Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

76. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Algiers, November 2, 1979, 6–7 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ulric Haynes, US Ambassador to Algeria
• Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• James M. Rentschler, NSC Staff Member
• Mr. Alec Toumayan, Interpreter
• Chadli Bendjedid, President of Algeria
• Mohamed Benyahia, Foreign Minister
• Interpreter

Dr. Brzezinski began by giving President Bendjedid a personal letter from President Carter.² He expressed pleasure at the opportunity he had had to visit Kabyle battlefields earlier in the day and his admiration for the many evidences of peaceful progress and development he had witnessed in the same region. He went on to state that because of the lengthy exchange he had had the day before with President Bendjedid’s very frank, very able, and very eloquent Foreign Minister he would not repeat all the points discussed on that occasion. Rather, Dr. Brzezinski said that he wished to underline a fundamental belief: while we may disagree on this issue or that, on the basics we do not disagree at all. We believe that the world is in the midst of fundamental change. We believe that Algeria is a very important regional and international force in that process. Algeria speaks for itself in international fora and for no one else. We respect Algerian independence, we understand its sources, and we understand Algeria’s influence on others. For all of these reasons, Dr. Brzezinski continued, we believe the time is ripe for more frequent contacts. We are prepared to engage in a serious dialogue with Algeria on all the major issues of concern to us both. We feel strongly that Algeria has a very major role to play, and we want to collaborate with Algeria as closely as possible. (U)

President Bendjedid replied that he wished to express his thanks both for what Dr. Brzezinski had said and for President Carter’s gesture in sending him to Algeria for the 25th anniversary observance of the Algerian Revolution. That gesture testifies to the fact that US-Algerian relations are going well, despite disagreement on some international affairs. Bilaterally things are going very well. Algeria and the US may have some divergencies, but these do not interfere with our bilateral relations. President Bendjedid went on to say that he knew Dr. Brzezinski liked to speak frankly, and the President himself wished to speak in the same way about an affair which concerns Algeria closely. Algeria has appreciated the attitude of the US in the North African region. President Bendjedid is not expecting support for the Algerian position and recognizes that the US has interests in Morocco as well as in Algeria and other countries; however, the Algerian people do not understand why the US gives armaments to one of Algeria’s neighbors and thereby contributes to danger in the region. (C)

President Bendjedid noted that the day Algeria got its independence, the Algerian position was clear: his country never tries to create problems for its neighbors or interfere in their affairs. On the other hand, during the difficult days which followed the death of Boumediene, Algeria’s neighbors tried to interfere in Algerian internal matters. Asked by Dr. Brzezinski to clarify that part of his remarks, President Bendjedid cited the parachuting of small arms into Algeria from a C–130 which came from Morocco.³ (C)

President Bendjedid stated that Algeria had had several opportunities to exploit a difficult internal situation in Morocco but did not do so. For example, following the attempted coup at Skirrat, the first head of state to call Hassan on the telephone and offer moral support was the Algerian President.⁴ Algeria also refused categorically to receive anyone who had participated in the attempted coup. Algeria believed in the principle of good relations with its neighbors; it never tried to export its revolutionary experience to Morocco, nor create problems there. King Hassan knows this. President Bendjedid invited the US to ask the King if he had evidence to the contrary. (C)

We have now a problem in the area, President Bendjedid continued. It is the Western Sahara, and our perceptions there were different. Algeria’s is based on the principle of self-determination for all people, a principle which it has believed in since the organization of its revolution. It is also a principle shared by the UN and the OAU. Algeria believes that the Saharan people must have the opportunity to decide its own future and organize its own life. Unless this principle is applied, there is the risk of creating a serious precedent in Africa, in effect a return to jungle law where smaller countries will be at the mercy of larger countries. This would lead to instability in the continent. (C)

President Bendjedid reiterated that Algeria has no claim in the Western Sahara. The problem there is between the Saharan people, who want self-determination, and another power which is using force against them. Algeria supports any and all liberation forces. President Bendjedid had said before to the American Ambassador that before the Western Sahara problem had arisen Algeria had very good relations with Morocco. The President wanted Dr. Brzezinski to know that Algeria’s principles are the same regardless of the monarchial system in Morocco. That system concerns only the Moroccan people. Algeria has no right to concern itself with Morocco’s internal affairs, but if it did have to pronounce a view, it would say that Moroccan stability is in Algeria’s interest. The President wishes King Hassan himself would recognize that Algeria does not want to make any problem. The most important thing for Algeria is to work for the improvement in the lives of its own people, to help the nation achieve development. Having fought for 7½ years, Algeria knows all the dangers of conflict, perhaps better than anybody else in the region. (C)

