Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

34. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter¹

Washington, November 15, 1979

I believe that any rescue operation into Teheran within the next two weeks would have a very low probability of success.²

We need better to help you prepare for a decision on such an operation, and on what the alternatives are.

First, you deserve an explicit statement of the likelihood of success of a rescue attempt. (Recall that the JCS reviewed the plan for the Bay of Pigs and judged it to have a “fair” chance of success. To the military, “fair” is like a “D” in college; the White House interpreted the JCS opinion as a “fair chance of success.”)

Next, you need to know how the likelihood of success would improve over time. You may not be able to control the timing, but you will want to consider alternatives in this light.

In addition, you deserve optional rescue strategies that have different political requirements. Only you can balance the political costs with the changes in probability they afford.

I suggest that you ask the JCS and Secretary of Defense to prepare a chart like the attached. (A second copy with only nominal entries is also attached to provide a feel for how useful it might or might not be.)³

Finally, you deserve a considered list of alternatives. If you eschew a rescue operation, the pressure of public opinion will require as immediate and decisive a set of actions as possible.

Attachment

Chart Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, November 15, 1979

RESCUE OPERATION OPTIONS

RESCUE OPERATION OPTIONS
			Probability of Success by:5
Plan	Type of Operation	External Support	Nov 20	Nov 27	Dec 3	Dec 10	Dec 17	Key Factors Driving Probabilities
A	Air land rescue team; helo to Tehran and return; fly out.	[less than 1 line not declassified]	Very low	Very low	Low	Low-Medium	Medium	Vulnerability of air lead; availability of helos.
B	Air land rescue team; helo to Tehran and return; fly out.	[less than 1 line not declassified]	Very low	Low	Low-Medium	Medium	Medium	Vulnerability of air lead; availability of helos. [less than 1 line not declassified] distances less; chance of land exfiltration higher.
			Probability of Success by:2
Plan	Type of Operation	External Support	Nov 20	Nov 27	Dec 3	Dec 10	Dec 17	Key Factors Driving Probabilities
C	Air land rescue team; infiltrate to Tehran; exfiltrate by road to air field.	[less than 1 line not declassified]	Very low	Very low	Very low	Low	Low-Medium	Difficulty of exfiltration by road.
D	Infiltrate attack team; helo directly in and out.	[less than 1 line not declassified]	Not possible	Not possible	Not possible	Low	Low-Medium	Need time to infiltrate rescue team, helo distance long.
E	Infiltrate attack team; helo directly in and out.	[less than 1 line not declassified]	Not possible	Not possible	Low	Low-Medium	Medium	Distances less.
F	Infiltrate attack team; helo directly in and out.	[less than 1 line not declassified]	Not possible	Not possible	Low-Medium	Medium	Medium-High	Distances still less.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 5: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Various Subjects. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. According to an undated paper prepared by the JCS, on November 12, Jones, by verbal order, created a Joint Task Force within J–3 to develop operation RICE BOWL, the original name of the rescue operation. RICE BOWL led to the establishment of a linked communications and intelligence net among NSA, Department of State, JCS, DIA, CIA, Fort Bragg, Ranger, Fixed-wing, and Helicopter elements that comprised the components of the proposed rescue operation. (Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 8, Iranian Hostage Crisis 1979–1984, I–93 Rice Bowl Annex B (Intelligence) JTF Oplan 1–80)
3. The second chart is not attached.
4. Top Secret; Sensitive. An updated chart was attached to a November 27 memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski. This memorandum detailed the status of the CIA’s role in developing a rescue operation. Turner noted that the CIA would continue to play an important role in “providing technical and operational guidance and logistical support “to virtually all aspects of the Delta team planning effort” and that “interface” between CIA and Defense and Delta “in planning for a hostage rescue operation has been extensive and continuous.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 13, Folder 1.
2. “Success” defined as 50% of hostages and rescue team exfiltrated safely. [Footnote is in the original.]