142. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
The Indochina Refugee Situation: An Update [portion marking not declassified]
Overview
Vietnam has shown it can regulate the refugee flow essentially according to its own dictates. The exodus of boat refugees from Vietnam decreased dramatically following strict governmental measures taken to moderate the outflow after the Geneva refugee meetings in July. [portion marking not declassified]
Hanoi does not seem to be preparing to resume the exodus. On the other hand, there is no evidence that Hanoi has abandoned its basic decision to rid itself of unwanted citizens, especially Chinese, and the [Page 488] flow of assisted departures could resume at any time. [portion marking not declassified]
Vietnam’s dry-season campaign and widespread food shortages in Kampuchea have caused another mammoth refugee influx into Thailand, the worst effects of which are probably yet to come. As many as a half million potential refugees may already be in western Kampuchean provinces, within reach of the Thai border. [portion marking not declassified]
The strong possibility that anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea will become a protracted guerrilla war means that the Kampuchean refugee problem—for Thailand in particular—will also be a long-term one. [portion marking not declassified]
The number of refugees from Laos has decreased considerably since Thailand and Laos agreed in August to cooperate in preventing border crossings. Reported Chinese plans to put pressure on Vietnam by supporting resistance in Laos, however, along with other factors, could result in future in another large refugee exodus. [portion marking not declassified]
Thailand has said it will grant temporary sanctuary to all persons fleeing to its territory. Bangkok might reverse this policy, however, if it decided permanent resettlement to other countries was too slow or international funding of holding centers was inadequate, or if domestic pressures became too strong. [portion marking not declassified]
The attitudes of other ASEAN countries toward first asylum will depend on the rate of new arrivals vis-a-vis departures to countries of permanent resettlement. A resumption of the large-scale refugee exodus from Vietnam might result in increased attempts to prevent refugees from landing, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia. [portion marking not declassified]
The flow of boat refugees from Vietnam to Hong Kong has decreased. Hong Kong and China are cooperating in preventing the entry into Hong Kong of persons posing as refugees from Vietnam. [portion marking not declassified]
Present Vietnamese Policies: Boat Refugee
1. The mammoth outflow of boat refugees2 from Vietnam in the period January–June 1979, which totaled almost 60,000 during May, [Page 489] has slowed dramatically. The refugee total was less than 9,000 in both August and September, clearly demonstrating that Hanoi can reduce the flow as and when it sees fit. (Table 1 contains monthly statistics on Indochinese refugee arrivals in 1979.) Since mid-June, the government has implemented effective measures to diminish the exodus, particularly of Chinese, by turning off its “refugee machine” and by publicizing the harsh punishment meted out to offenders, including the death penalty for organizers and the shooting of escapees on sight. Increased land and sea patrols, and restrictions on boat building, also help prevent departures. Adverse weather may have been a factor at first but is so no longer. Several reports even indicate the government is refunding exit permit fees previously paid by Chinese. Refugees report increasing difficulty in bribing officials to facilitate departure. Recent escapees typically have been ethnic Vietnamese in small groups of friends and relatives using small boats, avoiding contact with the authorities, and departing clandestinely from southern locations. [portion marking not declassified]
Table 1
Indochinese Refugee Arrivals in Countries of Temporary Asylum in Southeast Asia, January–September 19793
| Month | By Land | By Boat | Total |
| January | 7,200 | 10,500 | 17,700 |
| February | 3,332 | 8,632 | 11,964 |
| March | 5,668 | 17,189 | 22,857 |
| April | 5,636 | 24,886 | 30,522 |
| May | 4,976 | 59,412 | 64,388 |
| June | 14,936 | 45,451 | 60,387 |
| July | 9,571 | 24,315 | 33,886 |
| August | 3,188 | 8,792 | 11,980 |
| September | 4,569 | 8,988 | 13,557 |
| Total | 59,076 | 208,165 | 267,241 |
