87. Editorial Note

In late summer 1981, multiple intelligence reports from a variety of sources revealed Libyan Chairman Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s intentions to assassinate U.S. citizens, including President Ronald Reagan. In telegram 79388 to multiple recipients, November 21, 1981, the Central Intelligence Agency provided an analysis of the attempt against Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts to provide background for Qadhafi’s current threats. According to this analysis, the plot to assassinate Eilts was formed in 1976, in reaction to the disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel. Qadhafi viewed these agreements as a form of treason and blamed the effort on the United States. According to the Agency: “Ambassador Eilts had been picked as the target of the operation because he was considered to be the major U.S. representative of the ‛imperialist-reactionary’ policy of U.S.-Egyptian collusion.”

The plan, developed by Venezualan terrorist Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez (“Carlos the Jackal”) and the Libyan intelligence service, involved the use of two hit men documented as Egyptians. The first plan involved planting an incendiary device “somewhere within the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.” That plan was subsequently abandoned in favor of “a small, well-trained team to carry out a direct personal attack on the Ambassador.”

“Execution of the operation involved two separate but related actions. First, a sniper, probably using a Soviet M–54 sniper rifle, would fire at the Ambassador as he exited the front door of the Embassy. The second member of the team would then throw grenades to anyone attempting to come to the Ambassador’s assistance. Should a sniper attack be impossible because of trees or other obstacles in the line of fire, then the main attack would be made on the Ambassador’s car as it exited the Embassy grounds. In this case, since ‛Carlos’ believed that the car would be armor-plated and would have bullet-proof glass, one attacker would throw Soviet-made high-explosive grenades underneath the car in order to force the occupants to leave the vehicle. The Ambassador would then be shot with a handgun. The other team member, with his sniper rifle, would be stationed in a building across the street from the Embassy where he could fire on anyone attempting to aid the Ambassador and also try to cover his partner’s retreat.”

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The plan was cancelled when surveillance revealed that security around both the Ambassador and the Embassy had been strengthened. Additionally, before the “action agents” departed for Cairo, Libya received a démarche from the United States, informing Qadhafi of U.S. knowledge of the plot, and demanding that it be aborted. No attempt was made against Eilts. (Telegram 79388 from the CIA, November 21, 1981; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, Box 3, Libya—Admiral Poindexter file (1)–(13))