160. Response to Request for Intelligence From the Acting Assistant Director for Joint Chiefs of Staff Support ([name not declassified]) to the Director of Joint Strategic Plans and Policy (Lyons)1
SUBJECT
- Afghan Paper for DDPMA Trip (U)
REQUIREMENT
- J–5 request of 8 January 1980 for information on US sanctions, Soviet tactics, airlift and casualties in Afghanistan
1. (C) Sanctions: The principal Soviet reactions to the various retributive measures announced by the President have been twofold. First, military operations in Afghanistan have continued with increasing evidence that the force buildup has not abated. Second, Moscow has launched a propaganda blitz, accusing the US, with Chinese and Egyptian complicity, of meddling in Afghan internal affairs, arming and training the insurgents, and supporting Pakistan in its assistance to rebel factions. Presumably the Soviets will take steps to ameliorate any shortfall in grain, fish, and technology requirements by finding alternative sources of supply or buying through a third country “cutout.” There are retaliatory actions against the US and allies available to the Soviets in such areas as Berlin, Cuba and elsewhere; however, these do not appear too likely in the near term given the operational success of their occupation of Afghanistan.
2. (TS [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]) Soviet Tactics: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began with an airbridge into Kabul on 25 December. When completed on the 27th, the airhead consisted of an airborne force equivalent to two regiments. Another proximate airborne regiment had previously been deployed to Bagram airbase north of Kabul in early December. The airborne forces in Kabul initiated the coup d’etat in the capital on the night of the 27th while some Bagram elements may have deployed north to secure the major road leading from the Soviet border.
(TS [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]) In Kabul, BMD-equipped battalions apparently moved to secure key government facilities, the Radio Afghanistan compound, and Darulaman Palace in the city’s suburbs where President Amin was staying. Soviet troops [Page 461] took Afghan sentries by surprise at most locations and after brief firefights succeeded in securing and disarming the troops. In addition, airborne forces moved to secure Afghan army garrisons ringing the capital. Amin and his entourage were reportedly executed that night.
(TS [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]) Simultaneously, two Soviet motorized rifle divisions poised on the border apparently invaded on two axes. One division moved south to Kabul along the road previously secured by the Bagram forces and arrived in the city on 29 December. The other division crossed into western Afghanistan and occupied the key Afghan cities of Herat and Shindand. These are the only confirmed ground force divisions in Afghanistan. However, elements of two additional divisions may now have entered the country—one along each of the previously used axes of advance.
(TS [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]) Information on the tactics employed in the operation, is sketchy [less than 1 line not declassified]. It appears that both divisions conducted a tactical road march south to their respective objectives with the western division reportedly encountering some resistance in Herat. The rise [use] of reconnaissance aircraft in support of ground formations’ advance along major routes has been confirmed as has the use of helicopters for medical evacuation missions. As yet, there is no reliable evidence of heliborne assaults or air strikes in conjunction with the Soviet campaign and, indeed, no indications of active Soviet counterinsurgency operations have been noted to date. As a footnote, despite the lack of hard evidence, it is believed some airborne elements may have been flown into key outlying cities during the 25–27 December airlift to secure important airfields prior to the subsequent arrival of regular combat units.
3. (TS [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]) Airlift: Currently, Soviet military transport aviation (VTA) is supporting military operations in Afghanistan with an average of 15–30 flights a day. These flights are bringing in important supplies as well as providing some medical evacuation support.
(TS [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]) During the Christmas airlift into Kabul, the Soviets apparently committed 50 percent of their AN–22/COCK and IL–76/CANDID assets to the air operations in addition to 35 percent of their more numerous AN–12/CUB fleet. These aircraft were drawn primarily from the western USSR but some came from the Soviet Far East. The actual airlift was conducted in two phases. The first phase conducted on 24–25 December represented an airlift of 150–200 VTA sorties into bases in the border region from the western USSR. This was the relocation of major elements of an airborne division. The second phase consisted of the movement of these airborne forces into Kabul and possibly other key cities by an [Page 462] estimated 250 VTA sorties from 25/27 December. During this airlift, at least two airborne regiments were introduced.
4. (S) Casualties: There has been no accurate information on Soviet or Afghan casualties incurred during the coup. One report cited as many as 250 Soviet casualties incident to the takeover but this is unsubstantiated. Similarly, there are various reports of conflict between Soviet units and dissident Afghan army troops and insurgents—all of these suffer from imprecise casualty figures. All that can be responsibly stated is that Soviet casualty levels are expected now to be low, resulting primarily from terrorist attacks and various hit-and-run attacks by the rebels. These figures should increase as the Soviet units become more actively engaged in combat operations.
Assistant Director for JCS Support (Acting)
- Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 4, Background paper for new DJ5. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].↩