[1 line not declassified]
2. Vietnam does not, however, appear to have changed its basic policy of intending to expel most of its Chinese, and there are reports [Page 490] of continued registration of Chinese for departure and of assertions by Vietnamese officials that the moratorium is temporary. Hanoi fears the Chinese represent a Fifth Column in the conflict with China and, furthermore, comprise an economic class that does not fit in with socialization plans. Desire to emigrate by ethnic Vietnamese unhappy with the government’s policies, especially deteriorating economic conditions, is expected to remain high for years to come. At present, the weight of international opprobrium, spearheaded by complaints from the ASEAN countries, keeps Vietnam from once again opening up the floodgates. Its future actions, however, will depend upon its own perceived interests, especially in the field of internal security, and will not necessarily be responsive to external pressure. [portion marking not declassified]
3. Vietnam is loudly publicizing, for propaganda purposes, a legal emigration program of orderly departures run in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The numbers involved so far are small—about 100 people a week fly out of Ho Chi Minh City on charter flights—and Hanoi has dragged its feet on implementation. There is no evidence that Hanoi has established new refugee processing centers, although the government could use the large number of existing military camps as holding centers if necessary. At the moment, most of the paperwork needed to acquire an exit permit is completed well before the departure date, the immediate predeparture steps take little time, and those permitted to leave apparently stay in their homes until shortly before departure. Some would-be refugees may be trying to leave under the orderly departure program rather than risk a hazardous and clandestine boat voyage. [portion marking not declassified]
4. [11 lines not declassified]
Thailand’s Refugee Problem: Disaster in Kampuchea, Less Urgency in Laos
Kampuchea
5. Vietnam’s dry-season campaign, coupled with widespread and severe food shortages, has created yet another potentially disastrous refugee situation in Thailand. Actual numbers are confused, but possibly as many as 200,000 refugees in various stages of malnutrition and ill health have fled to Thailand in recent weeks. Perhaps 200,000 others in various locations just across the border in Kampuchea may soon flee to Thailand; upwards of 100,000, for instance, are reportedly gathered inside Kampuchea across from Aranyaprathet. We estimate that several hundred thousand more Kampucheans in the western and southwestern regions contiguous to Thailand may be facing famine and military pressure and thus also represent a pool of potential refugees. In sum, up to 10 percent of Kampuchea’s current population, estimated at 5.7 million, could seek refuge in Thailand. [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 491]6. The refugees fall into the three groups: Pol Pot forces and their supporters; Khmer Liberation Movement and other non-Communist resistance groups plus supporters; and Kampuchean civilians with no ties to either group. Large numbers of Kampucheans also cross back and forth into Thailand to barter for food in a flourishing Thai trade or to obtain relief supplies. Volunteer agencies based in Thailand have access to these enclaves. Refugees report severe food shortages in western Kampuchea; they say it is no longer possible to find edible vegetation along the border area and that many will be unable to survive without relief assistance. [portion marking not declassified]
7. Current Vietnamese/Heng Samrin policy is apparently designed to deny food and medical supplies to Kampucheans who live in contested areas—except civilians under their direct control—not only in areas close to the Thai border but also in the central and northeast regions. Vietnamese troops have reportedly seized food and medicines from Kampuchean civilians. Vietnamese military strategy seems aimed in part at driving Pol Pot guerrillas and their supporters over the border into Thailand. Over the long haul, these guerrillas may be able to form the nucleus for an anti-Vietnamese protracted struggle, which means that the problem of refugees from Kampuchea will also be a long-term one. [portion marking not declassified]
Laos
