Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

98. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 15, 1979, 9:15–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Warren Christopher
  • Harold Saunders
  • Richard Cooper**

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General John Pustay

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Frank Carlucci

• Energy

  • John Sawhill**

• Justice

  • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti***
  • John Shenefield**

• Treasury

  • Secretary William Miller**
  • Anthony Solomon**
  • Robert Mundheim**

• White House

  • Stuart Eizenstat**
  • Lloyd Cutler**
  • Jody Powell
  • Hedley Donovan
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Gary Sick
  • Jerry Schecter****

** Domestic issues only

*** Domestic issues and Shah

**** Present only for discussion of Shah

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues

1. Economic Steps. Secretary Vance and Mr. Cooper reported on the discussions with the Europeans. The acceptability of various steps differs from country to country because of legal and policy problems. It was felt, however, that it is not necessary for all of our allies to adopt exactly the same posture. Dr. Brzezinski asked State to prepare a matrix which will show the position of each country on each of the prospective actions.² (S)

Secretary Vance reported that when and if we come to the point of requesting sanctions under Chapter VII, the Europeans are pledged to support us. We will have to decide whether to go for complete sanctions or in stages. We can initially request limited sanctions, e.g. denying military credits and military equipment deliveries; a second stage could be a selective trade embargo, excluding food and medicine, and termination of mail and rail links, which would involve removal of foreign nationals; the third stage would involve a total embargo. By Monday,³ State will be prepared to discuss options regarding resort to Chapter VII and the pros and cons of various strategies. Based on the discussions Monday, a recommendation will be prepared for the President. All agreed it would be premature to make a recommendation until we see what the reaction is to the World Court ruling. The European allies, however, have agreed to go ahead with sanctions if Chapter VII is defeated by Soviet veto in the Security Council. (S)

State and Treasury will today prepare and send cables to the European allies which clarifies and ties down the specific commitments they have made. This will be necessary before the European finance officials meet on Monday. On Monday, follow up messages jointly from Secretary Vance and Secretary Miller will request immediate implementation of the measures as agreed. It was agreed that no immediate steps would be taken with regard to Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada until after the Europeans have had their meeting on Monday.⁴ (S)

A separate cable of instructions will be prepared for Mr. Carswell, who is on his way to Japan. These instructions will outline the various steps which the Europeans have agreed to and request that the Japanese accept those steps plus a few technical elements which are applicable only to Japan. The instruction will set forth what we are asking the Japanese in very clear form and request that these be implemented directly. The Japanese will also be advised that sanctions under Chapter VII remain a possible next step.⁵ (S)

2. World Court. The ICJ order is expected today.⁶ State will see that VOA picks this up and broadcasts the text of the order in Farsi to Iran. (C)

3. White Paper. State recommended and all agreed that we should not proceed with a formal statement of our position for release in the form of a White Paper. In the past, such documents have provided a target for all to shoot at and have promoted, rather than discouraged, dispute. Instead, State proposes to collect the necessary information and provide position papers on particular issues which can be used as required. It will not be our intention to release a single document, however. The documents will be held in the White House.⁷ (S)

4. Lawyers for Tribunal. Lloyd Cutler has been working with a group of 40 lawyers who are preparing themselves in the event counsel is required for Americans on trial in Iran. At this point, they are relying primarily on the New York Times Index and other unclassified sources. State is making available some open source information. It was agreed that press guidance should be prepared for discussion at the Monday meeting. We wish to avoid any moves which would lend legitimacy to a trial in Iran,⁸ while recognizing the rights of Americans to legal counsel.

Political-Military Issues:

1. Shah. Press guidance had been prepared by Jody Powell for the Shah’s departure to Panama this morning.⁹ The guidance was reviewed and approved by the SCC for use as soon as Panama makes its announcement or when the story breaks. Congressional leaders were briefed this morning and a circular is being sent to all posts alerting them to possible demonstrations or reactions. Mr. Cutler reviewed the U.S. commitments flowing from the discussions with the Shah and his representatives.¹⁰ We have agreed that: (1) the children can remain in the United States for schooling and the FBI will continue its liaison with those providing security; (2) the Shahbanou will be permitted to visit the children here from time to time; (3) the Shah will have access to U.S. medical facilities in Panama as required; the Shah’s doctors have advised that the necessary [operation] can be performed in Panama; one of the U.S. doctors worked in Panama for seven years; (4) the U.S. will provide transportation and assistance for a medical team to visit Panama for the operation as required. The deposition required in the legal case brought by Bell Helicopter can be taken in Panama. (S)

2. Palestinians. The PLO representative in Tehran has made a proposal which will be delivered to Congressman Findley today about a delegation to Tehran which could result in release of the hostages. State will follow up. (S)

[Omitted here is information on Afghanistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 18, SCC Meeting #230 held 12/15/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, J” in the upper right corner.
2. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “Prepare for UNSC sanctions. I prefer maximum trade interruption.” The matrix was discussed at the December 17 SCC Meeting; see Document 102.
3. December 17.
4. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “all ok.”
5. As recommended in a memorandum from Platt to Brzezinski, December 18. (Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 107)
6. The ICJ unanimously ruled December 15 that Iran should restore the Embassy to the United States, that Iran should release all hostages and provide them with diplomatic protection, and that neither country should take any action that would aggravate the situation. Argumentation before the ICJ and the court’s ruling are in Department of State Bulletin, February 1980, pp. 40–53.
7. Carter approved the item with a checkmark and wrote in the margin: “ok, but I want it complete for our selective use.”
8. Carter underlined this sentence to this point and wrote in the left margin: “important.”
9. For the December 15 White House statement on the Shah’s departure, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 2251.
10. The report of the meeting with the Shah’s representatives is in a memorandum from Oxman to Christopher, December 18. (Carter Library, Records of the White House Office of Counsel to the President, Lloyd Cutler, Box 12)