101. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
Strength and Prospects of Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea Forces [portion marking not declassified]
Key Judgments
We estimate that Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces currently consist of 13 “divisions” totaling from 30,000 to 35,000 troops. This is a reduction of at least 25,000 from our estimate of the DK main forces at the time of the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 but a substantial increase over our estimates of their strength in late 1979, when desertions, casualties, malaria, and malnutrition had decimated their ranks. Our evidence for all such estimates is limited. [portion marking not declassified]
Recognizing Vietnam’s military superiority, the DK forces have chosen to operate as guerrillas in units as small as 10 to 12 men, although they have shown the ability to form into larger groups when operationally necessary. Some guerrillas operate in the Kampuchean [Page 357] interior, but most DK forces are confined to areas along the Thai-Kampuchean border. [portion marking not declassified]
Because the DK upper ranks—both army and party—are dominated by a small clique intensely loyal to Pol Pot, the command and control system is highly effective. [2 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]
For their food and military supplies, the DK are almost completely dependent on a tenuous lifeline through Thailand. This channel now provides over 2,500 tons of rice and other foodstuffs each month, and during the two years since the invasion the DK have received almost 6,000 tons of small arms and munitions from China via this route. No alternate route could keep the DK adequately supplied. [portion marking not declassified]
The DK currently have sufficient small arms to conduct effective guerrilla warfare in Kampuchea, but they lack the firepower needed for set-piece battles that might challenge the Vietnamese for territorial control. [portion marking not declassified]
We estimate the manpower base from which the DK might draw replacement combat troops to be between 30,000 and 70,000 men, but because of disease and injury not all of these would be fit for combat. A continuing revulsion against Pol Pot has thwarted the DK leaders’ efforts to broaden their recruiting base within Kampuchea. [portion marking not declassified]
The DK forces are highly disciplined, well organized, amply supplied, and in relatively good physical condition. With continued external logistics support, [less than 1 line not declassified] the DK can maintain guerrilla activity in Kampuchea. They have, however, no prospects of defeating the Vietnamese militarily. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the paper.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI) Job 82T00670R: Production Case Files (1980–1981) Box 1, Folder 30: Strength and Prospects of Pol Pot. Top Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified].↩