I am enclosing an assessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia. I
regret that it is so pessimistic. Frankly, I am as concerned as I have
been at any time during my three years here. There is one positive
factor which I purposely did not include in this paper—namely that I do
not believe the Saudis will take any action which might endanger your
reelection prospects. The entire government leadership, including
Fahd, Abdullah and Sultan are outspoken in
their support. They believe that without your reelection, there is no
hope for peace in the Mid-East.
For example, I referred in the assessment paper to my meeting with Prince
Abdullah two days ago. At
the close of the meeting, he asked my opinion as to whether Saudi Arabia
was producing too much oil. I replied that I didn’t think so for we
needed a continuation of the present surplus to stabilize the market. He
persisted by saying, “You really wouldn’t object too much if we cut
back, would you?”
I replied, “I hope you don’t but if you decide to do so, for goodness
sakes wait until after the election!” He laughed and said, “No, we’ve
got to have President Carter
reelected—it means as much to us as it does to you . . .”
Congratulations on winning the renomination—I hope the results of today’s
primaries3 cause Sen. Kennedy to withdraw—at last.
Your choice of Sec. Muskie was
superb. I am sending him separately a copy of this assessment.
Attachment
Report Prepared by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
(West)4
SAUDI ARABIA—AN ASSESSMENT AS OF JUNE 1, 1980
SUMMARY: A major crisis is coming in U.S.-Saudi relations. Indeed, it
has probably already begun, and is simply now increasing in
intensity and severity. Expressions by Saudi government and private
sector leaders indicate a growing concern and uneasiness about the
future of USG–SAG relations. Likewise, recent events
clearly show the beginning of a serious deterioration in the special
relationship. Two reasons emerge: (1) The Saudis see the
relationship with U.S. as one-sided, with the SAG’s actions on oil pricing and
production far outweighing any quid pro quo coming to Saudi Arabia,
and (2) The Saudis are increasingly convinced that Israeli interests
are paramount in USG policy
decisions in the Mideast, a conclusion which strikes at the very
heart of the bilateral relationship as viewed by the Saudis. END
SUMMARY.
SAUDI DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE “SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP”
Since my return from consultations in Washington six weeks ago, I
have noted increasing concern by normally pro-Western Saudis about
the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. I have travelled
extensively throughout the country and have talked to a wide
spectrum of people, including numerous members of the royal family
both within and without the government, ministers, deputy ministers,
provincial governors, and Saudi business leaders, most of whom are
Western educated and generally pro-Western in their sentiments. In
addition, I have
[Page 695]
talked
with U.S. business leaders with long experience and many contacts
here in the Kingdom. The conclusion is unanimous and inescapable:
our bilateral relationship is deteriorating badly.
Recent public statements and declarations by Saudi leaders have had a
common theme—dissatisfaction with U.S. policies in the Mideast and
disillusionment with the special relationship. There was official
condemnation of the use of force to attempt to rescue our
hostages.5 Foreign Minister Prince Saud’s speech at
Islamabad which criticized almost equally both the U.S. and the
USSR, Minister of Industry and
Electricity Qusaybi’s address to The Arab-American Society, and Fuad
al Farsi’s articles in the local press all have a similar ominous
note. These three SAG officials,
all products of America’s best colleges and universities, are
sending us a signal loud and clear that all is not well. Perhaps
most significant of all is Crown Prince Fahd’s recent interview in a
Kuwait paper which quoted him as saying that the SAG would not rule out use of the oil
weapon. It is the first such public statement by the Crown Prince. A
careful reading of the statement indicates that it was probably
reluctantly made; however, its significance cannot be
over-estimated.
From all of our public and private sources, there has been a nearly
unanimous opinion that U.S.-Saudi relations have clearly worsened in
recent times and are fast approaching a critical stage. There is
general agreement that U.S. policies of the past several months have
taken away much of the Saudi confidence and satisfaction with the
“special relationship.” There is a generally-shared feeling that all
Saudis now feel that the special relationship is one-sided, with the
U.S. receiving far more than it is giving.
In virtually every conversation, these typical Saudi questions and
comments are heard: “Why do we continue to produce twice as much oil
as we need just to accommodate the U.S.?” “Why do we continue to
sell our oil at $6.00 to $10.00 per barrel less than other countries
are receiving?” “We do these things for you and yet we receive no
thanks—only continued attacks in your press. What are we receiving
from our friendship with the U.S.?—problems with the Arab world, a
draining of our natural resource (oil) with no compensating concern
for our position, our needs and concerns.”
