Office of the Historian

20. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, May 22, 1978

SUBJECT

  • Status of Our Relations With Afghanistan

We have resumed normal diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and your decision on our overall posture has been communicated to the relevant agencies.2

In more specific areas, these are the principal actions taken by the Working Group that we set up under the SCC.

—Covert action is not appropriate at this time; we are, however, reviewing our intelligence collection priorities and capabilities.

—Aid projects [Page 49] underway are being continued; any new programs will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis in terms of your guidance. We hope to avoid a decision, but if pressed State will find that Afghanistan is not “under the control of international communism” and hence remains eligible for aid.

—Military and other trainees will be received routinely. So far indications are that the Afghans want to keep this channel open.

—We are in appropriate degrees of consultation with all concerned third countries (including China).

—A follow-on study is being prepared that will provide options for our posture and actions within the guidance you have given.3

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject File, Box 97, Chron: 1–5/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Thornton. Aaron initialed the memorandum for Brzezinski. Carter also initialed, indicating he had seen it. The memorandum is attached as Tab B to a memorandum from Thornton to Brzezinski, May 11 (not printed), which identifies Brzezinski’s memorandum to Carter as a “much shorter version of the same material” of a paper attached at Tab A to Thornton’s memorandum (and also not printed). That paper, entitled “SCC Working Group on Afghanistan: Summary of Actions,” noted the following: 1) there was no possibility at the time of a covert action against the Afghan regime due to lack of resources and a regional political atmosphere not conducive to such action; 2) there were no current plans to approach Afghan military trainees in the United States about moving against the regime [text not declassified]; 3) USAID in Kabul was carrying on its operations as normal; and 4) it was decided to allow the UN to take the lead in ongoing efforts to deal with the problem of narcotics in Afghanistan.↩
  2. See Document 12.↩
  3. Not further identified and not found.↩