Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

22. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Egypt¹

Washington, August 2, 1977, 0241Z

Tosec 80036/180597. From Moose to Habib. Subject: Aid to Chad. Ref: Secto 8006.²

1. Realistically, we can do very little for Chad in either military or economic aid in the near future.

2. The principal constraints in military aid are the provisions in our own legislation and the fact that Chad has no money. Grant assistance would require specific congressional authorization, and for practical purposes is out of the question. Chad is not eligible for Foreign Military Sales (FMS), but we are preparing a draft Presidential Determination that sales of defense articles and services to Chad under FMS will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace.³ Such a determination is a condition of FMS eligibility. Under present circumstances, the only way Chad can obtain military equipment from the US is to buy it from commercial sources. Chad’s Foreign Minister is about to leave for Jidda, and presumably will request financing to purchase military equipment. If the President were to determine that Chad is eligible for FMS, Chad could purchase through DOD but would still require financing. Chad is not interested in credit, except on the most favorable terms. If Chad were FMS eligible, and we were able to reprogram FY 77 funds, it might be possible to arrange FMS credits for Chad. We are asking PM to look into this possibility. I understand there is already quite a list of claimants, including Lebanon and Tunisia.

3. Chad could obtain US origin equipment through transfers from third countries. Chad has approached Zaire, Gabon, Morocco, Egypt and Sudan and will raise third country transfers with Saudi Arabia and perhaps Jordan. (FYI: Gabon has declined to provide further assistance to Chad because President Bongo is now President of OAU. Egypt has no US origin lethal equipment and little if anything else from US which would help Chadians.) Transfers of US origin equipment/services to a country that is not FMS eligible, such as Chad, require a determination by the Secretary that the US would be willing to transfer the equipment in question directly to Chad, and that the proposed transfers will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace. Furthermore, before transfers of FMS origin items are approved, Congress must be notified 30 working days in advance.

4. Increasing our economic aid to Chad in the short-run will be extremely difficult. We have a PL–480 Title II program designed to make up shortfalls in last year’s harvest. This program is valued at 7 million dols, about half of which is the value of the commodities and about half the cost of transporting it to Chad. Chad has requested, as part of its military assistance package, 50 tons of rice but we cannot provide this under PL–480 because PL–480 cannot be used for military purposes. The principal problem in the present PL–480 program has been a bottleneck at the railhead in Cameroon (N’Gaoundere) which has now been broken. Chad had requested an airlift to distribute food within Chad, which we turned down because it was not, and is not now, necessary. An airlift at this point would be a dramatic demonstration of our support for Chad, but would also be expensive and unnecessary, and would not directly assist Chad in maintaining its territorial integrity.

5. Our economic assistance to Chad in FY 77 amounts to about 4 million dols, chiefly devoted to increasing food production over the long-run. It would be very difficult to accelerate any plans now in preparation to increase this assistance.

6. In sum, subject to our readiness to take necessary policy decisions, for the time being the best advice we can give Chad is to solicit financing from countries such as Saudi Arabia in order to be able to buy military equipment from the US or elsewhere through commercial channels. A somewhat more lengthy and complex procedure would be to solicit such transfers of US origin equipment from other countries as US would agree to.

7. Sadat may raise with you the possibility of replacing military equipment including small arms, which are not of US origin, to Chad. Presidential Determination on arms for Egypt has now been signed.⁴ We could consider providing Egypt with replacements for such equipment. However, this would require consultations with the Congress and could impact adversely on our “non-lethal” package on the Hill.

8. In our discussions with other countries on assistance to Chad, we have found very little support for a meeting of potential donors. The French have suggested a concertation of assistance through a series of bilateral contacts. Belgium and the FRG may be possible sources of economic assistance, but are unlikely to provide Chad with any military assistance. Also, it appears that Morocco and the Sudan, though sympathetic to Chad, may only be able to provide at the most very little military assistance such as small arms and ammunition. Embassy Jidda believes Saudi Arabia would be willing to participate financially in a multilateral effort. Embassy Tehran believes Iran would not finance Chadian arms purchases, but might contribute to common pool intended to assist Chad economically. Saudi Arabia, Iran and possibly Jordan could be sources of third country transfers. At the moment France is providing Chad with logistical equipment support and technical assistance. Egypt is giving small arms, ammunition, and spare parts. Gabon has provided an aircraft but, as noted, Gabon has declined to provide more assistance.

9. As to possible Saudi financial assistance, Secretary may wish to raise topic during his meetings in Jidda.⁵

10. In sum, as soon as Chad can find a source of financing some non-lethal equipment (e.g., uniforms, rations) be made available from commercial sources in a matter of three to four weeks. Delivery would probably also require financing.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770275–1146. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Smith and Lewis; cleared in PM, AFR/SFWA, NEA, NEA/EGY, and P; approved by Moose. Vance was in Alexandria to meet with Sadat to discuss the Middle East peace process.
2. In telegram Secto 8006 from the Secretary’s aircraft, August 1, Habib wrote: “In anticipation of Egyptian interest could you let me have by immediate return cable a summary of what we can realistically do for Chad in military and economic aid in the immediate future. The Secretary would like to move ahead on this without delay. Also, sum up the results of our discussions with other countries and what they are doing or are willing to do.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274–0830)
3. See Document 24.
4. In telegram Secto 8025 from Alexandria, August 2, Vance summarized his meeting on Africa and bilateral issues with Sadat. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2615)
5. Vance was in Taif August 7–9 to discuss the Middle East peace process with Saudi leaders. There is no indication that he discussed Saudi assistance to Chad. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 74, 75, and 77.