Returning to the question of arms supply to Morocco, President Bendjedid expressed the view that this could lead Morocco to try to oppress its neighbors. To understand the importance of the Polisario fighting in the south, it is necessary to come back to the origins of the conflict: it is Morocco which oppressed the Sahara people, not the contrary. The role that Algeria played between the Polisario and Mauritania demonstrates its peaceful intentions so far as that conflict is concerned. (C)

At this point Dr. Brzezinski expressed the hope that President Bendjedid would permit him to use Mr. Toumayan as his interpreter. Sometimes, he said, he speaks in a way that is deliberately enigmatic, and Mr. Toumayan is accustomed to this. He went on to say that he had found the President’s views, as well as the Foreign Minister’s, extremely beneficial. These will enable him to return to Washington and to report to President Carter with a clearer understanding of Algerian foreign policy and a better understanding of Algerian concerns. He will also go back with the feeling that in terms of fundamental conceptions of world affairs, there is no real conflict between Algeria and the United States. (C)

Concerning the differences which have surfaced, Dr. Brzezinski continued, these strike him as essentially practical in nature; he can detect no fundamental strategic difference. He was very reassured by the President’s emphasis and that of the Foreign Minister on the need for political contacts. We share that view. On the question of US arms for Morocco, Dr. Brzezinski indicated that he would comment briefly. He was enormously impressed by the military parade which he had the privilege of seeing the day before. He noted that while he was not a military technician, he did have the impression that not all of the arms shown in the parade were of local manufacture. Moreover, some of the weapons not produced in Algeria impressed him as being very modern. Dr. Brzezinski thought that President Bendjedid would have far greater cause for concern if the US had already given the same level of arms to Morocco. What we are giving the King does not match what Dr. Brzezinski had seen the day before. In any event, the purpose of our arms is to ensure that the King, who is a source of stability in Morocco, does not feel cornered in a difficult situation. (S)

President Bendjedid replied that he would like to underline a point: if Algeria seeks modern armaments, it is not to oppress a neighbor. It has never used arms against its neighbors. President Bendjedid asserted that he had personally attended meetings in international fora where the King recognized that there was no border problem with Algeria. Algeria has neither expansionist policy, nor soldiers outside its frontiers. On the other hand, Morocco does have an expansionist policy—indirectly against Algeria and Mauritania, directly against the Western Sahara people. Having this point of view, Morocco could create a real danger in the region. President Bendjedid believes that all the big powers, especially the US, should prevent any country in the region from having such a policy. The US’ own interests in the region would thereby be served. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski thanked President Bendjedid for his views and said they were very helpful. The US fully believes Algeria is peaceful in its motivations and has no aggressive designs. Anyone familiar with Algeria’s courageous struggle, which forms one of the most remarkable chapters of contemporary history, understands Algeria’s craving for peace and development. (C)

President Bendjedid asserted that that was in fact an essential underpinning of Algerian national life; Algeria had suffered too much to desire anything different. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that besides wanting peace, Algeria was the strongest power in the region. It could feel secure about its peace. The US certainly has no intention of supporting anyone against Algeria. We intend to use the political leverage we have to encourage Morocco, and others who are our friends, to seek a peaceful solution. We do not underestimate the potential destructiveness of the Western Sahara conflict. It threatens not only Morocco, our traditional friend, but everyone else in the area. One cannot predict the consequences of an awakened political consciousness of the Saharan people as a whole. It might not be possible to circumscribe a conflict in its present area. One cannot exclude the possibility of a spillover which would invite an East-West ideological confrontation. (S)

President Bendjedid interjected that there is no ideological problem in the Western Sahara. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski countered that there could be in time should the conflict expand. One cannot predict the implications of such a conflict, one could make no firm assumptions. In any case, he wished to underline the US desire for the most rapid end of the conflict. The question is how and what will be the solution. We have no prescription. We will encourage our friends to seek a political accommodation; we will not encourage our friends to seek a military solution. We respect the principle of self-determination. That in turn raises the question of how to move in the direction of a solution based on principles shared by all the parties. At present, there is a division between the sides which excludes shared principles. But with patience and encouragement from friends, that division can be narrowed, and things which seem difficult or impossible to one or the other parties now can become acceptable. The important thing is to avoid creating a situation where one of the two parties feels compelled toward acts of desperation or provocation. (S)

