242. Telegram From the Department of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe1
[cable number not declassified] NATO Secret to NATO addressees. Subj: Request for Information (Afghanistan Rebels) (U). Ref: SY Sec SHAPE Msg DTG 141450Z Mar 80.2
1. (C) Afghan insurgent groups can be divided into two major categories; those groups based and operating within Afghanistan and those groups (exiles) based in Pakistan but operating in Afghanistan. The former represents the major ethnic groups (Pushtu, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and Aimak). Little is known of their exact numbers of leaders. Afghanistan’s tribes, especially the Pushtu tribes, have historically resisted government encroachments. Resistance is generally confined to ethnic or tribal boundaries. Islam, resentment of foreign intervention, and antipathy to Russians serve as unifying motives, however, none are strong enough to produce a coordinated rebellion. The second category, exiles based in Pakistan, is comprised of several major groups whose number changes almost daily with the formation of new groups, [Page 660] groups formed by cross-alliances and membership in more than one group. The major exile groups are: A. (U) the Islamic Revolution Movement, headed by Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi; B. (U) the Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF), headed by Sebqatullah Mojadedi; C. (U) the Jamaat-i-Islami Afghanistan, headed by Burhanhddin Rabbani; D. (U) the Hezb-e-Islami (HI), headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; E. (U) the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan (NFIRA), headed by Sayed Gailani. These groups vary from right-wing professional revolutionaries to Islamic orientation.
2. (U) Exact numbers for members of each category are virtually impossible to ascertain since members of tribes operating in Afghanistan can be claimed, at various times, to be conducting the insurgency either independently or as members of one or more of the exile groups based in Pakistan. However, the NFIRA group, headed by Gailani, has claimed approximately 70,000 members.
3. (S) The insurgents evince virtually no interest, with minor exceptions, in territorial control in a conventional sense. Therefore strongholds in the conventional sense are non-existent. Currently the insurgents hold no major city. However, with territorial control being highly relevant to the government, fighting has gravitated towards towns where government forces are located. The best approach in delineating rebel areas of operation is by province. The provinces where rebel activity is currently most severe are Kabul, Paktia, Laghman, Bamian and Ghowr. Rebel activity has also been severe in Konar and Nangarhar Provinces, however, recent Afghan/Soviet combined army operations and continued presence in these areas has restored a modicum of government control. Conditions suggest that Kandahar, Kunduz and Baglan are now beset with serious rebellion. In other provinces moderate levels of rebellion occur. The rebellion is currently least serious in Faryab, Jowzjan, and Bulkh. The arrival of Soviet forces in Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces has tended to stabilize conditions there.
4. (S) Afghan insurgents use a variety of weapons ranging from side arms to artillery, the majority of which were either captured or acquired from Afghan Army units or personnel who defected. These weapons include 76, 82 and 107mm mortars; 76mm mountain artillery; 107mm recoilless; 122mm guns; 122mm howitzers; tanks; APCs; AAA guns; rocket launchers; English .303, Kalashnikov and Dushka rifles; bombs; grenades; mines and various side arms. Tactics range from simple ambushes of convoys to attacks on Soviet and Af Army units and include H and I fire, mining roads, blowing bridges, opening floodgates, sabotaging water supplies, cutting telephone lines, and destroying electric power plants.
5. (U) As stated, the vast majority of the insurgent equipment was obtained in raids or from deserting Af Army units and personnel. [Page 661] Financial support is more difficult to determine. Obtaining funds is one of the primary aims of the exile groups in Pakistan although their success is unknown. Egypt has publicly stated that it will train and arm Afghan insurgents. Iran has also pledged support however, the form it will take is unknown. Saudi Arabia is allegedly also providing support. Currently we have no firm evidence to confirm or deny support from either Pakistan or China.
6. (C) The tenor of the insurgency during the winter months far exceeded expectations. A lull was expected in both the insurgency and Soviet/Afghan Army operations in order to refit, retrain and plan operations for the upcoming summer months. However, this was not the case and as the weeks progressed the insurgency gained momentum, most recently manifested in the general strike and demonstrations in Kabul. Historically insurgent operations increase in the warmer months. This, in combination with the increasing support of urban populations, continued defections of Afghan Army personnel, innate hatred of the Russians and the relative successes enjoyed to date portend increased insurgent activity during the summer months.
7. (U) [1 line not declassified]