88. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State1
475. For Asst Secretary Atherton, NEA. Cairo for Ambassador/Charge. Subject: Libyan Response to Presidential Message.
1. Below is an informal translation (by Embassy Arabic-trained officers) of note handed me at noon April 14 by FonOff Americas Dept official Ibrahim Bahad under direct instructions from ForSec Turayki. Arabic text will be pouched.
2. Bahad said delay in response was due to need for investigation into matter by Libyan Government. Investigation, he added, was continuing. After hearing his sketchy account of contents, I asked why Col. Qadhafi had not taken opportunity for direct communication with President Carter. Sahad said he unable account for Colonel’s methods but note constituted considered views of Libyan Government and hinted that Colonel had hand in drafting.
3. In response to my query, Sahad said he had not seen text President’s letter and didn’t know if Turayki had.2 He believed he and Turayki only two officials in Tripoli FonOff aware of subject; added that matter very sensitive for Libyan Government which appreciated thus far discreet handling by U.S. He reiterated continuing Libyan desire improve political relations with new administration and regretted ongoing unfriendly U.S. attitude more in sorrow than anger. He [Page 222] noted even Libyan motives in Philippine mediation were being impugned in Departmental letters to Congressmen.3 Had improvement in political climate Libya sought actually occurred, present misunderstanding might not have arisen. He concluded brief presentation by reiterating statement made to me early March in Sebha by FonSec Turayki that U.S. would be best advised not to take sides in disputes between Arab countries.4 (At time, Turayki was referring to Tunisia; Bahad clearly had Egypt in mind.)
4. Unsurprisingly Libyans sticking to Qashut’s initial denial but in more detail and seeking pin blame on Egypt. Content of note appears to be one long prevarication while tone is conciliatory.
5. There are probably a variety of reasons for indirect response through Embassy rather than direct answer from Colonel. High on list is Libyan pride and pique that Charge Qashut’s initial retort was not accepted.5 Another factor is desire to downgrade whole affair and characterize it as a “misunderstanding.” Even though powerfully preoccupied of late, Qadhafi certainly involved in composition of note. Nevertheless, he probably chose to toss it back to FonOff as gesture of unconcern which I doubt he really feels.
6. Text of note follows:
“Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamaheriyah, No. 30/3, April 14, 1977. Diplomatic Note.
The Foreign Secretariat presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and refers to the Embassy’s note of March 20, 1977, from President Jimmy Carter to Brother Leader Muammar Qadhafi.6
The Secretariat wishes to clarify two points contained in the above-mentioned note. In the first instance, the names of the persons (men) are non-Libyan, as the numbers of their passports and dates of their births in that note (of that date) exchanged on this subject. Despite our conviction that the subject in its entirety does not warrant the sending of messages, nevertheless we respond in order not to destroy a dialogue even on this subject.
[Page 223]Secondly, the aforementioned note names some officers and the American Ambassador to Egypt who was the subject of the note. It is very clear that this information is false Egyptian information.
Before responding to this note, we gathered the facts about the first point and began an investigation of the aspects of the note as soon as it was brought to our attention.
The two officers mentioned were referred to in a message broadcast by the Egyptian Middle East Radio (MENA) for reasons of their own. This information that appears in the note is the work of Egyptian Middle East News Broadcast (MENA). We wish to make it clear that the officers do not work in Libyan intelligence but work in the field of agriculture since the beginning of the revolution and everyone knows them and knows the agricultural projects which they are known for. No doubt the American companies working in the area know that as well.
We undertook a careful investigation of the two persons mentioned in the message and it appears that the first is Azzat Mahmud Abdel Rahman of Egyptian nationality who entered the country more than four years ago as a construction worker (carpenter for reinforced cement) and the investigation continues to learn more information about him. As for the second person, he is Nasir Iddiin Jaffar. He is of Sudanese nationality and entered the country for work with a contractor. He is now working (as a houseboy) in the Brazilian Embassy in Libya. We are absolutely convinced that no Libyan party previously contacted or commissioned him with any act, but we do not know if this Sudanese is an agent of foreign intelligence and we do not know if he is involved in spreading rumors. We invite you to meet with him; the meeting can be attended by an American and a Libyan party, and we have no objection to a third, neutral party in order to assure you that your information is false and has no foundation in fact.
The very choice of the American Ambassador in Cairo shows that the entire subject is an Egyptian plot against Libya. Otherwise, why not an American diplomat working in Libya or in any other country. We return to the theme that Egyptian intelligence aims at involving the United States of America in a local dispute.
The Carlos mentioned in the message has only been mentioned by Sadat. We again must clarify that Carlos has not entered Libya except on the occasion of the Oil Minister’s kidnapping when he transitted Tripoli International Airport after the plane had stopped at other international airports. Since that time we don’t know anything about Carlos. We inform you that Carlos is wanted by us for trial because he killed one of the members of the official Libyan delegation at the OPEC Ministers’ Conference in Vienna.
We inform the United States of America that we are not killers nor bandits and we are principled.
[Page 224]If we decided on a belligerent course, we would announce this and it would be because the world would be convinced of the justification for it, or we ourselves would be convinced, and if we do not decide on war openly, there is no other way for us.
We took the first steps to encourage President Carter and we announced our faith in the new American administration because President Carter is a man of religious principle and morality. It is not reasonable that we would encourage the new administration by undertaking acts which would ruin relations with it.
Finally, it is not possible that we could be responsible for the brutality which is attributed to us. We know that we are a neutral, progressive revolution with friends and enemies. The enemies will plot our downfall if we are not prepared to counter whatever the enemy may conspire against us. Because of this, we work for ourselves and carry the burden with courage.
Complimentary close. End.”
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 61, Libya: 2/77–12/78. Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. Sent for information to Cairo.↩
- An unknown hand underlined “seen text of President’s letter,” and wrote: “Let’s see if we can get this from Rick (see p. 3).” Carter’s letter was not found.↩
- Libya was hosting peace negotiations between the Philippine Government and representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front.↩
- Carle reported on his meeting with Turayki in telegram 281 from Tripoli, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770070–0188)↩
- See Document 86.↩
- An unknown hand highlighted and underlined “Embassy’s note of March 20, 1977, from President Jimmy Carter to Brother Leader Muammar Qadhafi.” The Embassy’s note with Carter’s letter was not found.↩