238. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State and the Embassy in Morocco1
93. Dept pass USCINCEUR Vaihingen Ge for POLAD. From the Ambassador. Subj: U.S. Policy in Morocco and North Africa. Ref: (A) Rabat 0043;2 (B) State 005792; (C) Algiers 0078; (D) Nouakchott 0066; (E) FBIS London 041233Z Jan 79 (Notal).3
1. Summary: I heartily concur with Ambassador Parker’s suggestion that the United States reexamine its policy in Morocco and, by [Page 582] implication, North Africa. From here, however, the creation of some sort of Saharan state seems just a matter of time whatever action we choose to take or not take. I feel, therefore, that the United States should prepare itself in light of recent events in the area for the changes that are likely to occur in the upcoming months. Such a newly considered policy should enable us to be ready for what happens and not taken by surprise. End summary.
2. I want to endorse strongly the thrust and conclusion of Ambassador Parker’s refreshing cable (ref. A). As addressees are aware, I have felt for some time that the time is ripe for a North African policy review and for analyzing and identifying specifically U.S. interests in the region and the conflicting claims on us which the nations in the region have.
3. As ref C tries to make clear, there are no current U.S. bilateral policies with either Algeria or Morocco which greatly disrupt our bilateral goals and [garble—objectives with] the other. In this light, I would like to examine the Western Saharan question as it is seen from Algiers.
4. Mauritania wants out of the Western Saharan fray. This has been reported by well-informed observers (refs. D and E). The GIRM graphically displayed its desire for improved Algerian-Mauritanian relations by sending its Foreign Minister to President Boumediene’s funeral. Ould Saleck’s New Year’s message (ref. D) further demonstrated this policy. The big question seems to be not whether Mauritania will opt out of the Western Saharan conflict, but when and how, and what will be Morocco’s reaction.
5. Polisario is alive and relatively well. Boumediene did not create it, although he certainly helped it create a national conscience in the Sahara. In spite of the lack of widespread popular Algerian support for the organization and its cause, the GOA continues to back Polisario strongly (see para 7 below). If this Algerian support were to dwindle or even disappear, most observers believe that Polisario now has enough cohesion, moral and political consciousness, and military equipment to continue to harass Moroccan (and if necessary, Mauritanian) forces in the Western Sahara.
6. According to non-official American and other Western observers who have recently visited the Moroccan-controlled portion of the Western Sahara and Saharan refugee camps near Tindouf, at least among some of the more articulate Saharans, there is considerable feeling against Moroccan and Mauritanian domination. Para 8, ref A confirms this feeling. As the conflict continues and strong Moroccan military activity becomes necessarily repressive, these antagonistic Saharan feelings are likely to deepen, thereby enhancing Saharan nationalism.
7. Contrary to earlier beliefs that Algerian support for Polisario would diminish after Boumediene’s [garble—death there] is every indication that this will not be the case. Interim Chief of State Bitat made [Page 583] a big issue of continued GOA backing for Polisario when he opened the National Youth Congress January 6 and the Polisario observer to the Congress was given special attention. Indeed, it would be unwise to believe that Algeria would give its Moroccan rival a break in the Western Sahara at this time. All arguments run counter to such a concilliatory move. The post-Boumediene regime must demonstrate its revolutionary credential. The GOA views the U.S. vote on the Sahara as a demonstration of international support for its Saharan policy. Even if it does not go very deep, there is some intellectual and philosophical support for Polisario as a liberation movement among Algerians. For those Algerians who cherish their revolutionary history and credentials, and especially for the present government, it would be very difficult to abandon Algerian support of Polisario. Mauritania seems to be leaning Algeria’s way and Polisario forces are not being defeated in the field. Morale in the refugee camps, as reported by private U.S. and other Western observers, is good.
8. Morocco, on the other hand, seems to be painting itself into a corner. It is true that there appears to be genuine, widespread support for King Hassan’s Saharan policy in Morocco. However, Hassan is in a weak position in the Sahara given Morocco’s increasing isolation, the strength of the Saharan opposition and his internal headaches (a sluggish economy, deeply seated social inequalities and, in the possible future, an army that is tired of fighting a losing battle).
9. In light of the foregoing, there are policy implications which the United States has not faced squarely:
A) The United States cannot afford to ignore reality:
1) Given the apparent Polisario strength and continued GOA support, the Saharan conflict is not going to wither and die. On the contrary, it is most likely to continue at its present level.
