Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

285. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 22, 1977, 9:30–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Asst. Sec. Richard Moose
  • Amb. Stephen Low

• Defense

  • Dep. Sec. Charles W. Duncan
  • Leslie Janka

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

• CIA

  • Dr. Robert Bowie
  • William Parmenter

• USUN

  • Amb. Donald McHenry

• NSC

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Thomas Thornton
  • Henry Richardson

Secretary Vance, Chairman, set the agenda to discuss, in order, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

Rhodesia

There was general sentiment that the United States could not withdraw or slow down from its present initiative toward a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. An outside peacekeeping force was a necessary condition to a negotiated settlement, most probably a Commonwealth rather than a UN force. The US should not take the lead in organizing a peace-keeping force; that would be a new policy. The British should remain in the forefront, and Owen should be urged to return to Africa after the Rhodesian elections. But British objectives are ambiguous. The reciprocity between an acceptable political package and the evolution of a Commonwealth force was noted.

A Commonwealth force also has symbolic value by helping create a situation in which either Nkomo or Smith might feel forced to join, especially Nkomo should Smith resign and arrangements emerge for free elections based on one man, one vote.

The possibility of Smith handing over power to Sithole in an internal solution was discussed; the US could not support such a solution because it would undermine US credibility in southern Africa. Secretary Vance noted that no conclusion was reached in the discussion on Rhodesia.

Namibia

Though no major policy decisions stood to be made, major issues included African parties demanding the strongest possible role for the UN; the withdrawal of South African troops, and the importance of that issue to SWAPO’s participation in negotiations and elections. US policy, with the Five Power Contact Group, seeks a situation where neither the UN nor South Africa would actually be totally in control of the interim process but where each can plausibly tell their own constituencies that they are. The delaying tactics of SWAPO, the possibility of disorder in Namibia, and the general distrust by Africans of the South African government were identified. There may be new momentum: the Secretary General will now make his staff available for contingency planning and will appoint Atasharri as the UN Special Representative. Owen should be asked to call Waldheim in this connection.

High level discussions with the Front Line States and Nigeria, perhaps when Ambassador Young is in Lagos in late August, would be timely. The connection between US relations with Angola and progress in the Namibian talks was noted.

South Africa

Secretary Vance asked whether, relative to a list of steps presented in order of severity of action against South Africa, now was the time to take smaller, or more severe, steps against that government.² It was decided that now was the time to begin taking smaller steps.

Relative to some proposed small steps, it was decided that a study was needed to recommend desirable ways to accomplish specific reductions of military, diplomatic and commercial personnel in the USG South Africa mission.

On “Gray Area Sales” to South Africa, it was decided that a new directive was needed that there should be prohibited, with respect to new items, all exports for sales to or for use by South African police or military forces.

The issue was discussed of whether, with respect to spares and maintenance equipment for items previously licensed for export to South Africa, all further exports of spares and maintenance equipment for items whose export would now be prohibited would be terminated. It was decided that this issue should be the subject of additional study.

It was further decided that pending cases concerning the export of spares and maintenance equipment should be decided on a case-by-case basis for a limited transition period. The above study should be completed by the time of the Lagos Conference on Apartheid August 22–24,³ and it should look toward the elimination of this category of exports to South Africa, unless that government provided substantial reason otherwise.

It was generally agreed that another meeting would be needed on southern African issues.

Follow-up Actions

1. State is to recommend desirable ways to accomplish specific reductions of military, diplomatic, and commercial personnel in the USG South Africa mission, and the conditions necessary to implement these, by August 22.⁴

2. State is to prepare a Presidential Directive prohibiting, with respect to new items, all exports or sales to or for use by South African police or military forces by August 17.⁵

3. State is to prepare a study on whether, with respect to spares and maintenance equipment for items previously licensed for export to South Africa, all further exports of spares and maintenance items whose export would now be prohibited would be terminated, to be completed August 17.⁶

4. State is to prepare guidelines for cases concerning the export of spares and maintenance equipment to South Africa, in conformity with these PRC conclusions, by August 17.⁷

5. A follow-up PRC on southern Africa should be scheduled for the period between September 26 and October 7.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 7–8/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. For a discussion of proposed steps, see Document 284.
3. The World Conference for Action Against Apartheid was held in Lagos August 22–26.
4. See Document 319.
5. See Document 170.
6. Not found.
7. Not found.
8. See Document 169.