Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

71. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, November 29, 1979

SUBJECT

• Iran: Next Steps

Your press conference² has been enormously helpful in placing the issue in perspective, in reassuring the U.S. public, in dramatizing your personal leadership, and in keeping up front the central issue: the illegal detention of hostages.

In the meantime, we are proceeding with the UN Security Council debate and with the World Court case. What other steps ought we contemplate, in the event the Iranians are not accommodating? The table I gave you a week ago has a complete list of options,³ and I will not duplicate it here. However, I do want to outline a possible scenario, in the event that peaceful accommodation proves not to be possible. Khomeini’s conduct suggests that he may not want any compromise or peaceful solution. Accordingly, you may wish to consider the following:

1. We obtain a positive Security Council vote—while refusing to debate Iranian charges as long as our hostages are detained. (Through the middle of next week—in progress.)

2. We press for a World Court ruling. (Anywhere up to about the third week of December—in progress.)

3. We go to our allies and ask them to join us in a financial and economic embargo of Iran—hinting to them that lack of support will leave us no option but to act militarily, a contingency they much fear. We should also consult with them at a high level, perhaps through a Presidential emissary.⁴

4. We request economic sanctions from the UN under Chapter 7.

5. You appear before the General Assembly to appeal for support in preserving international norms.

6. We formally break relations, expel Iranian diplomats and demand the release of ours. (Immediately after 5 above, if rebuffed.)

7. We initiate some form of blockade of Iranian ports for as long as our people are detained and warn of more direct action if our hostages are hurt, or when our people are put on trial.

8. We have in readiness a series of military actions (not just one strike) if the Iranians respond to the blockade by harming our hostages selectively or sequentially, or if they harm them without our blockade.

9. In the meantime we reach an internal decision regarding future relations with Iran, including covert action.⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 11/28/79–12/4/79. Top Secret. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.
2. See footnote 9, Document 67.
3. Not further identified.
4. The attachment on Giscard is relevant. [Footnote is in the original.] Not further identified. The Summary of Conclusions of the November 30 SCC meeting noted that “strongly worded letters from the President to the appropriate heads of state requesting their cooperation in calling Iranian defaults and other economic measures are being prepared.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Box 23)
5. Brzezinski added by hand: “The above steps are basically familiar, but their sequence and timing needs to be determined.” Along the left margin on the first page of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Pursue them all as options—”