124. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State1
46. Subject: President Carter’s Message to Qadhafi. Ref: State 13252, State 13254, State 13208.2
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Morning January 19 I called on Ahmad Shahati, head of the Foreign Liaison Office, to discuss U.S. Libyan relations and request that I be received by Colonel Qadhafi to deliver a message from President Carter. I briefly reviewed the results of my consultations last month in Washington and told Shahati that I had just received a message from the President which he hoped would help establish US-Libyan relations on a new and more positive basis. I emphasized that an essential part of this process was the access of the official American representative in Libya to Col Qadhafi. Hence the President was asking that I be received, as he had received the Libyan representative, Ali al Houdairi, in Washington. I said I would of course be ready to go to Benghazi to see Qadhafi at any time, but suggested that it might be helpful if Houdairi, who is coming to Tripoli January 26, could accompany me to help ensure that our communication was fully understood and placed in the context of his contacts and efforts in Washington.
3. Shahati said he would immediately transmit my request to Qadhafi. He was carefully noncommittal as to whether Qadhafi would receive me. With a smile he referred to Qadhafi’s comment in a recent press conference about receiving the US representative if the Americans in Tripoli established a People’s Bureau. I said we assumed Qadhafi had been joking and asked Shahati’s opinion. He said it was probably not a joke, but he added that Libya respected the American representation in Tripoli. We agreed that I could probably get the support of the American community if it came to a vote, but I added that of course since we respected the position of the head of the Libyan Peoples Bureau in Washington we expected the same for the representative of the President and American people—all of them, not just the local community—in Tripoli. Shahati agreed.
4. I observed that since it was not certain how soon I might be seeing Qadhafi there was a part of the President’s message regarding [Page 297] Afghanistan that I would ask Shahati to transmit to Qadhafi immediately. I then read from notes (with Mukhtar Jamal recording it) the part of the message on Afghanistan with direct quotes on the request for advice to non-aligned and Muslim nations and the need to support Pakistan. Shahati showed considerable interest and concern about Afghanistan and asked a number of questions regarding the danger to neighbors. I emphasized the vulnerable position of Pakistan and Iran, particularly the latter with its unstable internal political situation and long term Russian ambitions in the direction of the Indian Ocean through Baluchistan. Shahati wanted to know the reason for US concern over such a distant land, and I gave him some historical background. He noted approvingly that we were offering 400 million dollars of aid to Pakistan and, with a logic that I did not entirely follow, he asked whether this was not a time to do something for Libya by getting “the aircraft” passed through Congress. I explained that it was not exactly a question of getting the Congress to pass on the aircraft but rather involved the overall impression of the Congress, Executive and people toward Libya and its policies. I noted that a clearer perception of Qadhafi’s attitude toward the hostages in Tehran and toward Afghanistan could be helpful in this regard. Qadhafi would have an opportunity to make his position known to the American public when he is interviewed by Harry Reasoner of CBS in Benghazi a week from now.
5. In concluding, I told Shahati that for the next few days I could be reached in Tunis through the Embassy here and that I would be on hand in Benghazi on short notice if the Colonel wished to receive me.
6. Comment: Ideally the meeting with Qadhafi would take place when Ali al Houdairi is here to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and that follow up actions are initiated to put both relations and the Embassy on a new footing. There remains some question whether Qadhafi will in fact receive me. With Houdairi here the chances of such a meeting will increase, and if it does not come off under such favorable circumstances we will know that a considered policy decision is involved on Qadhafi’s part and not simply a typical Libyan communications failure.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800032–0682. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- See Documents 122 and 123. In telegram 13252 to Tripoli, January 17, the Department summarized Qadhafi’s message to Carter on Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890016–0622)↩