58. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State1
US RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA IN A NORTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
US relations with the states of North Africa have remained in a relatively fixed pattern since the mid-1960’s. Ties with Morocco and Tunisia are close, but ideological hostility and political confrontation have characterized those with Algeria, despite a growing economic relationship.
There have been indications over the past year that Algeria, primarily for economic reasons, may be seeking a better relationship with the US. The present situation offers possibilities for more stable US-Algerian relations without affecting the ties the US has with its historical allies in North Africa. Nevertheless, while an extensive US-Algerian relationship in the economic field could lead to less confrontational Algerian tactics on issues of concern to the US (particularly on North-South issues and the Middle East peace process), it would be unlikely to lead to major modifications in Algerian foreign policy, at least in the short run.
Indications of Algerian Moderation
During Under Secretary Habib’s visit to Algiers, April 10–12, President Boumediene expressed the view that US-Algerian differences were in the past and emphasized that Algeria’s “battle” now is for economic development.2 These remarks do not mean, however, that the Algerian leadership has modified its radical, “anti-imperialist” ideology, which is the product of a deeply engrained sense of national identity forged during the bitter eight-year war of independence. Nor were they meant to imply that Algeria will abandon its “progressive” stances on North-South issues which it genuinely believes to be justified.
In recent months, however, there has been evidence that Algeria has pulled back somewhat from its point position as leader of Third World radicals. Algerian leaders have given the impression that they are weary of being “out front” in international meetings and perhaps feel that it is now time for others to bear a larger share of the burden. [Page 155] This was symbolized by the passing of non-aligned leadership to Sri Lanka at the Non-Aligned Summit Conference at Colombo in August 1976.3 Other, more specific factors also account for the lower Algerian visibility in Third World affairs:
—Economic Dependence on the West: The major source of Algeria’s moderation appears to be a growing realization among its leaders that Algeria is economically dependent on Western technology and financing. As a result, while Algerian positions on specific issues involving concrete interests remain unchanged, the confrontational tactics of past years seem to be waning.
—Internal Problems: The Algerian leadership over the past year has been preoccupied by its efforts to legitimize itself through a long, cumbersome process of institution-building that has included four major elections. In addition, the country’s ambitious development programs have slowed. Inflation, sluggish performance, bureaucratic inefficiency, shortages of consumer items, and other problems have resulted in growing popular disillusionment.
—The Western Sahara Dispute: The continuing dispute with Morocco over the Western Sahara and related diplomatic problems with the Arab world have diverted Algerian attention from other Third World issues.
With respect to the US, there have been several Algerian overtures which have complemented expressions of interest by Foreign Ministry officials in higher level exchanges and long-term cooperation. These have included:
—unusually warm congratulatory messages to President Carter and Secretary Vance in January;
—the appointment of an Algerian Ambassador to Washington (a Cabinet Minister) after a two-year delay following the reestablishment of Algerian-US relations; and
—the diversion of several tankers of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the US during the US gas crisis this past winter.
Algerian Objectives
Though the Algerian leadership continues to view the “imperialist” posture of the US with suspicion, it apparently perceives significant benefits to be gained by closer relations:
—Economic: The paramount goal of the Boumediene regime is the implementation of Algeria’s plans for economic development and industrialization. The regime is urgently seeking decisions from the [Page 156] Federal Power Commission on long-term LNG sales, which Algeria needs to finance its development plans. Additionally, in view of its difficulties in obtaining credit, Algeria desires a liberalization of the Export-Import Bank’s loan policies. Algerian economists may also be seeking US technology and know-how in various fields, including the agricultural sector, where productivity has continued to decline despite the government’s agrarian reform program.
—Regional: Boumediene hopes to dissuade the US from what he perceives as the US “tilt” toward Morocco on the Western Sahara issue. At a minimum, Algeria wants continued US neutrality and encouragement of Moroccan restraint. Algerian requests to purchase limited amounts of military equipment (jeeps, radios, radar) in the US are intended in part to test our evenhandedness, as well as to send signals to Morocco that the US would not stand behind it in the event of Moroccan-initiated hostilities against Algeria.4
—Global: Closer relations with the US would also demonstrate Algeria’s genuine non-alignment and show proof of US respect for Algeria’s international status. Algerians also seem to think that the Carter administration will be flexible on North-South issues and that a dialogue with the US in this area would be productive.
Potential Opportunities for the US
While no quick modifications of Algerian ideology are expected, the US could derive significant economic benefits and some long-term political advantages from a favorable response to Algerian overtures for a stable, more comprehensive relationship:
—Economic: Algeria is a major source of natural gas (its proven reserves of over 125 trillion cubic feet are fourth largest in the world). Its need for assured markets for its gas is likely to lead to a stable economic relationship, resulting in sizable commercial contracts for US firms.5 (Sales already average about $500 million annually, with prospects for a significant increase.)
—Short-Run Algerian Moderation: Promotion of solid economic relations should encourage a continuation of Algeria’s lower international profile and a further reduction of the extreme, often gratuitous, confrontational tactics that characterized its past positions on many international issues.
—Long-Run Political Cooperation: Algeria, genuinely non-aligned and with a proven capacity for Third World leadership, appears to be [Page 157] the most important state in Northwest Africa. Extensive, comprehensive relations in functional areas would likely work, over the longer run, toward greater Algerian willingness to compromise on political and diplomatic issues.
The long-term evolution of US-Algerian cooperation is, of course, the least predictable of the potential benefits that would accrue to the US. Any significant modification of Algerian foreign policy will be slow and will result from the internal dynamics involved in a mutually beneficial economic relationship. Since Algeria does not consider economic and political relations to be linked, efforts by the US to use economic relations to bring about such changes probably would be counterproductive.
Effects of a Rapprochement on US Relations With Tunisia and Morocco
A US decision to seek closer and more comprehensive relations with Algeria could have adverse consequences for US relations with traditional friends in the region. To mitigate these consequences, it would be necessary to continue to pay high-level attention to Morocco and Tunisia and to reassure them that better relations with Algeria did not indicate a decrease of US interest in them. Assuming such reassurances, the following reactions could be expected:
—Tunisian leaders, because of Tunisia’s basic policy of accommodation with Algeria, would not likely be overly concerned. They feel secure in their own close ties with the US and would probably view closer US relations with Algeria as having a moderating and restraining effect on that country.
—The Moroccan leadership, in contrast, would be disturbed by a US-Algerian rapprochement because of the continuing Algerian-Moroccan confrontation and the delicate situation in the Western Sahara. Especially if the US were to sell military-related items to Algeria, Morocco would probably view a rapprochement as a weakening of US support for its position on the Western Sahara. While this might discourage Morocco from escalating its military activities against Polisario guerrilla targets in Algeria—if such moves were seriously contemplated—too close a link between the US and Algeria could lead to a cooling of US-Moroccan relations. Though major shifts in Moroccan foreign policy would be unlikely, the Moroccans might express their displeasure by, for example, permitting fewer visits of US naval vessels to Moroccan ports or by reversing their current policy of accepting visits of US nuclear-powered vessels.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2–12/77. Confidential; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. Drafted by Flora; approved by Stoddard.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 57.↩
- For a summary of the proceedings of the August 16–19, 1976, conference, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1976, pp. 27977–27980. Algeria had led the Non-Aligned Movement since the previous Summit in September 1973.↩
- An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.↩
- An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.↩