8. The influx of refugees from Laos has decreased from approximately 6,000 to 3,000 per month since Thailand and Laos agreed in August to cooperate in preventing border crossings. Vientiane’s recent decision to suspend forced agricultural collectivization may also have contributed to this diminished flow. The Laotian Government reports that several thousands of refugees have returned from Thailand—a figure that is probably exaggerated—and has given reassurances that returnees will not be treated harshly. [portion marking not declassified]
9. The basic causes of the refugee exodus have not been removed. The government may resume forced agricultural collectivization following the 1979 rice harvest. Furthermore, Vientiane reports a projected 1979 shortfall of between 70,000 and 80,000 tons of foodgrains. These economic factors, possibly combined with departures caused by political frustration, could once again increase the rate of departures. In the future China’s apparent plans to put pressure on Vietnam by supplying resistance groups in Laos could step up fighting there and result in an increased refugee flow. [portion marking not declassified]
Reactions and Policies of ASEAN States
Thailand
10. Earlier in 1979 Thailand took a hard line against Kampuchean refugees, at one time forcibly repatriating 48,000 to an uncertain fate. [Page 492] On 19 October, Prime Minister Kriangsak announced a major policy change, stating that, for humanitarian reasons, and in view of the high level of international assistance, Thailand would henceforth accept for temporary asylum all Kampuchean refugees and would abandon forced repatriation. [portion marking not declassified]
11. Bangkok intends to transfer newly arrived Khmer refugees away from the immediate border area to temporary holding centers to be constructed in Prachin Buri, Chanthaburi, and Surin Provinces with UNHCR support. Some of these holding centers have already started operating, but so far they are little more than open fields surrounded by barbed wire where conditions are bad. Thousands of refugees reportedly fled back into Kampuchea to avoid being sent to these rear camps. After a few weeks in these centers, the refugees will be transferred to a “national refugee center” to be created by expanding a small existing camp in Trat Province at the southern end of the border into a facility capable of accommodating up to 300,000 persons. However, priority is being given to the temporary holding centers and it may be some months before the “national center” is operational. Thailand also wants to set up a relief task force, composed of government and international volunteer relief agencies, to bring order to emergency relief efforts at present hampered by lack of central coordination. Thailand has recognized the need for additional medical assistance, and promised to permit more foreign medical personnel to operate in refugee camps. It has also called for a United Nations factfinding mission to monitor the Thai-Kampuchean border. [portion marking not declassified]
12. Thailand continues to cooperate with international organizations in sending food and medicines to refugees inside Thailand and across the border into Kampuchea. It also permits the use of Bangkok as a stopover for Red Cross and UNICEF supply planes en route to Phnom Penh. Bangkok has stipulated that it will retain full control over all relief efforts in the border area and insists that some aid must go to Thai villagers displaced by the refugee influx. [portion marking not declassified]
13. Bangkok continues to discourage refugees from Laos from entering and to try to repatriate those who evade checkpoints. Thai leaders have stated, however, that they will not forcibly repatriate Lao refugees, although in June provincial officials reportedly sent back several hundred persons. At the Geneva meetings, China offered to accept up to 10,000 refugees already in Thailand or other ASEAN countries and in September agreed to resettle 10,000 Lao and Hmong refugees from Thai camps. [portion marking not declassified]
14. The new Thai policy entails considerable political risk for Kriangsak, although it may also accrue international praise to him for [Page 493] Thailand’s humanitarianism. Thai authorities view the large number of Indochina refugees as a potential security problem and an economic burden that threatens the government’s stability. The Thais in particular are concerned that the influx of refugees, including Pol Pot’s supporters, could provoke incursions by and conflict with Vietnamese troops; indeed, several small-scale incidents have already occurred in the border area. The Vietnamese have stated forcefully and publicly that, despite public Thai denials, they have evidence of Thailand’s cooperation with China in the training and resupply of Kampuchean resistance forces. [portion marking not declassified]
