Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

65. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 27, 1979

SUBJECT

• The U.S. and the Islamic World (U)

It disturbs me that the net result of our response to critical events in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world contributes exactly to what our enemies most want to see: we isolate ourselves from Muslims, mutual suspicions grow and permanent alienation sets in. Thus we will find it harder and harder to communicate with Muslims—because we reduce our opportunities for communicating. If we do not stem this process, the Carter Administration will have left its successors a legacy that will require many years to eliminate. (U)

Steps to protect Americans in Muslim countries from imminent attack by evacuating dependents and reducing staffs are probably unavoidable in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, but I sense that we may be on the edge of a form of bureaucratic panic. The more we reduce presence in such countries, the less opportunity we have for communication with their governments and peoples on any level and the more opportunities there will be for suspicions and misunderstandings to grow. Rather than demonstrating to the world that we break and run when under pressure, we would serve our own interests better if we displayed a stubborn insistence on staying in place, asserting ourselves and being ready to fight (let the Marines shoot!) to defend our installations and our principles when challenged. (C)

Eleven hundred Marines to protect more than 150 diplomatic installations around the world is too few. We need to double that number. We still possess the most advanced technology in the world—we should announce a new program to apply it to defense of our diplomatic establishments abroad. Our information efforts are already too weak in most of these countries; our exchange efforts are oriented too much toward listening to others and too little toward telling our own story. The naive idealistic thrust of these programs which has become enshrined as a set of sacred principles in recent years should be reversed. (C)

We are well on our way to being cast as anti-Islamic, anti-nationalist and “imperialist” in most of the Muslim world. Local demagogues find such tactics expedient, and their appetites are whetted every time we look weak. The Soviets cannot resist exploiting these opportunities. We deceive only ourselves if we take soothing words Dobrynin may utter to Marshall Shulman as evidence of real Soviet concern for our welfare in these countries. If we apply the “but-there-is-no-evidence” principle to judging what the Soviets may be doing to undermine us among Muslims and avoid looking for it, we delude only ourselves. We might serve our national purposes better if we reverted to some of the healthy suspicion that characterized our reaction to events such as the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950. (C)

The Soviets, who have been viciously oppressing Islam in their own territories for 60 years, aim to emerge from the present commotion in the Middle East with an enhanced image as protectors of Islamic nationalism. They will have to resort to some extraordinary acrobatics to get this point across in Afghanistan—but what has been happening in Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia has pushed Afghanistan far into the background. We can challenge Soviet misrepresentations and expose their own record successfully only if we equip ourselves with the means to do so. (U)

There is nothing irretrievable about our present predicament in the Islamic world. We survived commotion which was at least as severe in 1967 and again in 1973.² But our net image as a nation which defends its interests and protects those associated with it was a bit brighter then than it is now; and the Soviet effort to denigrate us was not so highly developed. We have neglected our defenses too long in this part of the world, and have slipped into a habit of defensiveness. We have become too apologetic about our own interests. This makes it difficult for our friends—who still outnumber our enemies in the Islamic world—to take any kind of action in our behalf. (U)

Bluster, military threats with little obvious rationale or substance behind them, retaliatory schemes contrary to our traditions, and punitive measures against minor or defenseless groups do us no credit as a great power. They will not help us achieve our goals in this important region of the world. Quite the opposite. (U)

In our approach to the Islamic World we need:

• to display a determination to stick it out and assert ourselves,

• to maintain embassies, cultural centers and other facilities and let everyone know they are going to be strongly defended,

• to discourage unofficial Americans, businessmen, and others from packing up and running,

• to accuse the Soviets of what we know—or suspect—they are doing, and expose their tawdry record toward Islam,

• to get our story across in every way possible—by increasing outlets and expanding resources,

• by showing the kind of determination and strength that will enable our friends to help us assert ourselves. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 27, Iran 11/78–11/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Sick, Hunter, Brement, Larrabee, Ermarth, Odom, Thornton, Funk, Gregg, and Griffith.
2. The 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.