THE ISRAEL FACTOR IN U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS
The answer which we often give to the above questions is that the
U.S. security system is Saudi Arabia’s primary protection from
Russian
[Page 696]
aggression, along
with a reminder of the sale of the F–15s and of
USG’s
response during the Yemen crisis of early 1979. Those
answers are no longer effective, for events of recent months have
weakened our position as a friend, ally, and reliable arms supplier.
We are forced to conclude that the basic cause of the present
deteriorating status of the U.S.-Saudi special relationship is the
Arab-Israeli problem. This conclusion is particularly serious in
that many influential Saudis have heretofore viewed the U.S.-Saudi
“special relationship” as equal to the ties the U.S. has with
Israel. Now, however, there is a growing perception among Saudis
that this evenhandedness has vanished.
There is unanimous agreement among all Saudis with whom we have
talked or with whom we have contact:
(1) That the autonomy talks have failed and that the U.S. does not
now have the will or capacity to cause Israel to make the
concessions necessary to solve the Palestinian problem. In the
absence of such a solution, Saudi Arabia’s continued support of U.S.
interests, especially in oil production and pricing, subjects Saudi
leaders to increasing internal pressure and at the same time
isolates Saudi Arabia from the rest of the Arab world (except
possibly Egypt), a position they consider completely untenable;
(2) That U.S. foreign policy is Israel-oriented and that no action
will be taken by the U.S. which is considered to be pro-Arab or
anti-Israel. Such a conclusion frightens the SAG political and military leadership
and undermines confidence in the U.S. as a reliable friend, arms
supplier, and military ally. These conclusions are cancerous and
strike at the very heart of our special relationship.
The Saudis have contended from the outset of the current peace
process that the Camp David accords would never result in a real
solution to the Palestinian problem. Early on, they responded to our
assertions that autonomy for the Palestinians would be the first
step toward that solution with the rejoinder that there would never
be any real autonomy as long as Begin’s government was in power and unless the U.S.
was prepared to exercise pressure upon the Israelis. Unfortunately,
events since Camp David seem to have proven the Saudis right. With
the passage of the May 26 deadline,6 they are more convinced than ever that a
separate peace has been accomplished between Egypt and Israel; that
Egypt has been effectively removed from the Arab orbit; that the
Palestinian problem has been shunted aside; that Israel is now
moving forward to legalize and finalize its occupation of Arab
territory seized in the 1967 war; and, as a final blow and insult to
the Arab world, that Israel is moving to make its occupation of
Jerusalem
[Page 697]
a non-negotiable
issue with the Arabs, a step which would be in conflict with U.S.
policy and contrary to the understandings of Camp David.
With regard to the present Saudi conviction that U.S. foreign policy
is Israel-oriented, there have been a series of events over the last
months which, in Saudi eyes, have substantiated this belief. These
events include the resignation of Ambassador Young,7
the repudiation of the UN vote on
Jewish settlements,8 the abstention on the votes on
UN resolutions condemning Israel
for its incursions into Lebanon and the expulsion of the three Arab
notables,9 and, most disappointing of all, the
failure of the U.S. to respond affirmatively to all of the SAG’s recent arms requests.10
With typical Bedouin frankness, Prince Abdullah, the third ranking member of the royal
family, told me on June 1, “Arabs all over the Mideast are now
convinced that your policies are set in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
Can’t you do something to give your friends in Saudi Arabia a basis
to deny that charge?”
THE LITMUS TEST OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS: THE
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
The Saudis have seized upon their arms requests as the litmus test of
the U.S.–SAG relationship. Well
aware of the open-ended military assistance the U.S. has given to
Israel in recent years and concerned with their own security needs,
the Saudis have included in their military equipment requests many
of the weapons and systems that we have supplied or promised to
supply to Israel. U.S. refusals to grant certain equipment are now
being challenged heatedly, and the same requests are being raised
again and again.
A leading case in point concerns supplemental equipment for the
F–15s. The SAG is again insisting
upon the acquisition of conformal pods and multiple ejection racks
(MERs) for these advanced fighters, plus KC–135s to permit aerial
refueling. We have learned that the SAG military was not consulted when the Saudi
government concurred in Secretary Brown’s letter to the Congress in April 1978, saying
that the
[Page 698]
conformal pods
and MERs would not be included in the F–15 package.11 This decision has been a source of
frustration and anger within the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), and has been the subject of
considerable discussion among Saudi political and military
leaders.
