144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
145754. Subject: Nuclear Export License XSNM–1379. Refs: (A) State 140858;2 (B) State 137164;3 (C) New Delhi 7992.4
1. During your discussions with Desai on regional nuclear problem (ref A), we believe that in view of NRC questions on XSNM–1379 (ref B), it would be appropriate for you to take up with the Prime Minister the question of Tarapur spent fuel disposition and safeguards.
2. We recognize that there is a degree of conflict between our attempting to continue our overall dialogue with the GOI on securing a satisfactory solution to the safeguards issue and this approach, which is based on the assumption that these efforts will fail. However avoiding a bitter legal dispute with the GOI and finding acceptable arrangements for disposition of the spent fuel are essential to achievement of our non-proliferation objectives. In addition, we have a mutual goal of [Page 391] securing approval of the current export license, and in view of NRC’s concern about the question of spent fuel, we believe it is appropriate to engage in such a dialogue.
3. We have two objectives in regard to spent fuel: First to secure an affirmation or acceptance that GOI will maintain safeguards on spent fuel if our supply terminates; and second, to see if the GOI would be prepared to consider a return or other mutually agreed disposition of TAPS spent fuel. It may be that in the final analysis we would be unable to buy-back the fuel for our own domestic reasons, but we need a general indication of Indian receptivity to the “take-back” concept. As you know we have not discussed this with India since 1976.
4. While we consider it desirable to resume dialogue with GOI on TAPS spent fuel disposition as soon as possible for reasons known to Embassy, we want to ensure that raising it with Desai in no way detracts from or dilutes full discussion with him of regional nuclear weapons problem. Hence you should raise spent fuel problem only after finishing full discussion of regional problem and only if you believe it would not be counterproductive.
5. You may wish to use the following talking points during your discussions with Desai on these subjects:
—I would like to discuss briefly an issue that is important to both the immediate problem of the next Tarapur license and our longer range relationship whether or not US-Indian nuclear cooperation continues. This is the issue of disposition of the spent fuel.
—As you are aware, the NRC is now considering the next shipment for Tarapur. The Executive Branch has urged it to act favorably and expeditiously on the license.
—The NRC has raised several questions regarding US-origin spent fuel. We would like to clarify with the GOI a number of questions about the spent fuel. In the event that the NRC does not act favorably on the application, these clarifications would also help facilitate congressional consideration of a Presidential authorization.
—We would like to have early discussions with appropriate Indian officials on the general problem of finding mutually agreeable solutions for disposition of the fuel, including determining India’s continued interest in pursuing a return of US-origin spent fuel, something which we discussed in 1976.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790257–0797. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay. Drafted by Rust Deming (OES/NET/NEP) and Lande; cleared in T, DOE, PM/NPP, S/AS, S/P, P, and by Miklos and Van Doren; approved by Pickering.↩
- Telegram 140858 to New Delhi, June 2, communicated ideas on how to break the impasse with India concerning nuclear matters and suggested that Goheen accept Desai’s February 14 offer of private informal discussion at his home. (See Document 127.) The telegram noted the Department’s belief that the only way the nuclear issue could be resolved would be through Indo-Pakistani nuclear restraint and that Pakistan’s stated offer to accept any restrictions on its nuclear activities that were also accepted by India should be explored even though it could be a bluff. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2610)↩
- Telegram 137164 to New Delhi, May 29, forwarded a letter from the NRC to the Department of State in connection with the NRC’s review of XSNM–1379, the then current application to ship enriched uranium to India. The NRC sought answers to a number of questions about India’s prospects for developing nuclear weapons, including: “What is the view of the Executive Branch on the implications of Pakistan’s alleged clandestine enrichment activities with respect to the U.S. Government’s review of XSNM–1379; i.e. have Pakistan’s actions affected, or are they likely to affect, India’s nuclear policies or programs in the short or long term?” The NRC also inquired into the future of U.S.-origin spent fuel stored at Tarapur. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790245–0009)↩
- Telegram 7992 from New Delhi, May 9, relayed Indian press reports of Desai’s comments at a meeting with a parliamentary consultative committee on atomic energy, space, and electronics. According to the press reports, Desai “told the committee that a Pakistani nuclear explosion would not result in a change of Indian nuclear policy as long as he was Prime Minister. He did not believe that a Pakistani bomb would pose a ‛security’ threat to India. Desai said India had rejected President Zia’s idea of a bilateral India-Pakistan safeguards agreement and the demand that India should open its nuclear facilities to international inspection.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790211–0563)↩