Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

210. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 29, 1980, 1:15–1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Assistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
• Gary Sick, NSC Staff
• Mr. Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Special Advisor to the President of the Republic of Tunisia
• Tunisian Ambassador Ali Hedda

The media was invited in for the first few minutes during which the President noted the long friendship between the United States and Tunisia and congratulated them on their economic and social development. He noted that we would view with concern any outside interference or threat to the nation and people of Tunisia. He expressed gratitude for the help Tunisia has offered us on issues of great importance to us. Mr. Bourguiba replied that he was grateful for the President’s remarks.

The President opened the private meeting by noting his great concern for the recent unwarranted attack on Tunisia from Libya.

Mr. Bourguiba expressed gratitude for the prompt and spontaneous rescue of the U.S. which provided assistance immediately. Prime Minister Nouira and President Bourguiba both send their great thanks. President Bourguiba as soon as he was able to appraise the quality of the equipment which was sent, gave a great boost to the morale of the army and the people by saying that the U.S. is now with us, so let ten Qadhafis come! In that way, he has now committed the U.S. to our defense!

The President said we are with Tunisia, within the limited budget constraints we face. We would hope to be able to provide the necessary assistance. The recent delivery was about the fastest we have ever made.

Mr. Bourguiba said that the attack was a clear attempt to destabilize Tunisia but it had not succeeded. The population remained faithful to the regime and Tunisia’s friends came to its rescue, the foremost of whom was the United States. Tunisia will never forget that. However, on the basis of Qadhafi’s own threats, the attempt will occur again. Now that Prime Minister Nouira is ill, Qadhafi expects that his opponents will combine to form a government more to his liking. In 1956 Tunisia made a choice in favor of people above materialism. In 1980, that same choice has resulted in a nation which disturbs those neighboring countries who made other choices. The regime is still fragile, although it has advanced more in human terms than the others have been able to do with all their oil and gas. Tunisia must be able to defend itself, so it must divert the little nature has provided away from development. Tunisia must have the capability at least to detect and deter future actions of the sort which happened recently. He did not anticipate direct military action but future attempts of the same type of guerrilla operation. Tunisia’s friends and those who share its values must share this concern. The decision the U.S. takes will have a great psychological effect. It will persuade those who are timid to speak up in Tunisia’s behalf and will encourage Tunisia to keep on with its efforts. It will help Tunisia to keep high its honor and be a little showing of the Free World and idealistic world in the world of materialism. He was aware that the U.S. has financial and other problems, but he wanted to stress that Tunisia is one of the links of the Free World.

The President asked if Tunisia has close relations with President Sadat of Egypt.

Mr. Bourguiba said their relations were good until the whole Arab world reacted to his gesture in 1977. It was courageous but it was at the wrong time. Sadat was too weak and he could not oppose the hard bargainer on the other side of the Talmudic negotiations.

The President observed that Egypt would be a good friend for Tunisia.

Mr. Bourguiba said that since the Arab League had moved to Tunis, President Sadat had begun to speak a little badly of Tunisia.

The President said that he hoped Tunisia would have contacts with Egypt. Sadat’s feelings about Qadhafi would overcome whatever other concerns he might have. The movement of the Arab League was not important to Sadat, as he had told the President privately. Sadat has a deep distrust of Qadhafi. The President repeated the assurances he had stated earlier, that our prompt delivery of military assistance was a clear signal of our concern for the security and independence of Tunisia. He felt that the U.S., France and other friends could help Tunisia overcome the propaganda attacks being directed against them by Libya.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 89, Tunisia: 7/78–7/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office.