Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 26, 1978

SUBJECT

• Next Steps in Zaire

The SCC met this morning² to discuss our overall approach to the Zairian problem and, in particular, what you should say to Giscard this evening.³ Talking points for the latter are at the end of this memorandum.⁴

The decisions that we make now are going to have important long-term consequences. To some extent, our support of the rescue operation has identified us with European attempts to preserve the situation in Zaire. If we now decide to proceed with support of French and Belgian ideas for a much more ambitious political and economic rescue plan, backed up by an international military force, we will have committed ourselves to an undertaking that will be costly with only a 50–50 chance of success. Most important, even the fact of consultations starts us on the road to this commitment.

You should be aware that the State Department is inclined to consult first and only incrementally develop issues for your decision. Instead, we have insisted on establishing a framework setting forth the limits of our prospective involvement as guidelines for any such consultations. The SCC recommendations on this are set forth below.

The key issues are:

(1) Are we willing to get involved in some measure in an increased long-term development/reconstruction effort?

(2) Are we willing to support an international “peacekeeping” effort in Shaba?

The Long-Term Effort

Despite the poor prospects for significant reform, there was a general SCC consensus led by State that Zaire is too important and the global stakes too high for the United States to continue its past posture of marginal support for the Zaire economic effort. It is important to recognize that before the invasion, the United States had given indications that it was prepared to support the Mobutu plan—a fairly ambitious multinational development effort with a price tag of about $300 million annually, with financing coming from governments and international banks. The disruption in Shaba will add another $150 million in short-term costs to that price tag. A multinational planning meeting of donor nations for Zaire has been planned for some time to convene June 14–15 in Brussels.⁵

The SCC recommends that any U.S. contribution to such a program would depend on significant reforms—many of which Mobutu has already pledged he would undertake.

The alternative of not participating in this effort would probably lead to a rapid economic collapse in Zaire and political fragmentation of the country. At the same time, you should be aware that deeper U.S. economic involvement will mean that Zaire will become politically more important to us and, success or failure, strategically more significant. In this connection, everyone agrees that, to the maximum extent possible, we should be junior partners to the Europeans and others in this development program.

Security Situation

The SCC agreed that any long-term economic recovery could not take place unless there was an improvement in the security situation. There was agreement that you should be prepared to indicate to Giscard our willingness to provide airlift for elements of an international force. It is also recommended that we assume the costs (in the neighborhood of $20 million for approximately 175 C–141 sorties).

The SCC also believes that we should respond positively to requests for equipment to replace US-origin items transferred into Zaire for the international force. It was recommended that we be prepared to participate in the financing of such replacement equipment but not assume the entire burden.

It was also agreed that while the United States should be prepared to provide some specific, very short-term training or familiarization with certain equipment (i.e., commo gear), we should not station any people in Zaire for maintenance or any other purpose.

Allied Consultations

There was consensus that the next step should be to begin consultation with the Belgians and the French on both the security situation and economic reconstruction plans. If you agree with the above principles, that would serve as guidance for such consultations.

Your meeting with Giscard would be the first of our consultations. At that meeting, you should try to get him to spell out the extent to which France plans to be involved. If the French are prepared to support the Mobutu plan and an international peacekeeping force as has been reported, you could indicate in general terms our willingness to do so within the above constraints.⁶ This would be followed up by a meeting between Cy Vance and the Belgian and French Foreign Ministers in the next few days⁷ and, subsequently, a lower level planning session in Europe.⁸ However, we also would wish to broaden the base of planning and consult as rapidly as possible with the Africans.

Talking Points

Talking points along the above lines are attached.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Zaire: 1–5/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum.
2. No minutes of this meeting have been found.
3. A record of this conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.
4. Attached but not printed.
5. See footnote 7, Document 112. In telegram 11758 from Brussels, June 14, the Embassy summed up the U.S. position in the meeting: “In sum we refused to commit our $18 million PL–480 package until the Zairians give us some indication of what foreign exchange revenues they foresee over the next three months and how they propose to use them to address essential import priorities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780248–1056)
6. A White House statement issued at the end of the meeting noted that Giscard and Carter “expressed their common concern about recent developments in Africa and agreed that concerted action with the African countries is necessary to promote security and development in that continent.” (Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 1008)
7. In telegram 13686 to Brussels, May 30, the Department reported on the meeting between Vance and Simonet on May 29, in which they agreed on the root causes and issues of the Shaba situation and Vance promised to send Newsom to Brussels for a meeting on the Mobutu Plan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780226–0553) In telegram 137873 to Paris, May 31, the Department reported on Vance’s meeting with French Foreign Minister de Guiringaud, in which they agreed that France would host a June 5 meeting in Paris to discuss Zaire’s security and economy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780228–0151)
8. See Document 111.