Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

153. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA M 80–10012

Washington, January 9, 1980

AFGHAN EXILE GROUPS BASED IN PAKISTAN

Peshawar, on the Pakistani side of the Khyber Pass, has for a century been the most important safehaven for Afghans who oppose whatever regime may be in power in Kabul. Following the Marxist coup in April 1978, the number of Peshawar-based dissidents grew and there was a proliferation of marginal and essentially ineffective “liberation groups”. Lacking meaningful financial support, the exile groups have had at best a modest impact on the course of the insurgency. Fragmentary reporting suggests they have provided insurgent groups in eastern Afghanistan with some material assistance, but the rebels’ main source of arms has been stocks captured from Afghan Army units or turned over by deserting Afghan troops and bought from arms dealers in Pakistan. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The numerous fragmented and feuding organizations acknowledge no single leader and have made numerous unsuccessful efforts to unify the Afghan exile opposition. An exile leader’s claim to the press after a recent meeting to have united exile organizations to counter the new Soviet threat is probably as insubstantial as earlier similar claims.² Among its leaders there is no figure with religious or political stature comparable to Ayatollah Khomeini who could rally national support against the Soviet-installed Kabul regime or serve as the leader of a new government. The exile groups probably do not have a sufficient number of technically qualified members who could form a new government. It is possible exile organizations could, however, contribute a few cabinet-level officials to a national front government made up of officials from former governments who might have survived Communist purges since April 1978. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

With the exception of one or possibly two groups that have a small guerrilla capability, the exile organizations do not command forces that have been active in the Afghan insurgency. One organization, the Islamic Party operates a clandestine radio in the Pak-Afghan border area that has probably made some impact in whipping up sentiment against the “godless” Kabul regime. Some exile religious leaders, moreover, are reported to cross the border into Afghanistan occasionally to buoy the morale of insurgent tribes responsive to their religious leadership. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The exile groups are likely to continue their infighting and probably will have no more than a marginal effect on the course of the insurgency unless Pakistan takes the lead in trying to unite or at minimum increase the coordination among the diverse groups. Without the assistance of Pakistan, moreover, the establishment of an exile command and control structure that could coordinate insurgent military action on a national scale would be beyond the capability of the Afghan exiles. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The exile groups could become a more effective conduit for channeling arms, food and funds to insurgent groups if Pakistan took charge of overseeing logistical arrangements. The Saudis have withheld more substantial financial aid to the exile groups—their payments probably total no more than $5 million—because they regard their disorganized, and uncoordinated efforts as ineffectual in supporting the insurgency. Some of the Saudi money reportedly has lined the pockets of some exile leaders. If the Saudis suspect that their funds are being misused—and they probably do—this would inhibit them from making further contributions to support the insurgency. They might be encouraged to reopen their coffers if Pakistan took responsibility for overseeing the expenditure of funds by the exile groups. A key factor in any Saudi decision would be their perception of US intentions regarding possible support of the insurgents.

The exile groups are the source of numerous misleading if not false stories that have appeared in the press on various aspects of the insurgency. Some of these stories allege the exiles exert command and control over guerrilla groups operating in Afghanistan. Other accounts have made exaggerated claims of rebel “victories” and, since Soviet intervention, of Soviet offensives against rebel strongholds.³ ([classification marking not declassified])

There are scores of exile groups based in Pakistan that have political and religious roots in Afghanistan of varying significance. The four most important, in approximate order of their significance, are the following:

—The Islamic Party (Hizbi-Islami). Probably the best organized of the dissident organizations, the Islamic Party is led by Gul Buddin Hekmatyar, also known simply as Gul Buddin. He commands a group of about 600 guerrillas based in Pakistan that, with the support of the Pakistan Government, carried out some paramilitary operations in Afghanistan against the Daoud government. Gul Buddin’s group probably has conducted a few raids in Afghanistan since the Marxists took power in 1978 and it may pass some arms to insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. It reportedly continues to receive some support from Pakistan. The Islamic Party is somewhat more secular in outlook than other exile groups and Gul Buddin’s rejection of the monarchy as a possible alternative to the present regime has tended to isolate him from other exile leaders. The Islamic Party was represented at the recent meeting at which the groups in attendance claimed to have succeeded in their effort to unite their organizations. Gul Buddin’s group has roots in the area between Ghazni and Qandahar and is most active there. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

—The Afghan Islamic and National Revolutionary Council (Jabbah-Azadibakhsh Islami) also known as the National Front for Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan. The Council is headed by Sayed Ahmad Gailani (also known as Effendi Jan) who is an important pir or religious leader who claims to have a following of 100,000 in the eastern provinces. Described by a US Afghan specialist as the exile Muslim leader with the most modern outlook, Gailani’s political strength is based on his religious following. He is related to the Iraqi Ambassador to Pakistan of the same name but it is not known whether this personal tie equates to a connection with the Iraqi Government. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

—The Afghan Islamic League (Jamiat-Islami-Afghani). The League is headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former professor of Islamic Studies at Kabul University. The organization reportedly receives some financial support from a small, conservative political party in Pakistan and is affiliated with another Afghan dissident organization, the Afghan National Liberation Front. Rabbani’s group reportedly has a military arm but its mission and capability are unknown. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

—The Afghan National Liberation Front (Jabhe-I-Negat-I-Melli). The group’s leader, Sebqatullah Mojededi, is a member of an important religious family that has a following in Kabul and other urban centers of eastern Afghanistan. An Islamic scholar, Mojededi reportedly has good contacts in Saudi Arabia and Libya. He claims to represent the Front’s “real” leader Prince Abdul Wali, cousin and son-in-law to King Zahir. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 120, Super-Sensitive: 1–3/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note at the bottom of the page indicates that the memorandum was prepared in the Office of Political Analysis.
2. A likely reference to a statement made by Ali Tabib, spokesman for the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF), who promised that major Afghan opposition groups, including the ANLF, the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party, and the Islamic Revolutionary Movement planned to announce their “organizational unification” against Soviet forces. Tabib also stated: “the key will be for us to make this war as costly for the Russians as Vietnam was for the Americans.” Tabib was quoted in David Kline, “Soviet Combat Troops May Unify Afghan Rebel Groups,” Christian Science Monitor, January 2, 1980, p. 7.
3. See footnote 2, Document 143.