Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

283. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 17, 1979

SUBJECT

• SCC on Nicaragua, July 16, 1979 (U)

Attached is a Summary of Conclusions on the SCC Meeting yesterday on Nicaragua. Since that meeting the following additional events have occurred:

—Somoza changed his decision to appoint Sanchez, and in turn, has decided to appoint Gen. Mejia. The Junta learned about that on Tuesday.²

—The Andean Pact countries are going to San Jose and from there to Managua for the change in government. We have tried to locate the members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and encourage them to respond to the Junta’s invitation. The Archbishop of Managua and other prestigious officials are also returning.

—We have instructed our Ambassador in Managua to urge the Director of the Red Cross to expand his Board to include prestigious moderate leaders.³ We have sent a high AID official to San Jose to begin liaison with the Junta’s relief committee. We have instructions to Gen. McAuliffe informally to suggest to Somoza that he begin considering a multilateral effort at reconstruction, which could involve military representatives from different Latin American countries.⁴

—We are preparing a statement which will be issued tomorrow morning.⁵ (S)

Attachment

Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting⁶

Washington, July 16, 1979, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Ambassador Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
  • Mr. John Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • ADM Gordon Schuller, Director Inter-American Region

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • Lt General John Pustay

• DCI

  • Mr. Frank Carlucci
  • [name not declassified] Office of Political Analysis
  • [name and office not declassified]

• OMB

  • Deputy Director John White
  • White House
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

Summary of Conclusions

1. National Guard (GN) Commander. Somoza said he wanted to appoint General Sanchez as GN Commander and the SCC decided to pass that name to the Provisional Government (PG) without any comment. If they accept it, fine; if they don’t, we will try to get Somoza to accept Mojica. If he balks or threatens to stay longer, we should let him do what he wants, and seek a change if necessary, after he departs.⁷ (S)

2. International Presence. The SCC agreed to try to ensure as large an international presence as possible during the transition period and beyond in order to reinforce the moderate political sectors. We will try to get the Inter-American Commission or Human Rights Commission invited, and the Foreign Ministers or their representatives from Venezuela and the Andean Pact countries should go there as well.⁸ (S)

3. Humanitarian Assistance. The SCC agreed that the US would begin disbursing larger amounts of relief assistance through the Red Cross in Managua and through the PG’s Relief Committee in areas under FSLN control. We will urge the Director of the Red Cross to try to expand his Committee to include other moderate leaders. The first planes to go into Managua will be civilian, and gradually as the need becomes greater and Nicaraguans become accustomed to US flights, we will send in much bigger military flights. General McAuliffe will also approach Torrijos to explore the latter’s interest in initiating a multilateral humanitarian assistance effort involving the US, Panama, and Andean Pact countries. This effort would work in cooperation with the National Guard in Nicaragua and other military elements in order to supplement and expedite distributional capabilities. The idea would be that Latin Americans would take the lead, and we would be supportive of the effort which could incidentally help improve the image of the GN and give added support to moderate elements. (S)

4. US Policy to new Government. Recognition will not be an issue. We will just relate to the government in place. When the new government sends a formal letter, we will accept it. We will work on a statement that will be issued tomorrow that re-capitulates the history of the last five months, that explains the US interest in mediating the crisis in a way that makes the Latin Americans look as if they have led, that reiterates the assurances made by the junta, and that discusses the Nicaragua case as a test of the ability of Nicaragua and its neighbors to forge a new democracy in Central America. State will begin backgrounding this evening. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 185, SCC–182, Nicaragua 07/16/79. Secret. Brzezinski handwrote the date on the memorandum. Carter initialed the memorandum. [text not declassified] provided another account of the meeting; see Document 282.
2. July 17. See footnote 2, Document 281.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. In telegram 184798 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 17, the Department sent the text of the statement released during the July 17 noon press briefing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790323–0885)
6. Secret. Carter wrote “ok J” at the top of the page. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
7. Carter placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
8. Carter changed the word “or” to “on” in the phrase, “Inter-American Commission or Human Rights Commission,” and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.