Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

248. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, October 31, 1979, 1705Z

7739. Subject: (U) Call by Deputy Secretary Christopher on King on October 30.

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Summary: During two and one-half hour session with King Hassan and his principal advisers, Deputy Secretary Christopher discussed the President’s recent decision on arms assistance to Morocco. Hassan set forth his reactions, military needs, and thinking on the prospects for reaching a peaceful solution to the problem of the Western Sahara. End summary.

3. King Hassan received Deputy Secretary Christopher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Murray, Mr. Trattner of the Deputy Secretary’s staff, and Charge Moffat for a wide-ranging two and one-half hour discussion late morning October 30. Flanking the King were his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, his three Royal Counselors and Moroccan Ambassador to Washington Bengelloun.

4. Mr. Christopher began with an expression of appreciation to the King for receiving him on short notice during a busy holiday week. He had been instructed by the President to come to Morocco as soon as possible to talk to His Majesty. Mr. Christopher elaborated upon the President’s high regard for the King’s role and position, and Hassan’s support for the U.S. policies in a number of areas. Dep Sec said the President had instructed him to speak to King very directly about the President’s decision to supply additional military equipment to Morocco. Christopher emphasized the President’s determination to support our friends, and to assist Morocco so that it could seek a peaceful solution from a position of strength.

5. Mr. Christopher detailed the kind of equipment envisaged in the President’s decision and the reasoning behind it. He focused particularly on OV–10’s and TOW-mounted Cobras, indicating that we were less sure of Morocco’s interest in the Cobras, since it had been quite some time since we had heard from the GOM on this subject. Should the GOM prefer another kind of armed helicopter, such as the Hughes 500, we would try to accommodate their preference. (At the afternoon meeting held with Foreign Minister and the military staff, Moroccan Air Force Col. Kabbaj indicated to Mr. Murray that a discussion with the King following Mr. Christopher’s morning meeting had resulted in a decision to drop the Cobra altogether, and select instead the Hughes MD500, which he described as less costly and less sophisticated and much better suited to Morocco. Col. Kabbaj indicated that he was making a formal request at the King’s instruction).²

6. Mr. Christopher explained that he was accompanied by Mr. Murray from DOD who was prepared to discuss Morocco’s equipment needs in detail if that was desired. He noted that Mr. Murray had just returned from Saudi Arabia. Given the magnitude of the sales contemplated, they would have to be presented to the Congress. It was important to begin this process as early as possible because the President was anxious to carry this through.

7. Mr. Christopher then gave his analysis of the climate within Congress and emphasized how important it was for Morocco to help us with Congress. We would have an insurmountable problem unless Congress could be convinced that His Majesty sincerely desired meaningful negotiations.

8. Though the U.S. had no blueprints for solutions to the conflict in the Western Sahara, and wanted to be neither arbiter nor mediator, we felt the time was ripe for the King to take the lead toward negotiations. Our discussions with the Algerian Government led us to believe that President Bendjedid’s government in Algeria does not wish to see a change in the Government of Morocco and on the contrary views the continuation of Hassan’s regime as important for stability of the region. We hope the King will now demonstrate the statesmanship he has shown throughout his life by entering into a new phase of negotiations, reflecting his country’s renewed strength.

9. We have followed closely the twists and turns of the situation, and believe that negotiations could succeed only if all interested parties participated. We are aware of the difficult situation concerning the Polisario and prescribe no formula, but hope that the King will find some way to include the Polisario in the search for a peaceful solution.

10. Mr. Christopher expressed his gratitude to His Majesty for hearing him out and expressed his interest in listening to His Majesty’s views about the manner in which the negotiating process might be started, the form a solution could take, as well as His Majesty’s evaluation of how the Tunis meeting³ and President Tolbert’s upcoming visit could be used as occasions to move forward on the negotiating front.

11. His Majesty responded that he would speak in all candor since he felt that clarity was the best form of diplomacy. He would start with Mr. Christopher’s last comments. He would have much preferred that this joint working session between long-standing allies and friends could have been devoted to ways of developing Morocco’s resources in the field of energy and production rather than talking about war. His Ambassador in Washington could explain at greater detail that the present state of belligerency had been neither foreseen nor desired by Morocco. Would it be logical to seek peace between Israel and the Arabs, and not want peace between Morocco and Algeria? Peace was His Majesty’s overriding concern for the sake of both his country and his own career. The King indicated that having doubled his borders in the past three years he could think of nothing better than the prospect of peace and regional cooperation.

