90. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
8566. Subj: (LOU) Possible Motivations Behind Arrival of Soviet Troops. Ref: (A) Kabul 2778 (Notal),2 (B) Kabul 7326 (Notal).3
1. (S—Entire text)
2. Summary: The recent arrival of three battalions of Soviet combat troops at Bagram Air Force Base has raised many questions here, especially since the insurgency does not appear to have dramatically worsened to the point that it threatens the regime of President Hafizullah Amin. To the much asked question of, “Why did the Soviets send the troops in now?”, I can suggest a few answers: Moscow and Amin hope to “preempt” the growth of any direct threat to the regime by injecting an immediate “stiffener” of Soviet troops, particularly should any DRA corps or division disintegrate; the troops are here to protect the safety of Soviet citizens should the security of Kabul collapse; the troops can play a key role in domestic politics should further splits in the leadership occur; and, the troops are merely the vanguard of a larger intervention which will eventually lead to a direct combat role by Soviet forces, a thesis I consider unlikely based on evidence available so far. Motivations behind this move by Kabul and Moscow could well be a combination of these and others, but whatever the case, Afghan claims to “independence” have been further eroded by this development. Moreover, the presence of Soviet troops will undoubtedly heighten domestic opposition to the Amin regime and his Soviet mentors, and in the long-run further destabilize the region. My NATO colleagues here generally accept our assurances that the Soviets have installed combat troops at Bagram Air Base, but they are as puzzled as we, if not more so, as to why the Soviets have taken this step now. End of summary.
3. Why did Soviet troops arrive now? Eight months ago (reftel A), we concluded here that an Afghan SOS to Moscow for direct military help would probably be sent only in face of a seriously deteriorating security situation. We believed at that time that lack of control of most [Page 251] of the countryside would probably not prompt a DRA cry for Soviet help, because political power here resides in Kabul and the major cities, and because insurgent control of the rural areas would not necessarily constitute a direct threat to the survival of the regime. Moreover, we concluded that for domestic and foreign political reasons, that neither Moscow nor Kabul would want to face the “Soviet troops” decision until other, less dramatic, means to counter the insurgents had been exhausted. Finally, should Soviet troops arrive, we believed they would be used to establish the security of Kabul and the major cities, and would probably not be deployed into the countryside where they could become bogged down in endless fighting over extremely rough terrain.
4. The arrival now of several battalions of Soviet airborne and motorized rifle troops raises a number of questions, especially since the domestic situation here does not quite fit the scenario we envisaged earlier this year. Despite the many headaches and political upheavals of the past few months, there have been no urban uprisings or garrison mutinies in any of the major cities similar to those which occurred in Herat in March or Kabul in August and October. Kabul, by far the key to political control of the country, has remained generally untouched by the fighting in the countryside, although there has recently been a dramatic upsurge in urban terrorism aimed at Khalqi officials and Soviet citizens. The key military units in and around Kabul appear to remain loyal to the regime. Moscow would appear, therefore, to have responded to an Afghan appeal for direct military help in a situation which seems not to include an imminent threat to the revolution or even to the Amin regime in Kabul, and I can arrive at only a few reasons for this development.
5. Kabul and Moscow hope to “preempt” the development of any serious threat to the regime. In my opinion, the regime’s overall security situation has gradually deteriorated over the past few weeks, caused primarily by a growing military manpower shortage (e.g., the draft age has been lowered from 22 to 20 years), an increase in urban terrorism in Kandahar and Kabul, indications that morale in the military officer corps may be eroding, and persistent reports that alienations within the PDPA resulting from the Taraki-Amin schism may be worsening. In this situation of gradual, rather than sudden, deterioration, the DRA leadership and Moscow may have decided that an infusion of Soviet combat troops now may provide the necessary “stiffener” for the Afghan military, in order to avoid any abrupt collapse or to protect the key northern approaches to Kabul should DRA units fighting in Samangan and Badakhshan Provinces disintegrate. In this regard, they may have believed that a shot in the arm at this point would be sufficient to bolster the regime until winter weather dampens activities on both sides, something which has not yet taken place.
