82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Relations with Libya and Iraq
You inquired about the status of our relations with Libya and Iraq.2 With the exception of South Yemen, where the U.S. has neither diplomatic relations nor resident officials under the flag of a protecting power, Libya and Iraq are the two Arab States whose interests and policies radically diverge from our own. Iraq is the only Arab country which has not resumed diplomatic relations broken off during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Libya was one of the few Arab countries which did not sever relations with us then; after Qadhafi’s takeover in September 1969, however, U.S.-Libyan relations deteriorated and since November 1972, our respective Embassies have been headed by Chargés.
Iraq and Libya refuse to accept the existence of the State of Israel and share support of the Palestinian elements that reject a negotiated settlement. Although Iraq and Libya share much of the ideological paraphernalia of the radical end of the Third World spectrum, Iraq’s orientation is secular and modernizing while Libya’s is conservative Islamic. Apparent similarities between Iraq and Libya probably are outweighed by actual differences in ideology, political style and social custom. The Soviet Union is the major supplier of military equipment to Iraq and Libya but the single-party governments in both countries remain deeply suspicious of the USSR. In Libya the Communist Party is outlawed; in Iraq it is severely circumscribed.
Libya
Under Qadhafi’s leadership, Libya adopted foreign and domestic policies characterized by extreme nationalism, militant Islam, and advocacy of radical Third World ideology. Between 1969 and 1974 the Libyans ejected us from Wheelus Air Base, attacked an unarmed American C–130 plane in international airspace, partially or totally nationalized U.S. oil interests in Libya, expelled American missionaries [Page 213] and confiscated their properties without compensation, and, during the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict, applied an embargo on the sale of petroleum to the U.S. which lasted until 1975.
But the most important issue dividing us has been Qadhafi’s commitment to the destruction of Israel, his willingness to use Libyan resources to undermine a negotiated Middle East settlement and subvert those Arab Governments which favor such a solution, and his support for international terrorism.
Despite our political problems with Libya, we maintain active commercial relations; nearly 10 percent of our crude oil is imported from Libya, representing about 30 percent of Libya’s production. Approximately 2,000 Americans live in Libya, working for oil companies and in other occupations. About 2,000 Libyans are studying at U.S. institutions of higher learning under Libyan Government sponsorship.
Since late 1974 the Libyans have professed a desire for improved relations. Libya appears uneasy over its estrangement from fellow Arabs and its growing reliance upon the Soviets for arms and technology. By improving relations with the U.S. Libya may hope to lessen its dependence on the USSR, to obtain access to U.S. military goods and technology and to regain status and respectability in the Arab world. Qadhafi appears to believe that the advent of a new U.S. Administration offers the possibility of a change for the better.
In our discussions with Libyan representatives we have indicated that a major change in U.S. policy toward Libya would not be possible as long as Libya persists in obstructing our Middle East peace efforts and supports international terrorism.3 We also have given considerable weight to Sadat’s opposition to any U.S. rapprochement with Libya in light of his own problems with Qadhafi. We have maintained restrictions on the sale of military-related items to Libya, including denial of export licenses for eight C–130 aircraft which Libya bought in 1972 from Lockheed, despite our making clear at the time that we could not give assurances that licenses would be issued if the sale were consummated.4
[Omitted here is material on Iraq.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 29, Libya. Secret. Sent to Carter on February 17 under a covering memorandum from Brzezinski. Carter wrote at the bottom of the covering memorandum: “Why should we not initiate proposals for normalizing relations—& see what prospects are? J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 48, Libya: 1/77–1/81)↩
- See Document 80 and footnote 2 thereto.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- In 1974, the United States refused to issue export licenses for eight C–130 aircraft that Libya had purchased from Lockheed. For an exchange of diplomatic notes on the aircraft, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 49 and 50.↩