139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1
255507. Subject: (S) Libyan Interception of RC–135. Refs: A) State 249006 B) State 249249.2
1. (S–Entire text)
2. Ref A reported Sep 18 Washington Post account of Libyan interception of and possible attack on US RC–135 and included guidance prepared for Department’s daily press briefing Sep 18. Subsequent to dispatch of ref A, guidance and its use was modified (see para 6 below).
3. Facts of incident: On Sep 16, an RC–135 aircraft flying a central Mediterranean track within international airspace aborted its mission and returned to Hellenikon based on indications that Libyan fighter aircraft may have initiated hostile action against it. Available evidence suggests that there may have been Libyan intent to engage the RC–135 using air-to-air missiles. This incident is an example of occasional harassment by Libyan fighter aircraft of US reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace which dates back to 1972.
4. FYI. The first serious incident occurred on March 21, 1973, when two Libyan mirages fired upon an RC–130 operating out of Hellenikon.3 The RC–130 was not hit, but evasive action resulted in damage to aircraft and the declaration of an emergency as it approached Hellenikon. This incident caused Greek officials to focus on nature of US flight operations at Hellenikon and during subsequent 1975–77 DCA negotiations, the Greeks demonstrated extreme sensitivity over reconnaissance activities at Hellenikon and challenged US authority for staging of US reconnaissance aircraft from there. A subsequent search by both parties never turned up a written agreement or evidence of a verbal agreement specifically authorizing US reconnaissance activities at Hellenikon. This circumstance and Greek sensitivity resulted in our agreement in the initialed but unsigned 1977 DCA to provide the Greeks with a dols 3.5 million quid and allow Greek participation [Page 338] in reconnaissance ground activities at Hellenikon in return for GOG authority for the US to continue to use the base for reconnaissance air operations and ground activities. End FYI.
5. You will note that our press guidance does not mention that the US operates RC–135 aircraft out of Hellenikon. While this is no secret, our intent was to avoid any press focus on Hellenikon which could rekindle Greek sensitivities and cause US reconnaissance activities at Hellenikon to become an issue again in the forthcoming negotiations on a new DCA. We have not seen any additional articles in the US press nor have Department or DOD received any follow-on inquiries. However, the Greek press, perhaps through reporters in Washington, could still pick up on this one and raise questions in Athens. Should this occur, we believe Embassy should be prepared to brief MOD Averoff and/or senior MFA officials promptly. For this purpose, you are authorized to draw on background in paragraph 3 above, press guidance in paragraph 6 below, and the following additional points:
—US reconnaissance flights in the Mediterranean are always conducted in international airspace well away from the airspace of any country. (This was the case in all the incidents mentioned above.)
—Such flights from several bases in the Mediterranean occur on virtually a daily basis;
—Given this frequency, such an incident is, indeed, an infrequent occurrence;
—The Libyan regime has conducted almost all of these occasional interceptions.
In any discussion, you should stress need for your interlocutors to maintain confidentiality of sensitive info re US ability to detect possible attack as described.
6. Modified press guidance, as used on Sep 18, follows:
“Q. What can you tell us about the Libyan attack on a US reconnaissance flight as reported in the Washington Post?
A. I have no comment on that story.
Q. What action are we taking in response to this attack?
A. The United States has no hostile intent toward Libya and we do not in any way seek confrontation with that country. Nonetheless, we are prepared to take all necessary steps to insure the safety of our aircraft operating in international airspace.
Q. What steps?
A. I think the statement speaks for itself.”
7. For Rome. Should it be necessary to discuss the incident, you should do so only with high-ranking officials whose discretion can be trusted, following the guidance given in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800457–0182. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Rome. Drafted by Pugh (EUR/SE) and in OSD/ISA; cleared in INR/INC, NEA, T, EUR/SE, and NSA; approved by Ewing.↩
- Telegram 249006 to Athens, September 18, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800445–1074. In telegram 249249 to several posts, September 18, the Department transmitted guidance to Athens, Ankara, Madrid, Valletta, and Rome regarding the Libyan incident. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446–0609)↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, Document 8.↩