15. Thailand’s new, more lenient refugee policy is undoubtedly contingent on the timely movement of refugees either to countries of permanent resettlement or back into Kampuchea (or Laos) when conditions permit. If this does not proceed as expected, or if the flow of international assistance to camps inside Thailand diminishes, the policy may be reversed and forced repatriation again employed. [portion marking not declassified]
Malaysia
16. The refugee presence in Malaysia could cause domestic repercussions affecting the regime’s stability, although tensions have decreased recently because of a decrease in arrivals and the increased rate of departures to countries of permanent resettlement. Malaysia has a long history of ethnic confrontation between Malays and Chinese and believes the refugee presence—including many Chinese—could result in ethnic violence. [portion marking not declassified]
17. In 1978, Malaysia granted first asylum to all boat refugees. In the first few months of 1979, however, when the sheer weight of arrivals threatened to overwhelm the country’s capacity to absorb the refugees and become a major political issue, it adopted a hard line. It set up a naval cordon off its east coast and towed new arrivals out to sea after providing fuel and food. Malaysia softened its stance somewhat following a major outflow of refugees from its camps to permanent resettlement elsewhere. Only seaworthy boats are now towed back to sea. While publicly reiterating its policy of refusing first asylum, in practice Malaysia has permitted some new arrivals to land and be processed. It has also allowed all of the “limbo” refugees—those scattered in unorganized small camps along the beach—into regular camps. [portion marking not declassified]
18. Malaysia, however, as cautious as ever in its dealings with Vietnam, appears reluctant to return to an acknowledged first-asylum policy at a time when Vietnam is critical of Malaysia and its ASEAN partners for their anti-Vietnamese stance at the nonaligned meetings in Havana and in the UN General Assembly. Malaysia reportedly feels [Page 494] that Vietnam might resume the refugee flow so as to put pressure on ASEAN to soften its collective policy toward Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime. [portion marking not declassified]
Indonesia
19. The Indonesian Government, despite strong anti-Chinese and anti-Communist attitudes, has generally been more lenient in granting first asylum to refugees. It too fears that the refugee presence may give rise to internal security problems, but the threat is less urgent because the refugee camps are scattered on islands far from major population centers. Indonesia’s stated policy is to grant first asylum to refugees who reach an Indonesian island, although there have been reports of seaworthy boats being provisioned and towed out to sea. [portion marking not declassified]
20. In May 1979, Indonesia agreed to establish a refugee processing center on Galang Island in the Riau group south of Singapore. Construction has since moved slowly, but Indonesia is transferring refugees from camps scattered on other islands, especially the Anambas group, to Galang. By mid-October, only two camps in the Anambas were still open, all other refugees having been successfully transferred to Galang. [portion marking not declassified]
The Philippines
21. The Philippines continues to grant first asylum to all refugees reaching its shores. Furthermore, the Philippine Government announced at the Geneva meetings in July that it would establish a refugee processing center for 50,000 people. [portion marking not declassified]
22. Imelda Marcos, wife of the President, is responsible for the establishment of the center in her capacity as Minister for Human Settlement and is taking a close interest in the project. The center was originally planned for construction on the island of Palawan, but this site was deemed unfeasible because of high malaria incidence and construction and logistic difficulties. The center will now be built on the Bataan Peninsula. Construction has been delayed by problems of financial accountability and funding. There is as yet no firm completion date. [portion marking not declassified]
