations which lead Vietnamese to become boat refugees.

3. At one end of the spectrum, there are what can only be described as political refugees. Those among recent arrivals affiliated with the former government’s now discredited civil or military bureaucracy indeed have no future in their native country. They have been systematically deprived of their political, economic and social rights with little chance that these lost human rights can be recouped. Many of those in this category who reach Songkhla have only recently been released from “reeducation camps” or escaped from “new economic zones”.³ Others are family members of those who cannot leave such places or have died in them, and who have been so tarred by that family association that they have no future in their own homeland. For these people there is little alternative but to escape Vietnam and seek a new life. In years past, these people may well have represented a majority of those coming out. Today, however, they are a definite minority of those arriving in Songkhla camp—at most twenty percent.

4. At another end of the spectrum are those refugees who are most accurately described as economic emigrants, leaving Vietnam for the same reasons that have impelled immigrants towards America for generations. Economic conditions in Vietnam are, by all accounts from refugees, harsh and deteriorating rather than stabilizing. Under such circumstances it should not be surprising that at least one-half of all newly arrived refugees in Songkhla give as their primary motive for leaving Vietnam the desire to seek a better economic life for themselves and their children in the United States. When initially questioned, most of these refugees state that they left Vietnam because they hate “Communism” and want to live in “freedom”. Closer questioning, however, as to what anti-Communism and freedom mean for these refugees reveals that they are actually talking about economic betterment. They reveal no indication of having been singled out for discriminatory treatment in any manner. People in this category were invariably employed in Vietnam, usually as unskilled or semi-skilled labor, and were making a living with adequate food and consumer goods available. They complain, however, about high prices and the need to deal frequently on the black market where such goods are expensive. Their clear motivation is to reach the United States, have better jobs, make more money, buy more consumer goods, and live better than in Vietnam. Were these people less certain of resettlement in the U.S., or if their economic prospects in Vietnam were significantly better, they would have remained at home rather than risk the crossing to Songkhla.

5. For those remaining thirty percent or so refugees, motivations are somewhat more complex and difficult to sort out exactly. For example, ethnic background complicates the question. For the ethnic Chinese who make up about ten percent of current Songkhla arrivals, one might plausibly argue that they are victims of officially sanctioned economic discrimination, and that by expressing a desire for economic betterment they are in fact fleeing an associated political injustice. Tempering this view, however, is the fact that the Chinese themselves, invariably express their own motives in economic terms unless they were part of the very few Chinese associated with the old regime. Another complicating factor in determining motivation is age. At least half of all draft age young men fleeing Vietnam appear to be doing so, at least in large part, to avoid military conscription and an unpopular war in Cambodia. Another motivation is certainly family reunification. Nearly all of the refugees claim to have relatives of varying degrees of closeness in the United States. In many cases fleeing Vietnam is a matter of spouses or children seeking to reunite with those who have gone before to the United States. Certainly the family motivation is strong in such cases, tempering the underlying economic motivation which these refugees also express. Obviously there are numerous other factors which dilute or modify what might otherwise be classified solely as economic motivation.

6. For those fleeing clear political persecution, that which they flee is in itself probably sufficient cause to take nearly any risk to escape. But what about the others? Can economic motivation in itself provide a strong enough impetus to risk apprehension by Vietnamese security forces, piracy, rape and drowning at sea to seek a better life in the West? Perhaps by itself, such an economic motivation does not. To the economic impetus, however, one must add certain factors and perceptions of the would-be refugees. The most important of these is the almost certain knowledge that they will be resettled in the United States. They know the size of our yearly refugee admissions quota as well as details of the category system to determine eligibility. Moreover, they know how to work the system to their best advantage. If by some stroke of bad fortune they are unable to get to the U.S., they know that some other Western country will take them instead. Closely related to this first perception is confidence that they will make it safely to Thailand as their first stop. They recognize that they will probably be robbed or raped, but such misfortune is simply calculated—as is the boat passage fee—as part of the costs of getting to the United States. And, once in Thailand, their stay in Songkhla will be brief due to rapid and efficient processing by U.S. agencies. The normal stay in Songkhla camp is now approximately two months, a fact well-known to would-be refugees.

