80. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Saudi Arabian and Pakistani Views on the Afghan Insurgency
On 30 October you directed me to take soundings with Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies on their intentions for covert action in Afghanistan. I understood that you wanted to know what the degree of their commitment would be were we to join with them in such endeavors. We have taken such soundings. The results are summarized below:
Pakistan:
There is no question that Pakistan—without waiting for us—is already supporting the Afghan tribesmen. The head of Pakistani military intelligence has made it clear that President Zia holds the continuation of the tribal insurgency to be vital to his country’s security and that support in the way of weapons, ammunition and explosives is essential to sustain the insurgency. (The Pakistanis have been pressing us for weapons and ammunition since early August.)
Our relations with Pakistan are not warm enough for us to elicit details on what type and how much support they are providing or would provide in a joint effort. Clearly they do not have large financial resources for such an undertaking.
Opinion: Pakistan will cooperate in covert action against Afghanistan. It will be anxious that U.S. involvement not invite strong Soviet responses. It will be nervous that U.S. cooperation might be terminated abruptly if U.S.-Pakistan relations should deteriorate over other issues. Overall, Pakistan can be counted on for operational support for joint efforts, but cannot be looked upon to take the lead or to supply resources.
Saudi Arabia:
The Saudi chief of intelligence states that his government is committed to assisting the Afghan insurgents and that some monies have been disbursed to refugees resident in Pakistan. The Saudis, however, are [Page 225] confused as to the relative merits of the various tribal groups and have requested a briefing from CIA so that they can gauge the field situation and make a judgment as to the strengths and weaknesses of the tribesmen.
On three separate occasions the intelligence chief said that his government would react positively to secret CIA proposals on support to the insurgents. The Saudis, however, are concerned about what they perceive as a lack of U.S. will to engage in political action and they are not sanguine that we will become involved to any significant extent. As a result of this attitude we were unable to obtain an estimate of how much money the Saudis would likely commit to such a program.
Opinion: I think we have pushed the Saudis as far as we can push them at this point. The Saudis lack general intelligence capability, so their confusion is understandable. As in many other areas, it will be necessary for us to lead the Saudis by the hand in getting them to make a firm decision. Nevertheless, the Saudis appear willing to put up resources once we make a firm commitment. I therefore suggest that the finding be signed and that we be authorized to tell the Saudis we will put up [amount not declassified] (less the amount for communications equipment) and expect them to put up at least as much.2 We will then work with them and the Paks in assessing the capabilities of the various groups and the degree of support which should be given to each.
Should the Saudi’s delay too long or back off for one reason or another, we can then reconsider whether to continue our unilateral program.
- Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Carter initialed “C” in the top right corner.↩
- The Finding was signed on November 7; see footnote 1, Document 76.↩
- Turner signed “Stan” above his typed signature.↩