Singapore
23. Singapore consistently takes a hard line on refugees and has never offered first asylum. It cooperates effectively, however, in the transit of refugees through its territory if it receives cast-iron guarantees of acceptance by countries of permanent resettlement. [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 495]Current Chinese Policy
24. In principle, the Beijing government continues its policy of permitting refugees from Vietnam to enter China, although relatively few appear to be doing so. Beijing claims to have accepted 250,000 refugees from Vietnam, most of whom crossed over the border by land. In July and August, the Chinese claimed that about 10,000 Vietnamese refugees per month were entering China. After Vietnam reduced the flow of refugees, however, China became silent on the number of new refugees and the latest Chinese refugee figure remains at around 250,000 persons. [portion marking not declassified]
25. China may have allowed some of these refugees to “escape” from their resettlement camps and make their way to Hong Kong, claiming to have come directly from Vietnam; Hong Kong authorities conclude that as many as 20 percent of the “boat” people who landed in Hong Kong this year had originally been resettled in China. In September, however, Beijing issued directives to the southern provinces to stop assisting the onward flow of refugees to Hong Kong and has already taken back some 700 persons. [portion marking not declassified]
26. China has invited the UNHCR to observe the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees and has requested UNHCR funds to help pay for refugee assistance. The Chinese have not yet presented a firm figure for this support, but it is expected to run to the tens of millions of dollars. Beijing has ignored proposals to create a holding area in China where refugees could wait for processing of their applications to countries of permanent settlement. [portion marking not declassified]
Refugee Populations in Countries of First Asylum as of 30 September 1979
27. The total refugee population in countries of first asylum almost doubled in the first six months of 1979 and reached a peak of about 370,000 persons at the end of July. During August and September, the arrival rate was dramatically reduced and more than offset by the rate of departures for permanent resettlement. The total refugee camp population decreased by 23,000 (6 percent of the peak July population), leaving 347,000 refugees still to be resettled. Malaysia and Indonesia experienced the greatest reduction, accounting for more than 70 percent of the refugees departing for resettlement. Thailand and Hong Kong together provided only a quarter of the refugees leaving for resettlement, even though their combined refugee population constituted two-thirds of the total. Singapore, the Philippines, Japan, Macao, and Korea each experienced slight increases in their refugee populations, but the total increase was less than 3,000 persons. [portion marking not declassified]
28. Thailand continues to be the country with the largest number of refugees. As of 30 September, its camps contained almost half of all [Page 496] registered refugees, and, as each day goes by, refugees from Kampuchea swell the numbers. Hong Kong’s camps held almost one-fifth of the refugee population, while Malaysian and Indonesian camps combined accounted for less than 30 percent of the total. The share of other countries amounted to only 4 percent. (See table 2.) [portion marking not declassified]
Thailand
29. Thailand’s registered refugee population of 170,300—that is, before the current influx from Kampuchea—is primarily (95 percent) made up of people arriving over land. Ninety percent of these registered land refugees have come from Laos and represent lowland Lao and highland Hmong (Meo) in roughly equal numbers. Registered Khmer refugees as of 30 September accounted for less than 10 percent of land refugees in camps, and Vietnamese only 1 percent, although the number of Vietnamese boat refugees increased by 287 persons (20 percent) during the period 31 July to 30 September. (See table 3.) [portion marking not declassified]
30. More than 5,300 land refugees left Thailand between 31 July and 30 September. Those departing were roughly half Lao and half Khmer. Thailand’s boat refugee population decreased by almost 14 percent to 7,300 during the two-month period ending on 30 September. [portion marking not declassified]