[Page 252]6. Security for Soviet citizens primary but probably not only concern. Security for the hundreds of Soviet citizens—especially in Kabul where they have been targeted for elimination—was most probably a major consideration in the decision to send troops, although I suspect the move has several goals. This particular thesis, however, would be buttressed should the Soviet troops eventually be sent to Kabul to protect the Soviet housing area and Embassy. So far, we have not detected any of the just arrived Soviet combat units in the capital, although Bagram Air Base is only about 40 miles away, and the Soviet decision-makers may elect to leave the troops there, rather than raising their visibility dramatically.
7. The troops may eventually play a role in domestic Afghan politics. I assume that the Soviets are very aware that Amin is widely perceived as the cause of much of this country’s woes, and it is conceivable they may have concluded that his departure may be necessary to save the revolution. I don’t think so. Most of us here are agreed that Moscow’s fundamental commitment is to the revolution (and party) and not to specific individuals. Whether or not Moscow may have a hand in any anti-Amin move, there are probably many individuals or small groups gunning for him, and Amin-Soviet tensions flowing from the Taraki affair are widely believed to be serious. By stationing Soviet troops near the capital, Moscow may want to be ready to intervene to back a specific contending faction in the event of intraparty civil war—to preserve the special position of the Soviet Union in the country. I should point out too that these troops represent an impressive argument should the Soviets decide to try and “convince” Amin to leave the scene “voluntarily” for the sake of the revolution’s survival, and in favor of a less “tainted” leftist leader—perhaps a currently unknown military man. At this point, however, I cannot identify any Khalqi leader who could come close to filling Amin’s shoes, and the exiled Parchamists appear not to hold out much promise as alternate leadership.
8. Direct Soviet combat role strikes me as unlikely, but cannot be ruled out. I doubt that the Soviet troops here will actually take the field against the insurgents, unless some key DRA military corps or division collapses and Kabul is threatened. At most they might man a roadblock to safeguard one of the approaches to the capital—until loyal DRA relief forces arrived.
9. Winter is approaching fast, the countryside is extremely rugged, and, were Soviet units to get spread thin, and engage in search and destroy missions, Soviet combat casualties could well become significant, especially since the guerrilla warfare being waged by the insurgents is not necessarily vulnerable to sophisticated armies. Nonetheless, General Pavlovskiy, Commander of Soviet Ground Forces, may have [Page 253] concluded during his two-month stay in Kabul from mid-August to mid-October, 1979, that a military solution to this domestic conflict is feasible, and that a certain number of Soviet troops can turn the trick. Pavlovskiy may also have concluded, of course, that a limited number of troops in non-combat roles would be enough to buck-up the Afghans in their own efforts.
10. Afghan independence eroded even further. As I pointed out two months ago in reftel B, growing Soviet influence here, and increasing DRA adherence to Moscow’s politics on the world stage, cast doubt on Kabul’s protestations that it is master in its own house. The infusion of Soviet troops adds considerably to this doubt, especially if they actually deploy in the field and begin killing Afghans. Even a more passive Soviet role, however, will undoubtedly heighten opposition to the Amin regime among the Afghan masses who generally hate Russians and Communists. In this regard, if I can point to one thing which might unify the heretofore disjointed opposition, it is the arrival of regular Soviet troops. The long-term implications of direct Soviet military involvement here could thus be far-reaching, despite the presumed legality of the move under the 1978 Soviet-Afghan bilateral treaty.
11. Local reaction remains muted. In spite of the international media attention being devoted to this development, there has not yet been any observed reaction among Kabul’s residents, excluding the urban terrorism campaign which is probably unrelated. My NATO Ambassadorial colleagues generally accept our word that the Soviet military presence has risen at Bagram, and are even more puzzled than we as to why it should occur now.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800012–0699, D790585–0980. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Islamabad, Jidda, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, Paris, Athens, CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and CINCEUR (also for POLAD). A copy of this telegram was found in the Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, folder 1.↩
- Telegram 2778 from Kabul is dated April 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790164–0676)↩
- See Document 72.↩