Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, June 17, 1977, 2250Z

141679. Subject: Reply to Waldheim Regarding Sahara Problem. Refs: A) Secto 4127,² B) Rabat 2841,³ C) Algiers 1287,⁴ D) Madrid 3987,⁵ E) Rabat 2790,⁶ F) Nouakchott 1226.⁷

1. As you have seen from reftels, our Embassies in the area recommend strongly against our getting involved in any Waldheim initiative on Sahara problem and question whether there is anything constructive SYG could do at this point. We share negative assessment of prospects for Waldheim initiative, and understand dangers of U.S. involvement in enterprise which could needlessly complicate our relations with Hassan and do little to ingratiate us with the Algerians or resolve the basic conflict. We also wish to avoid introducing an element of superpower involvement into a situation which we have told both sides we believe should be settled on a regional basis. Nonetheless, we see no harm in simply informing Moroccans of Algerian approach to Waldheim while stressing our own “hands off” policy.

2. Among other factors which incline us towards a not overly encouraging response to Waldheim are: Waldheim’s fear that the Moroccans may be planning a preemptive strike or that the French may intervene on the side of the Mauritanians is not supported by intelligence reports or on-the-scene observers.

—A French report indicates that the Moroccans and Algerians already have turned down Waldheim’s proposal for “some kind of autonomy” for the Saharans as an element of a possible solution.

—The French are concerned that a Waldheim initiative might complicate their efforts to free their hostages captured by the Polisario at Zouerate.

3. Looking to the future, we recognize that the Western Sahara issue requires our continued attention because it is potentially destabilizing and shows no signs of going away. There are indications that the Polisario has strengthened its infrastructure and its operational capacity despite significant military commitments by Morocco and Mauritania. It seems unlikely that the guerrillas will be able to win a military victory and a clash between Morocco and Algeria also appears remote, but the strains of maintaining their levels of activity in the Sahara put pressures on all three governments involved. In addition, we are concerned about the human rights problems associated with the thousands of Saharans living in refugee camps in Algeria. With this in mind, we are considering a possible response to the UNHCR’s renewed appeal for contributions for Saharan refugees.

4. For USUN: Given Waldheim’s own ambivalence and the exploratory nature of his exchange with Secretary on this matter, we believe that an informal, oral reply would be appropriate. Please seek meeting with SYG to deliver message, on behalf of the Secretary, drawing on the following talking points:

—During your recent meeting with the Secretary in Geneva there was a discussion of possible initiatives to resolve the Sahara dispute.

—We have given careful thought to Algeria’s proposal and to your own ideas as to possible face-saving formulas. We have also solicited the views of our Embassies in the area.

—Our judgment is that the Moroccan Government would not be receptive at this time to an outside initiative, whatever its origin.

—In addition, we have consistently maintained the position that this problem can best be resolved on a regional basis, and that it should not become a source of contention among the major powers.

—As you requested, we plan to inform King Hassan through Foreign Minister Laraki of the approach made to you by Boumediene’s emissary in Maputo.

—For the reasons cited above, however, we are disinclined at the moment to become further involved in discussions of possible face-saving solutions.

—Should it appear in the future that either side were contemplating action against the other, we would be prepared to reconsider our own diplomatic role.

5. For Rabat: Per Waldheim request in ref A, you should apprise FonMin Laraki during your next routine meeting with him of approach to Waldheim by Boumediene’s emissary, noting that you are merely carrying out SecGen’s request to Secretary Vance that this info be passed on to King Hassan. You should tell Laraki that we believe it is entirely appropriate for Waldheim to continue to explore possibilities of a solution, but reassure him that U.S. is maintaining its “hands-off” position and does not wish to become involved in these endeavors.⁸

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770218–0936. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkinson and Peck; cleared in NEA, IO, and D/HA/ORM; approved by Vance.
2. See Document 211.
3. In telegram 2841 from Rabat, May 25, the Embassy wrote: “French Ambassador Raimond told Ambassador May 23 that he had just read a confidential report that Waldheim had discussed ‛some kind of autonomy’ as a possible element of Sahara solution, and that both Algerians and Moroccans had turned Waldheim down.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770186–0693)
4. In telegram 1287 from Algiers, May 22, the Embassy wrote: “We believe US should be extremely wary of getting involved in SecGen Waldheim’s initiative on Sahara because we are skeptical of Algerian motives.” The Embassy also expressed concern regarding the possible consequences of U.S. support: “If foregoing analysis correct, utilization of USG good offices in support of Waldheim initiative on behalf of Algerians would, from Algiers viewpoint at least, uselessly complicate our relationship with Hassan in order help Algerians extricate themselves from temporarily tight bind and pursue their diplomatic efforts. It would do little to ingratiate us with Algerians or resolve basic conflict.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 1, Algeria: 2–12/77)
5. In telegram 3987 from Madrid, May 23, the Embassy commented on Spain’s position on the Sahara: “If the U.S. decides to become involved in any sort of initiative on the Sahara, we urge that we consult with the GOS at an early stage, if only on a closely held basis. Such consultation is not only entirely consistent with our treaty relationship, but in addition, Spain’s long-time experience in the area suggests the GOS might have some helpful insights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770183–0714)
6. In telegram 2790 from Rabat, May 23, Anderson wrote: “I have thought long and hard over the past year as to how we might usefully involve ourselves. Unfortunately, I do not believe our involvement in support of Waldheim would have any useful result nor do I see any way that our national interest could be other than hurt by the inevitable failure of a Waldheim initiative. Our relations with Morocco would be undermined and we would have unwisely and needlessly introduced an element of superpower involvement into a situation which has devolved onto a regional body.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770183–0386)
7. In telegram 1226 from Nouakchott, May 27, Handyside wrote: “Lengthy list of volunteer mediators who have stepped forward unsuccessfully over past twenty months underscores fact mediator can only help disputants who truly wish to resolve an outstanding problem. That has not been case in past in Sahara dispute. There is little hard evidence that Sahara protagonists have yet sufficiently altered their positions to make present any different.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190–0044)
8. In telegram 3429 from Rabat, June 22, the Chargé reported on his meeting with the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, describing his reaction as “highly negative.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223–1106)