12. He was pleased that his American friends recognized that a stronger Morocco would be in a better position to pursue negotiations. He wanted the President to be assured that the problem of the Sahara was not a territorial problem. The nature of the conflict was the incompatibility between a totalitarian and a democratic regime that could not survive and co-exist in the region. Moscow’s expansionism was opposed by the peoples of the region who do not want to be colonized by Moscow. Negotiations were needed but it would not be easy.

13. His Majesty had a political plan in mind and [garble—would share?] it with President Carter when the time came. He would communicate it to the President personally. The year 1980 would be favorable to peace and negotiations, but Morocco must have the assistance of all its friends in the U.S. and the Arab world.

14. The King asserted that Congress would not be so blind as to refuse to help the President, if Congress understood that Morocco was indispensable to the survival of Israel (because if Morocco was lost the Straits of Gibraltar would not be free and Israel could not be resupplied nor could Greece and Turkey be supported). Surely this argument ought to convince hesitant Congressmen.

15. His Majesty stated that Libya was at the root of all the problems of the region but Khadafi was not the mastermind, decisions were made in the Kremlin.

16. Hassan then turned to the discussion of military equipment, stressing that the OV–10 was an indispensable weapon for the form of desert warfare forced upon him. It would remain useful for years to come and he thought it might be a good idea to look for ways to reactivate the production line. (In the afternoon staff talks, reported separately, Ambassador Bengelloun indicated that they had already talked to Rockwell executives along those lines informally on a number of occasions and that he foresaw no problems).

17. The King felt that there should be a joint Saudi-Moroccan approach to Rockwell if the U.S. agreed. The King argued that OV–10s would be of great use in the Arabian Peninsula in countering guerrilla warfare, such as the Dofar rebellion. Mid-air refueling was also a vital need to be met. (At the subsequent staff discussions, the Moroccans indicated that they had chosen the KC–135 for this purpose and might also adapt some of their C–130s for that purpose). The King emphasized that the kind of equipment he needs [garble—must] be conventional, sturdy, lethal and reliable. He described some of the difficulties encountered by equipment in desert warfare conditions and stressed that the Armed Forces plan of 1974 had made no provision for desert warfare. No one had thought there would be a war between Algeria and Morocco.

18. At this point, however, Morocco knew that the OV–10 was definitely the kind of aircraft it needed. The Cobra also met Moroccan requirements. But six of each would not give Morocco the strong position it needed to negotiate; in fact it would create more dangers for Morocco because it would arouse the enemy without giving Morocco the necessary strength. If six of each was all that he could have he would prefer to turn them down because it would not help him. The King reiterated the need to reactivate the OV10 production line for the sake of a number of countries in the area who would need this kind of defensive aircraft. The U.S., he said, should think in terms of weapons its non-NATO allies need.

19. The King stressed the importance of obtaining more F5E’s and indicated that in 10 or 15 years Morocco would have the most credible air force in Africa and that this would serve all of Morocco’s friends. At present, aircraft numbers favored Algeria.

20. If Algeria stopped supporting the Polisario then Libya would take over completely and this would create a danger for Algeria itself. The King felt that at some point Algeria and Morocco would become objective allies against the threat of Polisario actions. Algeria’s economic situation was very shaky and its agriculture had collapsed. President Bendjedid wanted to renounce Boumedienne’s experiments and hoped to achieve a wider opening to the West. However, Libya and Moscow would not let him act freely.

21. Algeria and Morocco could inflict considerable damage on one another in a war. It would be a crime for either side to initiate it, and it would take a couple of generations to recover. The King wanted the President to be convinced that he would not make war against Algeria and would not go beyond his borders. He just needed the means to score a few points in the field. Then he could work on the King’s real problems here: 3.5 percent annual population growth, the need for schools, teachers and food for these growing numbers.

