173. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) and the Deputy Director for Operations (McMahon)1

SUBJECT

  • Conversation of 16 January 1980 (U)

1. Re Afghanistan, I also discussed our first shipment to the insurgents and said we were holding the second one waiting for Pakistani clearance.2 (In my meeting with Brzezinski later, he urged me to come back to the SCC quickly for permission to go on with the second [Page 496] tranche. He said that because he felt some people were beginning to waiver in whether and how far we should continue this support. I told him that I wasn’t coming back to the SCC; I was going ahead with the second tranche and felt that we had that authority up to $10 million. He agreed and encouraged us to push the second tranche as rapidly as possible.) (S/Sensitive)

2. I went on in my discussion to point out the dilemma that support to the insurgents created, i.e., the more they succeeded, the more likely the Soviets were to put pressure on Pakistan and that the best the insurgents could hope for was a continual running sore with loss of life. The comment was made that in some sense the fact that we had to funnel through Pakistan was a check valve on this, and that if they thought it was resulting in too much pressure on them they would slow it down or turn it off. (S)

3. There was also a discussion of the possibility of diversion of equipment to Pakistani or other uses. I said I certainly thought that was likely and possible and that we could not hold a real audit on this, but that nonetheless it was all going to be useful. The comment was made that perhaps some of our own military aid would be sent to the insurgents. I pointed out that that was American equipment and we were using Soviet and hoped to keep it that way so the American hand was not as blatant. That point had not been registered before, that is, that we were supplying Soviet equipment. I then asked that mention of thanks for the splendid cooperation of the Egyptians in providing ammunition to match our Soviet weapons be given to Mubarak tomorrow. (S)

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R, Box 1, DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. An unknown hand signed for Turner.
  2. Turner met with Carter, Jordan, and Brzezinski on January 16 from 11:29 a.m. to noon. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)