The Saudis feel even more strongly that the restrictions should be
removed in view of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Their
contention is that there is now complete military justification for
this additional equipment but that political constraints (read
Israel) are preventing the U.S. from furnishing these needed items.
The feeling that they are being given only second class
consideration by the U.S. creates bitter resentment and unconcealed
frustration.
THE FRENCH CONNECTION
Thus far, the Saudi response to these forces has been restrained.
However, the SAG has repeatedly
hinted that its patience with U.S. policies has its limits, and
there are now strong indications that other options are indeed being
actively considered. The French seem to be the leading benefactors,
and the significance of growing Franco-Saudi defense ties (which
have included during the past year a visit by Sultan to Paris and
two visits by French Defense Minister Bourges to Saudi Arabia)
should not be underestimated. The Saudis believe they can get
whatever they want from the French in terms of equipment, advisors,
and support for Saudi political positions. As Prince Sultan remarked
to a local journalist on May 11, “Our friends in France will not
refuse us anything that we might ask from them in the future.”
THE ROAD BACK: REASSURING THE SAUDIS AND THE
CONSEQUENCES IF WE DON’T
The Saudis, therefore, see themselves buffeted by four forces: (1)
the threat of military aggression by the Soviet Union and/or its
proxies; (2) internal political and military pressures; (3) the
anti-U.S., anti-monarchial tendencies of the Arab world; and (4) the
efforts of the Western Europeans, chiefly the French, to replace the
U.S. as the principal security partner of Saudi Arabia. The end
result of this buffeting is to call into serious question the
U.S.-Saudi special relationship. Thus, the two questions which next
arise are what can be done to preserve this relationship, and what
will be the consequences of continuing deterioration if strong
remedial action is not taken immediately.
[Page 699]
The most obvious answer to the first question is some clear
indication that the U.S. is acting to move the peace talks forward
by securing meaningful concessions from Israel on the core issues of
the Palestinian problem. Failing that, the administration should
make a commitment to explore with the next Congress the furnishing
of the additional F–15 equipment including KC–135s. The consequences
of doing nothing and seeing the continued deterioration of the
relationship has, potentially, both short-term (6 months–2 years)
and long-term (2–5 years) consequences.
The major short-term consequences concern oil. The Saudis may have
already started to relinquish their role as a moderate on oil prices
and to allow market conditions to determine the price. This action
could well be followed by a substantial Saudi reduction in oil
production. We do not, however, believe this will occur prior to the
fourth quarter of 1980. We also anticipate that there might be a
gradual termination of the relatively favorable treatment of U.S.
firms in the Kingdom. The accommodation presently being made by
SAG officials to avoid
disruption in U.S.-Saudi business dealings by moderate application
of the anti-boycott laws would begin to disappear.
Another short-term consequence, and one which is already underway, is
the Saudi move to other suppliers for military equipment. Recently,
for instance, the Saudis informed us they do not wish to purchase
U.S. M–60 tanks for the next stage of their army mechanization
program. The Saudis have agreed with the French on a mammoth coastal
defense package, and several other arms deals are in the offing. The
net long-term significance of these developments is of crucial
importance, as the SAG appears to
be seeking a new security strategy. This new strategy is still not
well defined but, even so, two elements have emerged. The first
element, noted earlier, is that the Saudis are seeking an
alternative to the U.S. as principal arms supplier—enter the French
connection; the second element is Saudi interest in forming an
alliance with other Islamic countries to pursue a non-aligned
course. This new tack could include exploration of a new
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the USSR in the reasonably near future.
The adoption of such a strategy—even if over the long term—would have
a profound and injurious impact on U.S. vital interests. Heretofore,
the U.S.-Saudi special relationship has largely traded oil for
security. For the Saudis to decide that their security is now best
guaranteed elsewhere would deprive us of what is, in the final
analysis, the only card the U.S. can play effectively in a game
where the stakes involved affect, to a significant degree, our
economic and political well being.
The U.S. must not, therefore, permit our relationship with Saudi
Arabia to deteriorate further. Instead, we must make the difficult
politi
[Page 700]
cal decisions
necessary to restore our credibility with the Saudis and the rest of
the Arab world. The Saudis need to be reassured that close
friendship and cooperation with the U.S. need not prejudice their
own vital political and economic interests as they are now
increasingly inclined to believe.