7. Nearly every refugee reaching Songkhla at this time has a relative already in the United States. Approximately half of those relatives are newly arrived refugees themselves, having arrived in the U.S. within the past three months to one year. Clearly what is happening is a phenomenon whereby one family member will escape from Vietnam and seek admission to the United States, not even asking for resettlement elsewhere for fear of being accepted. Once resettled in the U.S., the first member notifies his relatives still in Vietnam that they can then make their escape. Following family members can then leave confident that they will fall into a high enough category to be eligible for quick resettlement in the United States. In short, when the potential refugee is contemplating leaving Vietnam, he knows that he will be pirated, that his women will be raped, and that there is some chance he will lose his life at sea. Yet balancing this knowledge is the belief that at the end of his voyage there is almost guaranteed resettlement in the United States. These perceptions provide a powerful impetus for any dissatisfied Vietnamese to leave their native country, whatever their other motives. The vortex effect is obvious. Family members leave Vietnam, reach the U.S., send money and good news, thereby encouraging more family members to leave. They, in turn, are related to still other potential immigrants, their numbers increasing geometrically much like recipients of a chain letter. Gibson.⁴

C. Refugee Section Comment:

1. Boat refugees are leaving Vietnam for a variety of reasons. We continue to see a significant proportion of political refugees, some fresh out of prison or re-education. Others, including members of the middle-class, former civil and military personnel, students and the Chinese flee because they see an utterly hopeless future. Such individuals constitute 3/4 of the U.S./boat refugee caseload in Thailand. Some might term such refugees “economic” but to the extent that they are from segments of society being systematically and intentionally defined out of the new Communist system, they are victims of the political policies of the SRV.

—There is a smaller proportion of people of more ordinary background who may have had the opportunity for some marginal niche in the Communist economic system, and who may more closely fit the “economic” label, but even these people are desperate enough to risk the boat trip.

2. Enough is generally known about the extraordinary dangers and terrors of being a boat refugee so that we will not dwell on it. The prospect of rape for women refugees is omnipresent and the sailing conditions of some boats are simply incredible.

3. The statistics cited in AmConsul Songkhla message apparently relate to observations about the overall boat refugee population. More precise statistics are available for that portion of refugees accepted by the U.S. program and shed a bit more light on the flow which is not predominantly lower class, and includes a large percentage who do not have U.S. relatives:

—Former professionals, middle class, students and government officials—75 percent (about a third of whom are Chinese)

—Those with close relatives in U.S. (through siblings)—about 20 percent

—Those with distant relatives in U.S.—about 40 percent

—Former farmers, fishermen, laborers—about 20 percent.

4. Without doubt the U.S. and third country resettlement programs do have a magnetic effect. Yet dissatisfaction and hopelessness are so pervasive in Vietnam that many refugees would continue to flee even if it meant an indefinite stay in refugee camps. This would not be a totally unacceptable outcome, but the problem is that without resettlement offtake the temporary asylum countries would soon close their doors.

Our belief (shared by most of those who screen and interview the refugees) that many refugees would opt to leave Vietnam even for an indefinite stay in the refugee camps, sharply distinguishes the boat refugee flow from a migrant stream. In other words, even in the absence of “pull factors,” “push factors” would continue to drive many Vietnamese on to refugee boats.

Abramowitz

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800614–0612. Limited Official Use. Sent for information to Hong Kong, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore, Chiang Mai, Songkhla, and Udorn.
2. Telegram 60186 from Bangkok, December 18, reported on the encounter of the USS Robison with Vietnamese boat refugees. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800602–0657)
3. See footnote 3, Document 46.
4. Richard M. Gibson, Consul at Songkhla.