22. Morocco’s problem was compounded by its geographical location and the absence of good neighbors. He described Mauritania as being in total disarray and Spain as having to relearn to live within the international community after 40 years of isolation. If Morocco was lost, the Sixth Fleet could go into dry dock. In conclusion the King wanted the President to be assured that he had always been loyal with his partners, even with his enemies. There was all the more reason to be loyal when dealing with a friend like the U.S. and President Carter.

23. If given means to score in the field, he felt that 1980 could bring peace to the region. He had a plan which he would communicate orally to the President when the time came. The sooner he could score the sooner that time would come. He summarized the equipment needs by describing the Cobras, OV10 and F5E as three indispensable links in one continuous chain and pointed out again the inadequacy of numbers since to have one aircraft flying, have to have TOW in maintenance.

24. Mr. Christopher responded with a brief technical discussion on the Cobras, F5Es and OV10s and their availability. He explained that the 6 Cobras offered for early delivery would be from our own forces. We were prepared to offer additional Cobras, but these would come from production with a long lead time for delivery. We need an indication from His Majesty so that we can go to Congress and begin the process of consultation.

25. At Mr. Christopher’s request, Mr. Murray explained that our equipment is either in the hands of our own soldiers or in production. We had made a major decision to withdraw OV10s and Cobras from our own inventories. This would enable us to start early delivery with both political and military impact. Mr. Christopher discussed the 20 F5Es which the Moroccans had believed available from the cancelled sale to Egypt. Mr. Murray pointed out that the aircraft were without engines or ground support systems and had been offered to other governments for eventual purchase. Mr. Murray was not sure what other aircraft were available as an alternative to the F5E. Mr. Christopher indicated readiness to hold additional discussions at the expert level in the afternoon as suggested by His Majesty.

26. Turning to the OAU’s mediation efforts and President Tolbert’s visit, Mr. Christopher asked the King for an evaluation. The King responded that President Tolbert would be here [garble—next Saturday?] and that he would talk about the OAU’s role in the Sahara. The problem was that President Tolbert often changes his mind. African-style palavers were time-consuming. The King was of course himself an African but was also a European by education. The procedure he had in mind would be much quicker and more effective; the King indicated he could say no more at this point. He appreciated importance of the President’s decision. It indicated that the U.S. would not hesitate to choose between its friends and those who are not. It was an important international decision and would be welcomed in Africa to give renewed courage to some who were beginning to worry. If the King wanted the war to drag on he would only ask for smaller quantities of equipment but he did not want the war to go on. He wanted to be able to move rapidly. He reiterated that he wanted the President to be assured that he would not violate Algerian territory or Algerian air space. The process that would lead to peace from a position of strength was taking shape in his mind. He would seek international agreement for it, not just African support alone, because he wanted Morocco to be rid of the problem once and for all. He did not want to say more at this point but would share his plan with the President when the time came.

27. Mr. Christopher expressed his gratitude for the time devoted by the King, and the candid discussions of the issues. The President had made an important and difficult decision that indicated our support of a long time friend. The King would see that the implementation of that decision would reflect our determination to stand by our friends.

28. Mr. Christopher then asked to see the King privately for a few minutes. He gave him the President’s letter stressing the importance the President attaches to his private correspondence with His Majesty.⁴ The King replied he would treat also very confidentially. Mr. Christopher discussed his forthcoming press comments. A brief discussion of the Tunis Summit resulted in the King’s statement that he felt his presence was required and he would attend. The King said that after Baghdad, the time has come to restore a calm atmosphere. The King expressed his hope for an early arrival of Ambassador and Mr. Christopher confirmed that this would be around December 1. In parting the King asked Mr. Christopher to convey his strong personal regards to the President, to Mrs. Carter and to “his friend” Miss Lillian.

29. The above has not been cleared by Mr. Christopher.⁵ Department may wish to repeat to Algiers for attention of Mr. Brzezinski.

Moffat

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–2003. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 285147 to Rabat, Algiers, and Jidda, November 1, the Department provided an account of the afternoon meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503–0552)
3. The Arab League Summit was held in Tunis November 20–22.
4. See Document 179.
5. In telegram 7712 from Rabat, October 30, Christopher summarized the meeting with Hassan for Vance and Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 3, Algeria: 1/77–11/80)