Hong Kong
31. Hong Kong’s refugee population increased from less than 5,000 to over 66,000 between 1 January and 31 July 1979. Since then, it has decreased by around 1,000 persons—a reduction smaller in both absolute and proportional terms than that experienced by other major first-asylum countries. (See table 4.) [portion marking not declassified]
Malaysia
32. Malaysia experienced the largest absolute reduction in refugee population among the major first-asylum countries during the two-month period ending on 30 September. Almost 85 percent of the decline can be attributed to departures from the camp on Bidong Island, but all camps had refugee departures except for the transit facility in Kuala Lumpur and the Kuantan camp. The net reduction amounted to 15 to 20 percent of the 31 July refugee population. (See table 5.) [portion marking not declassified]
Indonesia
33. Figures for Indonesia have not been as reliable as those reported from other countries. This has been due in part to the arrival of refugees on remote islands and also to the moving of refugees from island to [Page 497] island. We believe, however, that the refugee population during the two-month period ending 30 September decreased by between 9,000 to 12,000 persons. (See table 6.) [portion marking not declassified]
The Philippines
34. Most of the 6,700 refugees in the Philippines are concentrated in three camps: 3,000 on Tara Island, 2,100 on Palawan Island, and 543 at Subic Bay. The remaining refugees are scattered in the Manila area. [portion marking not declassified]
Table 2
| 30 Sep 795 | 31 Dec 78 | Net Change | Net Change | |||
| 31 Dec 78–30 Sep 79 | 31 Jul 79–30 Sep 79 | |||||
| Persons | Percent | Persons | Percent | |||
| Country | ||||||
| Thailand | 170,300 | 139,140 | 31,160 | 22.39 | −5,346 | −3.04 |
| Land Refugees | (163,000) | (135,532) | (27,468) | (20.27) | (−4,174) | (−2.50) |
| Boat Refugees | (7,300) | (3,608) | (3,692) | (102.33) | (−1,172) | (−13.83) |
| Hong Kong | 65,200 | 4,810 | 60,390 | 1,255.51 | −1,451 | −2.18 |
| Malaysia | 51,700 | 46,286 | 5,414 | 11.70 | −9,859 | −16.02 |
| Indonesia | 46,000 | 2,607 | 43,393 | 1,664.48 | −9,0266 | −16.406 |
| Philippines | 6,600 | 2,265 | 4,335 | 191.39 | 806 | 13.91 |
| Macao | 3,500 | NA7 | 3,500 | — | 234 | 7.16 |
| Singapore | 2,200 | 641 | 1,559 | 243.21 | 1,047 | 90.81 |
| Japan | 1,170 | 597 | 573 | 95.98 | 639 | 120.34 |
| Korea | 140 | 74 | 66 | 89.19 | 102 | 268.42 |
| Others | 520 | 7 | 513 | 7,328.57 | −408 | −43.97 |
| Totals | 347,330 | 196,427 | 150,903 | 76.82 | −23,262 | −6.28 |
[1 line not declassified]
[Page 498]Table 3
Thailand Land Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 19798 (By Camp and Ethnic Group)
| Camp | Camp Total | Percent of Land Refugees | Lao (lowland) | Lao (Hmong) | Khmer | Vietnamese | Net Change | |
| 31 Jul–30 Sep 1979 | ||||||||
| Persons | Percent | |||||||
| Ban Vinai | 38,330 | 23.69 | 4,460 | 33,870 | 0 | 0 | −126 | −0.33 |
| Ubon | 37,840 | 23.38 | 37,840 | 0 | 0 | 0 | −230 | −0.60 |
| Nong Khai | 34,080 | 21.06 | 31,100 | 2,680 | 300 | 0 | −2,610 | −7.11 |
| Ban Nam Yao | 13,420 | 8.29 | 765 | 12,655 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 0.40 |
| Sob Thuang | 10,360 | 6.40 | 100 | 10,260 | 0 | 0 | −67 | −0.64 |
| Chiang Khong | 6,750 | 4.17 | 930 | 5,820 | 0 | 0 | −196 | −2.82 |
| Aranyaprathet | 5,440 | 3.36 | 0 | 0 | 5,440 | 0 | −586 | −9.72 |
| Trat | 4,920 | 3.04 | 0 | 0 | 4,920 | 0 | −259 | −5.00 |
| Chiang Kham | 2,890 | 1.79 | 5 | 2,885 | 0 | 0 | −28 | −0.96 |
| Surin | 2,650 | 1.64 | 0 | 0 | 2,650 | 0 | −1,195 | −31.08 |
| Sikhiu | 1,730 | 1.07 | 50 | 0 | 20 | 1,660 | 497 | 40.31 |
| Fak Tha | 1,470 | 0.91 | 360 | 1,110 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.07 |
| Kamput | 950 | 0.59 | 0 | 0 | 950 | 0 | −590 | −38.31 |
| Buriram | 480 | 0.30 | 0 | 0 | 480 | 0 | −171 | −26.27 |
| Transit Facility | 510 | 0.31 | 0 | 0 | 510 | 0 | 152 | 42.46 |
| Totals | 161,820 | 100.00 | 75,610 | 69,280 | 15,270 | 1,660 | −5,354 | −3.20 |
| Percent of Land Refugees | 100 | — | 46.72 | 42.81 | 9.44 | 1.03 | — | — |
[1 line not declassified]
[Page 499]Table 4
Hong Kong Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 1979
| Camp | 30 Sep 1979 | Percent of Refugee Population | Net Change | |
| 31 Jul–30 Sep 1979 | ||||
| Persons | Percent | |||
| Kai Tak North | 14,380 | 21.88 | −22 | −0.15 |
| Tuen Mun | 13,366 | 20.33 | 13,3669 | —9 |
| Sham Shui Po | 8,582 | 13.06 | 1,482 | 20.87 |
