Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

29. Memorandum From William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 23, 1978

SUBJECT

• North African Developments

One effect of our intense concentration on Arab-Israeli issues has been to ignore North Africa. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but I am concerned that the bureaucracy is operating on a day-to-day basis without any sense of what our broad policy objectives in this region are—apart from the omnipresent goal of “improving relations.” As third-world countries go, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are of considerable interest to us, and we have reasonably good ties with all three. Pressures are mounting, however, to make decisions that could tend to polarize the region unnecessarily, or at least to erode our ability to pursue our interest effectively. Finally, we have invitations pending to Hassan, Nouira and Boumediene, and of necessity we will have to spend more time thinking about North Africa as their visits approach.

The issues as I see them, are as follows:

We need to decide on OV–10s and Cobras for Hassan.² There is a lukewarm, and even negative, Congressional attitude. There are problems of timing. There is a question of whether we would try to urge Hassan to be any more flexible on the Sahara issue. If Hassan invites himself to visit in April, would we want him to come then, or should we try to have all of the Maghreb leaders in late 1978/early 1979?

Algeria. The French and Moroccans would like to draw us into a policy of confrontation with Algeria. Boumediene seems determined to keep lines open to us, and we have quite a substantial economic relationship at stake. The question of LNG imports is being held up because of Schlesinger’s objections. With all the problems of dealing with Algeria, we have no interest in writing Boumediene off or leaving the field to the Soviets. Algeria is something of a test case for us in demonstrating that we can deal maturely with a self-styled radical country.

Tunisia. The fabric of Tunisian political life is coming under severe strain as a result of Bourguiba’s imminent demise and the emergence of socio-economic grievances. Libyan intervention cannot be excluded. The aftermath of the January 26 riots will make a smooth transition difficult. Tunisia constantly asks for more visible signs of support. I feel that there is enough here to justify a PRM on North Africa. There is no particular rush, but I would think that it might be worth requesting a study as a way of getting better coordination within the bureaucracy. If you agree, I will draft a request for a PRM for your signature.³

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate whether you feel a PRC on North Africa would be justified.⁴

Yes. Prepare a draft request for a PRM.⁵

Not now. Wait until closer to visit.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 73, North Africa: PRM 34: 2–7/78. Secret. Sent for action. Dodson wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “See RI [Inderfuth] & [illegible—DA (Aaron)?] notes p. 2.”
2. Laraki requested the arms in a September 13, 1977, meeting with Vance. See footnote 2, Document 152 and Document 222.
3. Brzezinski drew an arrow from this paragraph and wrote: “Have a working group meet first under your chairmanship.”
4. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Dodson added a typewritten note beneath the options: “Checked with Bill; under the second option, he intends to wait until next fall or even later if all visits get postponed to 1979. Christine.”
5. Inderfurth drew a line from this sentence to the bottom of the page and wrote: “I think we should go ahead with a PRM. First, it will give those in the bureaucracy working on the Maghreb direction. They apparently need it. Second, it has been some time since a regional PRM has been issued and it is important to have these periodically. If you agree to go the PRM route now, remember we can state a longer time—3–6 months—for completion. Rick.” Beneath this, an unknown hand, presumably Aaron, wrote: “I agree, though my experience is that [illegible] work on projects with long deadlines tend to be deferred until the last minute. Hence I would be [illegible] to go ahead, get [illegible].”