306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
196087. Subject: Gromyko Letter on Afghanistan.2
1. Confidential—Entire text.
2. Vasev called July 22 to deliver Gromyko’s reply to my July 14 letter on Afghanistan.3 (Text para 3 below.)
3. I would like in continuation of our exchange of views to express some considerations in connection with your letter of July 14.
We have noted the interest of the U.S. Government expressed in your letter in improving Soviet-U.S. relations. As is well known to you, this is consistently favored by the Soviet leadership. However, it is important to act precisely along these lines in practice. We, on our part, are ready to do so provided there is a similar readiness on the part of the United States.
Given such an approach and being guided by broad goals of strengthening peace and security, our two countries, as was proved on more than one occasion in the past, are quite capable of developing constructively their relations and finding mutually acceptable solutions to most complicated questions of mutual interest for the USSR and the U.S.
[Page 816]This, to use your own words, is the key to everything. Attempts to reduce the whole matter to any one single question, to tie to such a question the prospects of our relations as the whole, are not only wrong but also non-productive. You are aware of our assessment of the causes that led to the present state of Soviet-U.S. relations. This was also the subject of detailed discussions at our meeting in Vienna.4
Therefore, I will not restate this assessment.
Now with regard to Afghanistan. We note the recognition in your letter of the legitimate interest of the Soviet Union in ensuring the security of its borders and in friendly relations with Afghanistan as well as of our concern about an outside interference in Afghanistan. This would seem to be a realistic premise.
However, this premise is directly contradicted by your persistent notion about the government, which exists in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, being unacceptable to the U.S. and by raising in this connection the question of “transition” to some other government. Here a complete clarity is in order: We do not intend to and will not engage even in discussions on posing the question in such a way.
I may as well note here that no useful purpose either can be served by the attempts to put in doubt the fact of the recent withdrawal of some Soviet units from Afghanistan. Why are you doing this? After all, you know—as, by the way, the whole world knows,—that such doubts are groundless.
As to your question what assurances of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan would be considered by us as satisfactory, the answer thereto is contained in the known proposals of the DRA Government of last May 14.5 An adequately full discussion was devoted to it also in our previous exchanges of views. The guarantees of non-interference must be an integral part of the general political settlement, the path to which goes through direct negotiations of Pakistan and Iran with the Government of Afghanistan with the aim of normalizing relations between them with simultaneous cessation of armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan as well as of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of that country in general.
It is Pakistan and Iran who, by continuing to refuse to conduct negotiations, are bringing the task of the political settlement to an impasse. This is why, if the United States is genuinely interested in such a settlement, it could, as we have already pointed out, exert appropriate influence on the Pakistan leaders and induce them to hold negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan.
[Page 817]We would like to hope that the U.S. side will be able to make a realistic assessment of the situation and will take steps to facilitate in practice the process of political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.
You may have no doubt that such a position will be met with appropriate understanding on our part.
Sincerely,
A. Gromyko.
End text.
4. Secretary’s response: The Secretary noted that on the face of it, he did not see any new elements in Gromyko’s letter, but he did not want to give a reaction before studying it more carefully.
5. Instructions will follow septel on how you should brief the Quad.6
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, EM-Vasev, 7/22/80. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Shulman, cleared in S/S, and approved by Muskie.↩
- In an attached action memorandum to Muskie, July 23 (not printed), Vest stated: “The most notable feature of the Gromyko letter is its insistence on Soviet unwillingness to discuss any change in the Babrak government.” Vest argued: “presumably Moscow wants to avoid any hint of readiness to talk about replacing Babrak because they fear this would only fuel factional infighting in Kabul.” Vest made three recommendations in the memorandum, all of which Muskie approved: 1) send Gromyko’s reply to the Embassy in Moscow (this telegram); 2) send a telegram to the Embassies in London, Paris, and Bonn relaying the substance of Gromyko’s letter (the draft is attached but not printed; it was sent as telegram 196086, July 24 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D910096–1634, N800008–0459)); and 3) defer a response to Gromyko. In a memorandum to Brzezinski, July 23, Brement summarized Gromyko’s letter, characterizing it as a “rigid restatement of the Soviet position,” and agreed with Vest that there was no need for an immediate reply. Brement suggested U.S. policy going forward should be based on the concept that a “complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan must be the basis for a genuine political solution to this problem.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 7/80)↩
- See Document 299.↩
- See Document 272.↩
- See Document 270.↩
- That is, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. See footnote 2, above.↩