Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

47. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 22, 1979, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Warren Christopher

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Frank Carlucci

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom
  • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. AWACS. Secretary Brown and General Jones will prepare a recommendation for the President concerning the possible location of an AWACS aircraft in the region, possibly at Aswan, with overflight rights for Saudi Arabia.² (S)

2. Presidential Views. The President talked to Dr. Brzezinski just prior to the meeting. He wants the group to consider how to prepare for the next stage. Should we try to deter trials? Should we communicate privately with Khomeini or those around him, informing them how we would react in the event of trials, including the possibility of military action? The SCC should review our options, including possible restriction of Iranian diplomatic activities in this country. The President felt that a break in diplomatic relations would be premature at this point. It had been suggested to the President that he might consider making an address to the UN General Assembly. He asked for the views of the SCC. If this seems appropriate, he would suggest a small drafting group under Hedley Donovan. (S)

3. United Nations. Secretary Vance believed that we should begin work on a draft Presidential speech, but he thought it was too early to go to the UN. He expects the Security Council to meet on Monday or Tuesday³ as part of the negotiating effort being conducted through the Secretary General. He felt that a Security Council resolution should precede any Presidential address. He recommended that the negotiations through the UN channel be permitted to play out for a bit more. After the SC resolution, we can consider a possible Presidential address calling for Security Council sanctions. Three of the four points in the present negotiating package seem to be negotiable. He was uncertain about the fourth.⁴ We should know by mid-week if this approach has worked and if the Secretary General could go to Tehran to bring back the hostages. It was agreed that Hedley Donovan would begin drafting a statement in cooperation with State. (S)

4. Trials. The group agreed that we wished to deter the holding of trials and, if trials were held, to deter any executions. We could privately inform Khomeini or those close to him that holding trials would bring U.S. action and that any executions would result in very severe action. A blockade was considered as a possibly appropriate step in the event trials begin. This is to be discussed further with the President. (TS)

5. The Shah. Available information indicates that radiation treatment should be completed this week, with a non-surgical attempt to remove the gallstone early next week.⁵ If all goes well, we are informed it is the Shah’s present intention to leave near the first of December, either to Mexico or some other location. Warren Christopher believes the Shah will ask for our advice before taking any decision. The Shahbanou is apparently counseling him not to go and to ignore the United States. It would be useful to have direct information, rather than second-hand messages, about what the Shah is thinking. The DCI will consult with the Attorney General about possible technical surveillance. The DCI believes the Shah’s departure would lead to an emotional outburst in Tehran which would be unpredictable but dangerous for the hostages. (TS)

6. Iranian Diplomats. The SCC felt that restrictions on Iranian diplomats were too insignificant to have any effect on the negotiating situation. They might, however, interfere with the progress of negotiations or—if our restrictions were very severe, e.g. restricting them to the embassy—it could lose us support by dragging us down to Khomeini’s level. The Vice President recommended continuing for several more days with the negotiating track through the UN. If that does not work, then we should do something with some bite, such as sanctions, limiting sale of foodstuffs, perhaps mining harbors. (TS)

7. Covert Action. The DCI will prepare a finding for the meeting tomorrow to begin specific steps [3 lines not declassified].

8. Longer Range Options. The SCC discussed our objectives in the post-hostage situation. All agreed that a decision to work for the overthrow of Khomeini would require a major U.S. commitment to follow through with money and the risk of direct military involvement. David Aaron will circulate an options paper drawn from the work by his “black chamber” group. (TS)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 106. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the right-hand margin of the page.
2. Carter wrote “proceed” in the left margin beside Item 1.
3. November 26 or 27.
4. See Document 33. Waldheim outlined his negotiating proposal to McHenry in a November 16 meeting. The package would include 1) release of the hostages, 2) “some kind of investigation of Iranian grievances with regard to the Shah,” 3) departure of the Shah “only in connection with a scenario which includes or coincides with the release of the hostages, and 4) “any other steps which Khomeini and those within Iran who wished to bring the impasse to an end might use to persuade the students to go along.” (Telegram 5321 from USUN, November 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–2439)
5. Attendees at the November 19 SCC meeting discussed the Shah’s health, noting that he had completed his fifth radiation treatment and that he was scheduled for non-surgical gallstone removal, a procedure that, if successful, meant that the Shah could leave the United States as early as December 1. Attendees questioned the impact on the hostage crisis. On the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting, Carter wrote: “I think it’s better for him to leave when able.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 17, SCC Meeting #205 held 11/19/79)