55. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State1
376. CINCEUR for POLAD. Subject: Valedictory Message—Political.
1. Summary. There has been significant improvement in our relations with Algeria over past two years, due largely to Algerian interest in our technology and market. Algeria will continue to be a force in international politics and to cause trouble, but it has dropped back to the second rank and as its economy grows may become more responsible. The country looks stable under the direction of Boumediene, and the regime seems remarkably relaxed about opposition. For better or worse, Algeria will be dominant power in North Africa. Our posture towards it should take into account our need for its energy resources. End summary.
2. This is a retrospective and impressionistic look at the development of US-Algerian relations over past two years and at local political prospects. It represents my own views, and not necessarily those of my colleagues.
3. Two changes:
A. US-Algerian relations—During the period under consideration there has been a significant improvement in US-Algerian relations, in spite of Algerian unhappiness with our position on the Sahara. This change has reflected the growing interdependence between US (discussed in my economic valedictory)2 and the limited choices open to Algerians. While there are other sources of technology and other markets, and while our companies are not as efficient as Germans or Italians when it comes to construction in Algeria, our positive approach and the size of our market make us their most interesting available partner.
4. Nature and extent of improvement should not be exaggerated. We do, however, have improved access to senior Algerian officials and are now able to carry on something of a dialogue with them on subjects [Page 148] of mutual interest. There has furthermore been a quantum jump in expressions of official interest in technical and education cooperation with US. A quick count, for instance, shows that the Ministries of Higher Education, Agriculture, National Defense, Health, and the Gendarmerie have all shown interest in the past two years in opening up one or more avenues of cooperation. While Industry and Energy and Finance have had close relations with us for some time, the other Ministries mentioned above have not. As I have said before, we have become respectable and a latent interest in things American is now being allowed to surface. Thus, President Boumediene told me during my farewell call that he hoped the teaching of English would be emphasized and expanded in the local education system in order to give the Algerians an alternative to reliance on French culture.3 He noted that the 1600 Algerian students now in the United States are a manifestation of increased Algerian interest in our technology and said that interest would increase as their economy developed.
5. The United States will nevertheless continue to be fair game in local media. We are unlikely ever to qualify as a brotherly socialist state and we can expect that our positions on most Third World issues will be criticized locally, unless we undergo a substantial change in our own outlook. The press does not reflect the attitudes of the average Algerian, or necessarily always those of the government, but it is an expression of the image we have for many Algerians. We are going to find this irritating, but should not rise to the bait. It is well to protest the more egregious offenses, but we should ignore the daily pinpricks, and hope that eventually, as their economy expands and they become more interested in stability and less in revolution, the Algerians will become more responsible.
6. In the multilateral area the Algerians have pulled in their horns somewhat over the past 18 months, apparently because they were tired of getting all the opprobrium for their forward position on Third World issues. They are still a force to be reckoned with, however, and we will continue to find them a thorn in our side on many issues. We should not be afraid to make our position known to them clearly and forcefully, and we may hope that one day our representations will have some effect.
7. Malcolm Kerr in an article some ten years ago said that doing business with Nasser was like trying to change a tire on a moving automobile. Doing business with Algeria is not like that. The car is not [Page 149] moving. It is just that the lug nuts won’t screw on properly, but with enough care and attention the tire will eventually get mounted.
8. B. Building institutions—One reason our relations have improved has been the Algerian concentration on institution-building over the past year. Boumediene, who has been fond of saying that Algeria was “solid” because if he went the people would remain and would know what to do, has nevertheless been well aware of the lack of institutions to take over should he disappear. He has no apparent intention to share any real power with them, but he is nevertheless going through a carefully worked-out process of setting up institutions, a constitution, a Parliament, and a reorganized government—to give the regime legitimacy and to make a power transition possible at some point. Energies which might otherwise have been expended on causing trouble internationally have been dedicated to this task, and the points of irritation between us have diminished accordingly. In particular, the Sahara has been put on the back burner—Boumediene did not even mention the word (although he referred to it indirectly) in our last conversation.4
9. The building of these institutions has not been greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm locally and there is a vocal, if modest, opposition to Boumediene and all his policies. The significance of this opposition is hard to gauge, and its future role will be determined to a large extent by the role the institutions are allowed to play. If the Parliament in fact is allowed to express the opinions of its members and enjoys some authority, the positions of regime opponents may be pre-empted.
10. Two questions:
A. Will the GOA get it all together?: The Algerians are embarked not only on building institutions but on a forced draft industrialization program which has occasioned much waste and a good deal of inefficient use of resources. The biggest single problem is that of the lack of competent people to run things. Middle management is a waste land, and hundreds of millions of dollars worth of delays have been caused by governmental inefficiency. Given the population growth rate (3.2 percent) and the massive unemployment (upwards of 25 percent) it is hard to be optimistic. Yet there are positive factors. For one thing, there seems to be general agreement on goals and there is a very competent elite which makes decisions on the basis of logical (if flawed) reasoning rather than family interest. For another, Algeria’s resources are impressive, and a certain amount of waste can be absorbed without fatal consequences.
11. It seems to me necessary to strike a balance somewhere between Pangloss and Cassandra. The Algerians are going to fall short of their [Page 150] goals. How short is the question. My own guess is that they will get about 80 per cent of what they are trying to do done.5 That is a passing grade, but whether they will be left with an unmanageable industrial establishment which is producing all the wrong things at the wrong time, and doing so poorly, as many of my colleagues argue, or whether they will eventually arrive at a second-rate but nevertheless functional equilibrium is the question. It is easy to make comparisons with Mohamed Ali’s experiment in 19th century Egypt, but the Algerians are considerably more sophisticated, and have much more to work with, than the Egyptians were and did then. As a perennial optimist, I will bet the Algerians reach a satisfactory equilibrium some time within the next twenty years, but I won’t bet much.6
12. B. How stable is Algeria? This is a question very much on the minds of American businessmen contemplating this place. It is of course impossible to predict what will happen here. Change is inevitable sooner or later. I am impressed, however, by the relatively relaxed attitude of the regime.7 Although there is opposition to it, as far as we can tell there are no political prisoners except some five people, including Ben Bella, who are under house arrest. The Army is as far as we know loyal to Boumediene and it holds the keys to power. There is always the risk that he will be assassinated. It would be easy to do. He often rides unescorted in the front seat of a BMW and follows an itinerary that frequently takes him through heavy traffic. I suspect, however, that, barring accidents, he will be with us for some time and that he will continue to rule Algeria with a firm hand. As long as he is in power there will be stability. When he passes, someone else will fill his shoes peacefully.8 The Algerians have had their revolution.
13. Conclusion: I close with the observation that, for better or worse, Algeria is going to be the dominant power in North Africa. We may feel warm about Tunisia and Morocco, but our economic interests are here. This is one of the four or five most important states on the African continent and in deciding what our posture towards it should be, we should keep in mind the need to heat our homes in a winter like that we are now passing through.9
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2–12/77. Confidential; Limdis. Sent for information to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tripoli, London, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, CINCEUR, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- Telegram 373 from Algiers, February 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0395)↩
- Telegram 366 from Algiers, February 12, summarized the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770051–0315)↩
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- An unknown hand underlined the phrase “relatively relaxed attitude of the regime.”↩
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