Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

283. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 4, 1980

SUBJECT

• Zia and Support for the Rebels (C)

You know, of course, that we are taking a beating in the press and abroad even (especially France) for our “failure” to support the mujihadin with weapons.² This could easily become a campaign issue (although there are obvious ways to counter it). (C)

You may have noted that Zia is climbing on this band wagon. Beginning in Salisbury and most recently in his meeting with Lester Wolff, he is deploring the failure of the US to provide him with the kind of support that would enable Pakistan to provide a conduit for support to the mujahidin.³ This is a clever approach for him to take of course, and I certainly don’t blame him for doing it. It is the best way of covering his tracks in a difficult situation. But it certainly doesn’t help us with our public relations problem. (S)

In addition, I am beginning to wonder just what we are getting as a result of our efforts to provide covert assistance to the mujahidin. CIA is confident but coy when I ask them. I haven’t heard of any of the SA–7s bringing anything down however, and Kramer’s articles in the Inquirer suggest that, at least in the part of the country where he was, there is nothing even resembling an anti-tank weapon.⁴ (S)

This may all be in the nature of things and our program may be moving along quite adequately, given the Pak constraints. Unless you know a lot more about it than I do, however, I suggest that you or David grill CIA pretty exactingly on the effect that our program is having. If you want, I could follow this up with the Station Chief in Islamabad when I am there. I have no particular desires in this regard, but if I were to do so to any effect, he would have to have gotten instructions from Headquarters to level with me. And those instructions will not be forthcoming without a push from you. (I do not, incidentally, believe it would be advisable for me to meet with Akhtar or his people.) (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you or David press CIA for exact details of the performance of their CA program in support of the Afghan rebels. I think this should be done in a smaller group, even, than the SCC(I). I would like to sit in, but it might be more effective one-on-one.⁵ (S)

2. If you want me to probe in great detail with the Station Chief, that you ask Carlucci to tell Islamabad that they should level with me completely. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 1–6/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. In the upper right corner, Aaron wrote: “ZB—I agree with this. Every time we push for details we get a limp leg. We should ask for a full-scale briefing for you. DA 6/6.”
2. See, for example, Daniel Southerland, “France hints US should do more to aid ill-equipped Afghan rebels,” Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1980, p. 6.
3. Zia, who was in Salisbury to celebrate Rhodesia’s independence, gave a press conference April 17, during which he called on the United States to pursue a stronger military response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. (Carlyle Murphy, “Pakistan Calls for U.S. To Arm Afghan Rebels,” Washington Post, April 18, 1980, p. A45) Congressman Wolff, who led a congressional delegation to Pakistan, met with Zia in Islamabad June 1. The Embassy reported on the meeting in telegram 5311 from Islamabad, June 2. Zia was quoted as saying: “we cannot convince the U.S. that Afghanistan should be top priority,” and “in superpower terms, we have already been passed over to the other side.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800270–0012)
4. A reference to a series of articles by Richard Ben Cramer on the Afghan resistance appearing in the Philadelphia Inquirer May 30–June 1, 1980. Cramer won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1981 for the series.
5. Brzezinski approved the recommendation. In the left margin next to his approval, he wrote: “I will do it,” from which he drew a line to the bottom of the memorandum, where he wrote: “Prepare me a memo to ST, asking relevant questions.” The reference is to Turner.