President Bendjedid asked for clarification; which were the two sides Dr. Brzezinski had in mind? (C)

Morocco and those who oppose Morocco, Dr. Brzezinski replied. He added that he didn’t really know who was opposing Morocco, but he assumed that everyone in the room knew. He went on to assure the President that the US is engaging in discussions with our friends, which aren’t easy, to encourage them to look at the realities in a peaceful and practical fashion. At this stage, we do not think it is possible to envisage the details of a peaceful solution, but that can be possible once a process has been started which can lead to a serious dialogue. (C)

President Bendjedid said he agreed with Dr. Brzezinski but wished to make the point that Algeria is a member of the OAU, an organization which has designated a committee to deal with the problem. The US and its friends should work with the committee to lead Morocco to adopt a different policy vis-à-vis the Western Sahara. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski replied that we are prepared to explore every avenue that might lead to peace. We ourselves are not prepared to become a mediator—we have the impression that neither Algeria nor Morocco desires us to play this role. (C)

President Bendjedid rejoined that this was not what he had meant to say. There is an existing framework for peace, which has not as yet been used. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that he would be seeing President Tolbert⁵ after his meeting with President Bendjedid, and he expected that this issue would be discussed further. All he is saying at present is that we will be exploring all ways to peace. Morocco and Algeria are Arab countries; there are many different ways to encourage the parties toward peace in that context. (C)

President Bendjedid assured Dr. Brzezinski that Algeria will welcome any initiatives leading to peace and stability in the conflict. It will be in Algeria’s interest to do so. Though Algeria is not directly involved in the conflict, it is in Algeria’s interest to see it resolved. He then asked Dr. Brzezinski if the US believes in self-determination as a principle. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski answered yes. However, he added, self-determination is only one principle; non-use of force is another; national security is a third. He was sure that we both shared these. (C)

President Bendjedid reasserted that Algeria has certain principles; he wished to underline that aspect. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that he did not believe that any fundamental conflict divided us on the question of principles or the application of these, either on this continent or anywhere else. We feel that the Non-Aligned Movement is a positive force in world affairs. This is a change in US policy from past Administrations. We feel that countries such as Algeria and Yugoslavia are providing leadership in a constructive way. This is an historically important development, because it implies a waning in previously intense ideological divisions. During many years in the West, for example, the concept of socialism was associated with atheism. Algeria is demonstrating that socialism and religion were compatible. (C)

President Bendjedid said he would like to stress the fact that Algeria continues to follow the same line as it builds its society. No one could make Algeria communist. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stated that he has never suspected the Algerian people or its leadership of sympathy for Communism; still, before his visit, he had underestimated the extent to which the Algerian people were attracted to religion. As a young student and academician he had thought of the Algerian struggle as more of a political and national phenomenon rather than religious. The resurgence of religion in national life is something which Dr. Brzezinski finds especially fascinating. In America we neither fear this nor object to it. We welcome it, for it comports with the philosophical and systemic mosaic we see as the ideal for a world of pluralism and diversity. If he were a Soviet leader, he added, he would be greatly concerned by this trend. He would have to ask himself, everytime greetings appeared in Pravda from the Socialist and Democratic Republic of Algeria, what the 65 million Moslems living in the Soviet Union were likely to think. He could imagine people from Tashkent saying “Why can’t I have my own mosque, my own flag, my own country?” (C)

President Bendjedid concluded the meeting by stressing how fruitful he felt his talk with Dr. Brzezinski had been. Algeria and the US both favored a cooperative relationship. As regards the Western Sahara, he believes that the US will act toward a political solution and is confident about US intentions there. He asked Dr. Brzezinski to relay his best wishes to President Carter, whom he looked forward to meeting. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski expressed warm thanks for his meeting with President Bendjedid, assured him that President Carter hopes to welcome him to the White House, and presented him a modest gift from the President. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9–12/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the Hotel Aurassi.
2. See Document 74.
3. Not further identified.
4. Reference is to the June 10, 1971, coup attempt at Hassan’s seaside palace in Skhirat. For details on the attack, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Documents 116 and 117.
5. Brzezinski met with Tolbert, who was the current Chairman of the OAU, from 7 to 7:45 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9–12/79. A brief summary of the meeting is in telegram 289347 to Algiers, Monrovia, and Rabat, November 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790509–1095)