| Jubilee | 7,378 | 11.23 | 911 | 14.09 |
| Chi Ma Wan | 6,597 | 10.04 | −1,996 | −23.23 |
| Kai Tak East | 6,231 | 9.48 | −9,772 | −61.06 |
| Government Dockyard | 3,197 | 4.86 | −1,286 | −28.69 |
| In Prisons | 2,807 | 4.27 | 1,983 | 240.66 |
| Argyle IV | 1,520 | 2.31 | −1,190 | −43.91 |
| Cape Collinson | 1,060 | 1.61 | −19 | −1.76 |
| Ma Tau Wei | 613 | 0.93 | 464 | 311.41 |
| Not Registered | — | — | −4,841 | −100.00 |
| Totals | 65,731 | 100.00 | −920 | −1.38 |
[1 line not declassified]
[Page 500]Table 5
Malaysian Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 1979
| Camp | 30 Sep 197910 | Percent of Refugee Population | Net Change | |
| 31 Jul–30 Sep 1979 | ||||
| Persons | Percent | |||
| Pulau (island) Bidong | 24,700 | 49.72 | −10,029 | −28.88 |
| Transit Facility (Kuala Lumpur) | 7,800 | 15.70 | 2,313 | 42.15 |
| Kuantan | 7,480 | 15.06 | 330 | 4.62 |
| Pulau Tengah | 6,500 | 13.08 | −1,394 | −17.66 |
| Kota Baharu | 1,970 | 3.96 | −1,350 | −40.66 |
| Sarawak | 800 | 1.61 | −1,168 | −59.35 |
| Sabah | 430 | 0.87 | −105 | −19.63 |
| Pulau Natuna Besar | — | — | — | — |
| “Limbo”11 | — | — | −476 | −100.00 |
| Totals | 49,680 | 100.00 | −11,879 | −19.30 |
[1 line not declassified]
[Page 501]Table 6
Indonesia Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 1979
| Sites | 30 Sep 1979 | Percent of Refugee Population | Net Change | |
| 31 Jul–30 Sep 1979 | ||||
| Persons | Percent | |||
| Djemadja Island (2 camps) | 27,713 | 63.89 | 927 | 3.46 |
| Bintan Island (9 camps) | 9,692 | 22.34 | −2,399 | −19.84 |
| Galang Island | 5,929 | 13.67 | 5,119 | 631.98 |
| Natuna Islands | 44 | 0.10 | −857 | −95.12 |
| Tarempa Island | — | — | −5,227 | −100.00 |
| Rambutan (Jakarta) | — | — | −211 | −100.00 |
| Not Registered | — | — | −9,00012 | −100.00 |
| Totals | 43,378 | 100.00 | −11,648 | −21.17 |
[1 line not declassified]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 46, Carter (Rosalynn): Thailand Trip: 8/79–1/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center. Carter wrote in the top right-hand corner of the cover page, “Ros[alynn] Info. J.” A note on the cover page indicates the assessment was prepared in the Office of the National Intelligence Officer for China-East Asia and the Pacific. Contributions were received from the Office of Political Analysis and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, National Foreign Assessment Center. The assessment was prepared at the request of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Strategic Research in the National Foreign Assessment Center and with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. A map of the Indochinese refugee camps is not printed.↩
- See NFAC Intelligence Assessments NI 79–10004 of July 1979, entitled Indochina Refugee Situation, and PA M 79–10292 of June 1979, entitled Vietnam’s Refugee Machine, for background on the current situation. [Footnote in the original. The “Indochina Refugee Situation” assessment is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0227, 1, Refugee Situation. The “Vietnam’s Refugee Machine” assessment is in Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00942A: Production Case Files, Box 12, Folder 7: Vietnam’s Refugee Machine.]↩
- Includes Hong Kong and Macao but not China. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Figures in this table may not agree with those in individual country tables because of disparities in the mode and date of data collection. All figures should be viewed as reasonably accurate approximations, not as results obtained from precise headcounts. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Rounded figures. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- The decrease in Indonesian camp populations during the 31 July–30 September period may reflect resolution of an uncertainty concerning the 31 July figures, which included an estimated 9,000 unregistered refugees. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Data not available. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Rounded figures. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Data for 31 July not available. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Rounded figures. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Refugees who arrived but may be pushed back out to sea. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Estimated number of refugees present on 31 July, but not registered with the UNHCR. [Footnote in the original.]↩