Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

340. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 13, 1980

SUBJECT

• Soviet Military Threat to Iran

Yesterday senior intelligence and policy officials reviewed the accumulating data on Soviet military preparations for operations into Iran. The consensus, which I share, is that the Soviets are not now readying an attack that is only days or weeks away. But they are methodically preparing their forces and contingency plans for a very ambitious offensive toward the Persian Gulf. At a time of their own choosing during the months ahead, they could unleash this offensive after some 3–4 weeks observable mobilization. (TS)

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

What all this means for us is, first, that the scope of Soviet planning envisions military aggression against Iran would be very farreaching and very threatening to us; and second, that the palpable threat of such aggression could materialize much more rapidly than our current force improvement and contingency plans appear to allow for. We have, over the past several months, moved in a positive manner to meet the threat of Soviet aggression. In light of the most recent evidence, however, we must, in all probability, considerably accelerate our political and military measures to deter such a Soviet move. (TS)

Because the Soviet threat to Iran is serious, but not immediate, (i.e., we see no troop mobilization evidencing preparation to attack within weeks), I have scheduled consideration of current developments next week. Ed and Harold are being appropriately briefed by their staffs. We must do our utmost to prevent leaks of this intelligence until we develop purposeful schemes for acting on it; a “war scare” that could fade after a few weeks would be very damaging, especially with allies and our own public. (TS)

The next order of business is to prepare options for speeding up our deterrent military preparations, for accelerating cooperation with allies and regional friends, and for dealing with the Soviets. Following SCC review, such plans will be presented to you for approval. (TS)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 33, Subject File, Iran 8/80. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.