Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zaire¹

Washington, June 11, 1978, 0304Z

148155. Subject: Follow-up to Five Power Demarche:² Letter From President Carter to President Mobutu. Reference: State 148132.³

1. Following the joint five power demarche to Mobutu on reforms, you should deliver the following message from President Carter to President Mobutu: Quote:

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of June 4 in which you noted the appreciation of the Republic of Zaire for the assistance my government has extended over the years and particularly during the current crisis.⁴

You raise the problem of Soviet-Cuban activities and intentions in Africa, which greatly concern the United States and other Western governments. I have initiated a review of this question and will be undertaking further appropriate actions when that review is completed.⁵

But in the meantime, I wanted to share with you my conviction that the problems of stability in Central Africa go beyond the issues posed by Soviet-Cuban activities. And on the basis of the discussions held in Paris on June 5, I believe that my analysis is shared by the other governments represented there. Indeed, the Ambassadors of the five powers have already shared with you the main conclusions of the meeting in Paris. Let me be more specific.

Between friends, we can speak frankly and address the need for reforms in Zaire. Your own public declarations on this subject have come to form the framework of needed reforms in the political as well as the economic fields. Both you and your foreign friends are in agreement that these reforms are urgent.

To summarize my understanding of what we have agreed thus far: on the economic front, a new stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund must be signed just as soon as possible and it is understood that continued bilateral assistance will be related to performance under the terms of the agreement. We have also agreed on the reforms you set forth in the “Mobutu Plan,”⁶ notably relating to the placement of foreign experts in key positions at the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and in customs, as well as a clear shift in development priorities toward agriculture. Our representatives will be pursuing these in Brussels June 13–14.⁷

As I review the elements of the economic reform package, I am struck by the common concern, not only in the IMF-led stabilization effort, but also in the Mobutu Plan, over control and repatriation of foreign exchange.

As you know, both the stabilization plan and the recovery plan cannot be put in place overnight, yet the urgency of economic reform is such that something must be done quickly to give the signal that the process is being implemented. This is particularly important from the American viewpoint where our Congress will want to see evidence of reform before we can envisage further assistance. In this regard, you might wish to consider putting into place an interim system for assuring that foreign exchange receipts are repatriated to Zaire’s essential import requirements. You may have other ideas which would get across the key message that Zaire’s own resources are being used to address essential needs.

Beyond the economic reforms you have laid out, I see particular significance in the political reforms you announced in your July 1 speech.⁸ As I understand it you envisaged the use of the office of the Prime Minister more fully to handle the day-to-day business of the government and to revitalize the functions of the legislative assembly. I consider this concept of decentralization critical not only to the functioning of your constitutional institutions, but also to the effort of national reconciliation which I know you are undertaking.

When the five met in Paris we reviewed the short term requirements of security in Shaba and, as you know, discussed the needs of the African force which is being put in place there. But we all agreed that the African force is only a temporary solution and that the fundamental problems of stability in that region had to be addressed:

—The reintegration of Shaba into the body politic of Zaire;

—An improvement in relations between Zaire and Angola, which would lead Angola to cooperate in preventing the further incursions of Katangans into Zaire;

—Restructuring the FAZ into a leaner, more disciplined force which would have the trust and support of the population.

Again, I know that you have ideas on how these critical problems can be approached and I would greatly appreciate hearing from you in this regard. In Paris, our analysis pointed to some specific actions, but we were all agreed that only you could undertake the dramatic gestures and detailed diplomacy that will be necessary.

Lastly, Mr. President, I must raise the most delicate of issues. As you know, the furtherance of human rights has become an integral part of American foreign policy.

There is no intention on our part of imposing our view on others, but it is also clear that a pattern of human rights violations in a given country inevitably has its repercussions on the overall relationship in general and on assistance programs in particular.

I realize full well the enormous challenge that bringing unity to the nation of Zaire presents and I know that American norms cannot be transplanted. At the same time, you must know that I cannot continue significant assistance if corrupt elements continue to be associated in the public mind with your government. Our Ambassador will be prepared to discuss specific allegations with you if you desire. Also, support will be most difficult if the pattern of arrests and executions we have witnessed continues.

This letter is being sent in a spirit of friendship and frankness. We wish to see Zaire develop into a strong and unified nation. We feel that this can be done only if the hard facts of the current situation are faced courageously and those decisions made which will insure the success of our common effort. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End quote.

2. This letter should be delivered only after joint demarche of five Ambassadors.

3. Info addressees should see to it that copies of President Carter’s letter to Mobutu are delivered in strictest confidence to the Chiefs of State of the respective governments with a note encouraging them to follow up with an equally firm line, making clear that we will deliver letter after joint demarche.

4. French text follows by septel.⁹

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780243–1142. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Paris, Brussels, Bonn, and London. Drafted by Walker; cleared by Brzezinski, and Moose and in S/S; approved by Newsom.
2. In telegram 18434 from Paris, June 9, the Embassy reported that the five powers (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Belgium) agreed to deliver a démarche to Mobutu on reforms agreed to at the June 5 meeting in Paris. The recommendations concerned national reconciliation, “full participation of all the regional entities of Zaire in the national life of the country,” the improvement of Zaire’s institutions, enhancing Zaire’s diplomatic position, and economic recovery and stabilization. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780241–1029) Regarding the June 5 meeting, see Documents 110 and 111.
3. In telegram 148132, to Paris, Brussels, London, and Bonn, June 10, the Department instructed the Embassies to urge their host governments to move quickly to deliver the five-power démarche. The telegram, also sent for information to Kinshasa, instructed that Embassies emphasize the need for Zaire to streamline and discipline its armed forces and to inform Mobutu that his comments that indicated Zaire might arm and train anti-Neto forces in Angola were “counter-productive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780243–0670)
4. In telegram 5777 from Kinshasa, June 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of Mobutu’s June 4 letter to Carter, in which he reaffirmed U.S.-Zairian friendship and expressed thanks from Zaire for the “assistance that the Government of the United States of America has never ceased to give it from its accession to independence in 1960 until today.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780234–1061)
5. See Document 11.
6. See Document 98.
7. Telegram 11763 from Brussels, June 14, reported on the conclusions of the meeting, which was attended by delegations from Germany, Belgium, Canada, the United States, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Zaire, the IBRD, the EEC, and the IMF. The telegram also transmitted the French text of the document agreed on by the participants. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780249–0162) In telegram 153099 to Brussels, June 15, the Department transmitted a translation of the French text. Entitled “Conclusions of the International Conference on the Mobutu Plan Held in Brussels on the 13 and 14 June 1978,” it listed the measures necessary to assist Zaire to implement its plan for economic and financial recovery: “management reorganization, economic and financial stabilization, revitalized production, particularly in the areas of agriculture, mines, transport, and manufacturing.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780252–0036) See also footnote 5, Document 109.
8. In telegram 6192 from Kinshasa, July 1, 1977, the Embassy summarized the main points of Mobutu’s July 1, 1977, speech, in which he proclaimed that Zaire’s “political structure and economy had to be democratized and decentralized.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770235–0981)
9. Telegram 148156 to Kinshasa, June 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780243–1145)