294. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are a title page, security information page, and a cover page.]
The Intervention in Afghanistan: Ramifications for Soviet Interests Abroad ([classification marking not declassified])
Key Judgments
Soviet interests abroad have suffered because of the intervention in Afghanistan—and especially the USSR’s failure to consolidate control. Although things now look better to Moscow than they did a few months ago, the negative reaction to the invasion was greater than the Kremlin anticipated and, though now diminished, remains of considerable concern. ([classification marking not declassified])
The desire to consolidate control in Afghanistan at any cost may prove overriding, but Moscow has been given important incentives to try to achieve this objective with a minimum of forces. A major escalation that did not produce victory in the field or obtain accommodations to strategic Soviet goals in Southwest Asia would result in further harm to Soviet external interests. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The Soviets have made several gains and avoided some potential losses:
• Moscow has derived comfort from West European desires to maintain a dialogue with the USSR and to avoid heightened tensions in Europe; the significance attributed by US allies to normal trade with the Soviet Union; and the uneven Western support of US policies toward the USSR in the wake of the invasion.
• In Southwest Asia, Soviet ability to bring pressure on Pakistan and Iran has been enhanced, although neither country has reacted by accommodating Soviet objectives thus far.
• India, although distressed by the intervention, shows no present inclination to alter its security ties with the USSR; Iraq’s dependence [Page 784] on Soviet armaments and other aspects of the alliance with the USSR has deterred Baghdad from abrogating the Soviet-Iraqi treaty and normal working relations. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has become even more anxious about US capabilities and resolve.
• The nonaligned movement has been unable to condemn the USSR except implicitly within the forum of the UN General Assembly. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Nonetheless, Soviet interests have suffered considerable damage:
• The political center of gravity in the West has shifted in ways generally adverse to the USSR; belief in Soviet expansionism has been reconfirmed; openmindedness about Soviet intentions and favorable attitudes about the USSR are voiced infrequently and receive scant hearing.
• US defense efforts have been accelerated, the European allies have pledged to fulfill the NATO Long-Term Defense Plan more rapidly, and a strong impetus has been given to increased Japanese defense spending and military cooperation with the United States.
• The United States has affirmed its readiness to use military force in the Persian Gulf, Western security cooperation with China has increased, and Western willingness to maintain military deployments in the Indian Ocean has been increased. Local opposition to forward US military deployments also has been undermined.
• Western economic sanctions have impaired Moscow’s ability to satisfy Soviet consumer demands for meat and dairy products and will probably further retard Soviet efforts to secure sophisticated technology and massive investment credits. Although Western support for the sanctions is eroding, Soviet economic weaknesses have been pointed up anew, both within the USSR and externally.
• The Olympic boycott has seriously damaged Moscow’s ability to use the games for propaganda domestically and internationally.
• The Kremlin has received uneven support from Eastern Europe, which has felt a strong identity of interests with Western Europe. Moscow has sensed vulnerability and shown less than full control over the Warsaw Pact states and has new reason to doubt the reliability of these allies.
• The interests of Cuba and Vietnam have been adversely affected by the Soviet move into Afghanistan, and North Korea has been upset by the invasion. Havana’s international position has been hurt; acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea has been at least slowed; and relations between Pyongyang and Moscow have become even more strained. The Kremlin is further concerned about the opening it may have afforded the United States for undermining its positions in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen.
[Page 785]• Finally, the USSR has tarred itself as an imperialist aggressor in the Third World. Most of the Muslim nations have formally condemned Soviet oppression in Afghanistan. The Kremlin’s ability to persuade the nonaligned movement to accept the USSR as an ally and to manipulate the movement against Soviet adversaries has been undermined. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options (May 1980). Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “This assessment was prepared by Stephen S. Kaplan USSR/EE Division, Office of Political Analysis. This paper has been coordinated with the Offices of Strategic Research and Economic Research.”↩