84. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
SUBJECT
- Changes in Libyan Government
Libya’s President Qadhafi apparently intends to carry out plans first announced in November to reshape the Libyan government into what he calls a “people’s democracy.”2 Although Qadhafi has been talking about such a move for years, he had no reason to worry about the structure of his regime until events of the past two years began seriously to erode his support in the military and key civilian groups.
The plan—which may go into effect within the next several weeks—calls for the introduction of a civilian governing structure that will allow Qadhafi to transform his popularity among Libya’s largely rural, tribal population into a more effective political instrument. It will also provide him with a pretext for sidelining and perhaps abolishing completely the military’s Revolutionary Command Council, which has theoretically ruled Libya since 1969.
We have no evidence that any of Qadhafi’s colleagues on the Council is planning to try to block him; the four remaining active members reportedly have grudgingly resigned themselves to the move. We know little, however, about the attitudes of the rest of the officer corps, which views the reorientation of the government as further evidence of Qadhafi’s distrust of the military. Although Qadhafi’s efforts to marshal his grassroots support may ultimately reduce his reliance on the armed forces, he is over the short term running a high risk of further demoralizing the primary prop of his regime.
Qadhafi’s Motives
Qadhafi has been on the defensive since 1975, when a coup attempt engineered by council member Umar Muhayshi and a small clique of [Page 216] army officers brought to the surface wide-ranging dissatisfaction with Qadhafi’s one-man rule. The defection of other Council members in the wake of Muhayshi’s betrayal and the resentment stirred up by an investigation of the conspiracy compounded tensions between Qadhafi and the military and ended all pretense of collegiality within the Council.
Since 1975, the incidence of insubordination and violence within the armed forces—including at least several attempts on Qadhafi’s life—has increased markedly. Qadhafi has responded by repositioning key units and major ammunition stores, by upgrading the police and paramilitary forces at the expense of the army, and by systematically replacing all those suspected of disloyalty with his kinsmen and members of tribes from his home region.
He has been hesitant to reduce the power of his subordinates on the Council, however, without first regaining control over the military. He apparently now feels confident that he can remove the glaring evidence of divided leadership that the Council has come to represent. None of the four active members, including Prime Minister Jallud, has a powerbase sufficiently strong to challenge Qadhafi, and dissension among them probably precludes their acting in concert.
In his campaign to sell the new government structure, Qadhafi has carefully skirted the question of what will become of his colleagues. He has said only that their “protective role” is over and that the people can seek their help as they see fit. The Council could theoretically remain as part of the military command or any of its members could relinquish his rank and serve in the new all-civilian government. Qadhafi may favor such an arrangement as a way of mitigating the ill-will he has already engendered in his colleagues.
The New Government
Qadhafi’s plan for the new government is designed to maximize his support among tribal and rural communities. Over the past year, the Libyan leader has spent much time in the countryside explaining his ideas, cultivating his supporters, and encouraging them to greater political activism. His orchestration of numerous popular demonstrations has served both to generate enthusiasm for the new order and to warn his detractors that he has the support to carry off the change.
Stripped of its socialist jargon, Qadhafi’s blueprint, in theory, resembles that of a parliamentary system. The electorate, however, is to be organized in small neighborhood “congresses,” trade unions, and “people’s committees” to give Qadhafi’s tribal supporters maximum representation. A national people’s congress, a secretary general, and a cabinet are to serve as parliament, premier, and government. The people’s congress is also supposed to elect a president—presumably Qadhafi—who has vaguely defined but no doubt sweeping powers.
[Page 217]Much of what Qadhafi has said about the new government and the way he has orchestrated its promotion are reminiscent of old-fashioned tribal politics. Meetings over the past several months to discuss the plan have consisted of debate over local interests, with Qadhafi both receiving and issuing criticism and advice but always acting as final arbiter. Most of his audience seem to enjoy the exchange, and are prepared to do his bidding.
The Cynical View
Qadhafi’s decision to inaugurate the new government in Sabhah—his small desert hometown where the Qadhafa tribe is still centered—and to invite such notables as Fidel Castro was calculated not only to attract international attention but to forestall any effort to disrupt the proceedings. He is probably especially worried about disgruntled officers who resent the termination of their special role in the Libyan government.
According to several sources, Qadhafi’s move is regarded by much of the military as a simple power play which will lead to further changes in the officer corps and a general diminution of the importance of the armed forces. Most officers concede that Qadhafi already completely controls what will become the apparatus of the new government, and believe he will have little trouble sidelining officers who are close to Prime Minister Jallud, Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kharubi, and the other two remaining Council members.
It is not clear that this cynicism extends to the rank and file. Most enlisted men come from Bedouin families whose lot has improved markedly under Qadhafi’s rule. Moreover, as Qadhafi has moved against officers, he has been careful to cultivate their subordinates. In addition to keeping the salaries of the enlisted men relatively high, Qadhafi has repeatedly admonished officers to follow the example of the “loyal” rank and file.
Libya’s small educated middle class probably views with alarm the changeover in government. The traditional commercial establishment and the new class of professionals and businessmen have never been sympathetic to Qadhafi’s military dictatorship. Now they are even more fearful of his turn toward tribal politics.
Qadhafi has coupled his elevation of tribal groups with repeated verbal attacks on the urban “bourgeoisie” and a number of policy moves against the private sector of the economy. So far, the business community has been able to fight a successful rear-guard action by simply delaying, ignoring, or evading his decrees. This may become increasingly difficult, however, as tribal and rural leaders—who have a strong bias against the urban establishment—become more politicized.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A: Production Case Files (1976–1979), Box 7, Folder 73: Changes in Libyan Government. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page reads in part: “This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated with the Clandestine Service.”↩
- In telegram 1491 from Tripoli, November 24, 1976, the Embassy wrote: “Qadhafi proposes basic reorganization of LARG, change of its name. Islamization of laws, popular rule with ultimate authority resting in General People’s Congress may be step towards democracy in Libya. More immediate effect would be to strengthen RCC Chairman’s run of country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760438–0768)↩