62. Alert Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[additional memorandum number not declassified]
ALERT MEMORANDUM2
USSR-Afghanistan
The Soviets may have begun to give more serious consideration to the spectrum of possibilities for direct combat intervention in Afghanistan. We are watching Soviet forces near Afghanistan closely but our collection capabilities there are poor, and we cannot confirm or deny reports that the Soviets have introduced or are preparing to introduce small combat units into Afghanistan; however, we do not see preparations for a large scale ground force intervention. There are no indications of changes in the status of the Soviet [1 line not declassified] near the Soviet border. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Our judgment of an increased Soviet concern is fortified by the mid-August arrival in Kabul of General Pavlovskiy, Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, and a high-level delegation which includes several other generals and colonels, reportedly to prepare a detailed report on the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military. Pavlovskiy is probably charged with assessing the extent of the threat to the Afghan government and preparing contingency plans which will outline the amount and nature of Soviet military support needed to contain that [Page 179] threat, both in its current stage and if it worsens.3([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
As opposition to the Afghan government has increased over the past year, the Soviets have gradually augmented their military advisory presence. Early this year, at least five generals and an estimated 750–1000 military advisors were stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newly promoted officers in the Ministry of Defense and training Afghan recruits. Since then, the Soviet presence has grown to at least 2,500. Moreover, the role of Soviet troops has increasingly changed from a mere advisory one to active participation in and supervision of a wide variety of activity including logistics and combat planning functions as far down as some regimental and battalion-level units. They are apparently heavily involved in guiding Afghan combat operations, as well as logistics and administration. Some unconfirmed reports allege that Soviet helicopter pilots, with Afghan co-pilots, have flown strike missions against the insurgents and that Soviet tank personnel have participated in combat operations. In addition, Soviet advisors have reportedly suffered about 80 casualties. If these reports are true, the Soviets are also actively participating in combat on a small and limited scale with Afghan units. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
[less than 1 line not declassified] in early September that the Soviets have moved up to 3,600 troops into Kabul within the past two or three weeks to protect Soviet facilities and personnel there. The information has not been corroborated, but Embassy Kabul has submitted similar reports from two other sources in the diplomatic community.4 It is possible that such a force, without heavy equipment, could have been brought into the city from the USSR undetected by the US, particularly if this was done incrementally over a few weeks or so as part of the ongoing airlift of material for Afghanistan. Such a movement of forces by the Soviets would suggest increased security precautions and an escalation of Soviet involvement beyond an advisory role. The Soviets might consider such a move into Kabul to be prudent in view of the uprisings that have occurred in Kabul this year and the continuing [Page 180] possibility of violence in the capital. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])
In expanding the level of their own involvement in Afghanistan, there is a danger that the Soviets—consciously or unconsciously—will amplify their own stake in the ultimate outcome, making it increasingly difficult for them to resist raising the level of their participation still another notch should they feel it necessary. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
[Section heading not declassified]
[2 paragraphs (10½ lines) not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 94T00046R, Box2, SWS Products on Afghanistan. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Attached but not printed is a September 14 memorandum from Turner to the National Security Council that read: “The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the Taraki regime and protect their sizable stake in Afghanistan. Small Soviet combat units may already have arrived in the country. I am concerned that the Soviets may be underestimating the difficulties of shoring up the regime and may find themselves under growing pressures to escalate the scope of their intervention in the next few months. Moreover, the Soviets may now be more inclined to gamble on a substantial intervention in Afghanistan because of their perception of a downturn in relations with the US and the uncertain prospects for Senate approval of the SALT treaty.”↩
- The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending political developments. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, [less than 1 line not declassified], NSA, and State/INR. [Footnote is in the original.]↩
- The mission of the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General I.G. Pavlovskiy, to Afghanistan, August–October 1979, was reported in telegram 6604 from Kabul, September 2. The Embassy surmised that the visit of the high-ranking general possibly signaled a Soviet decision to lay a “detailed contingency groundwork for the future intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790400–1145)↩
- The clandestine source reporting of early September was not found. [text, 1 line, and citation not declassified] In telegram 6672 from Kabul, September 6, the Embassy estimated the number of Soviet military advisers at between 3,000 and 3,500. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790410–0099)↩