2) We understand that the southern or Mauritanian-administered portion of the Western Sahara is already controlled by Polisario to a great extent.
3) The Saharans do not want to be part of Morocco (para 8, ref. A).
B) A Saharan mini-state is probably imminent:
1) Given the above realities, it is likely that the GIRM will sue for peace with Polisario soon. Polisario leaders, such as Omar Hadrami, member of the Executive Committee and Revolutionary Council (talking to non-official American visitors in Algiers recently), have repeatedly stated that Polisario will reject any offer of territorial sovereignty which does not include both parts of the former Spanish Sahara. Hadrami reportedly said that if Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco agreed to a solution which gives Polisario only the Mauritanian section of the Sahara, Polisario “would go it alone until the final victory.” In [Page 584] spite of such avowals, however, it is quite possible that Polisario would accept less than the whole loaf, i.e., the Mauritanian-administered area.
2) If such a mini-state is created, whether or not the United States likes it, it can (or should) do nothing to prevent it.
3) No-one knows what sort of ideology a Polisario-led Western Saharan state would follow. Probably, but not necessarily, it would lean heavily on the GOA and Algerian rhetoric. On the other hand, Polisario leaders have repeatedly told journalists and scholars that the Front has no ideology except to win independence. Whether completely true or not, this acknowledgement that Polisario has not chosen sides can be used by Western nations, including the United States, to develop positive relations with a new Western Saharan state. Comment: On the other hand, lack of official American contact with Polisario ties our hands and prevents us from developing the relationships which will be vital if the Western Sahara becomes independent. End comment. One must add that there is a great risk of misunderstanding the Sahara crisis, if we try to force it into the East-West ideological context with which we have grown accustomed to dealing.
D) At this late date, the United States cannot retreat from its public position supporting self-determination in the Western Sahara. It is our position, for good or ill, and we are stuck with it. To change it would win few friends and disappoint many, especially African, states. For years, we have used the self-determination slogan to mollify the OAU. To discard it now would be to risk considerable alienation in African circles. What’s more, self-determination has become an irreversible process in the last half of the twentieth century.
E) Morocco and King Hassan need the United States at least as much as we need them. While the King has often aligned his policies with ours, he has acted primarily out of his own interest, not that of the United States.
10. In light of the above, accommodation (para 11, ref. A) may offer the United States a way out of the present dilemma. A third option (in addition to the two mentioned in paras 13 and 14, ref. A and drawing from para 11, ref. A) is a trilateral agreement with Polisario to give it “a piece of Mauritania.” In spite of Polisario’s protestations (see para 9 B) 1) above), such a compromise would probably be accepted, however reluctantly, and seems the most likely from where we sit. Such an option raises further problems, of course (the probability that such a state will be a staging area for attacks into Moroccan-administered Sahara, and its viability), which would have to be carefully examined.
11. Finally, I wish to reiterate my total agreement with Ambassador Parker’s call for a policy review. North Africa is a region in ferment. I want to see the United States ready for those changes, not, as too often happens, simply reacting to events. We have been asked by the [Page 585] President and the Secretary to develop a more creative and imaginative foreign policy. Therefore, let’s try to anticipate and influence future events, not just on the sidelines as a situation falls to pieces. Current experience shows us how difficult it is to put the pieces together again.4
12. Comment: We apologize to Embassy Rabat for “poaching so heavily in its territory” in this cable. Nevertheless, we do hope that addressees will see some value in “the view from Algiers.”
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790016–0768. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Dakar, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Paris.↩
- See Document 237.↩
- In telegram 5792 to Algiers, Madrid, Nouakchott, and Paris, January 9, the Department requested comments on “Ambassador Parker’s thoughts contained reftel.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790011–0866) In telegram 78 from Algiers, January 10, the Embassy wrote: “Even though U.S. interests, as reflected in reftels dovetail, this Embassy believes that the current U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Western Saharan issue needs further scrutiny. Changes among the important players during the past seven months (i.e., and a new regime in Mauritania), plus apparently growing pressures on the GIRM to conclude a rapprochement with Polisario and some sort of acceptable peace, and the reality of the Polisario’s apparent ability to hang in there militarily against the Moroccans, lead us to conclude that U.S. policy in the area should be reexamined in light of these new developments.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790062–0939) Telegram 66 from Nouakchott, January 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790009–0103. The London FBIS report, January 4, was not found.↩
- Carter approved the sale on January 30. See Document 167 and footnote 6 thereto.↩