Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

318. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 18, 1980

SUBJECT

• Iran

The low profile policy² which we have followed since late April has yielded some benefits. Despite the intense in-fighting within Iran’s leadership factions over the seating of the Parliament and selection of a Prime Minister, the hostage issue had not been the political football it was in the past. Khomeini has ceased referring to the hostages during his speeches and attacks on the U.S. A consensus appears to be building within Iranian political circles that the hostage issue has been milked for all it is worth and that it is increasingly a political (and economic) liability which must be resolved. Even Beheshti has been prepared to refer publicly to the possibility of settling the hostage issue in accordance with the “humanitarian tradition” of Islam. (C)

Unfortunately, none of these developments provides any assurance that the Iranian leadership will be able to develop or carry out a rational plan for getting themselves out of the hole they have dug for themselves. On the contrary, there is a significant risk that events may run out of control in Tehran at some point in the coming months, confronting us (and them) with a crisis neither side wants. There are several ways this might occur:

—The Majlis has now completed its credential fight against possible moderates who managed to get elected, and constitutional obstacles to its operation have been removed. It should begin formal operations in the immediate future, and a Prime Minister and Cabinet should be selected by the end of this month. There is no indication, however, that the hostage issue will be taken up much before September, and some sources say it will be October before the issue is addressed. Whatever the timing, the chances of prompt, sensible action by the inexperienced and generally extremist electees of the new Majlis are not good. In terms of domestic Iranian politics, the most attractive solution available to the Majlis is to hold trials in some form. It will take firm and skillful leadership to restrain that impulse, possibly by Khomeini personally, and our past experience offers no reason for optimism that such leadership will be exerted. (S)

—A second problem is the progressive deterioration of public order in Iran. This is a vicious circle: incompetence by the Islamic regime leads to public dissatisfaction which leads in turn to more blatant purges and repression by the regime in self-defense which leads to more disaffection. No one knows how long this process will continue before the social structure collapses into a new round of general violence, but most observers believe it should be measured in months rather than years. A collapse of civil order would obviously place the lives of the hostages in jeopardy and would confront us with some urgent decisions. (S)

—A third possibility is the death of one or more hostages, or convincing evidence that their physical safety is in immediate danger. (C)

—Finally, there may be some act of desperation from within the country or in association with the various exile groups which attempts to split the country or establish an alternative regime. At the moment, the prospects for a successful movement of this type appear limited, but the possibility of an attempted revolt in Azerbaijan or an attempt to cut the Khuzestan oil fields away from the rest of the country, for example, cannot be excluded. Any such attempt would raise the danger of civil war and increase the temptation for the Soviets to intervene. (S)

Each of these events would effectively be outside our control but would demand a response on our part which would again place this issue at the forefront of public concern—in this country and elsewhere. Our diplomatic strategy is focused on the first of these contingencies. We are attempting to establish redundant and reliable channels of communications to various elements in the Iranian power structure which will permit an exchange of ideas. We wish to insure that the Iranians understand that trials are totally unacceptable to us. We also wish to explore ideas about how the issue could be managed with the Majlis to avoid unpleasant surprises or, if possible, a new round of sterile rhetoric and confrontational demands. The general outlines of a negotiating framework were established in the position paper developed during the earlier negotiating phase in February and March,³ and our objective is to encourage key Iranians to think in those terms in devising their own scenarios with the Majlis. Some tentative channels of communication have been established. Others may appear as activity intensifies in the Majlis. I have raised with Dave Newsom the possibility of a restricted PRC to review our present situation on the diplomatic front and State is now considering it. (S)

We really have very few assets for preventing or managing the last three contingencies. The UN could again become a useful forum in some circumstances. For example, a Security Council resolution expressly prohibiting trials might be more effective if trials appeared imminent than it would be as an abstract warning. A UN conciliation or peacekeeping effort of some sort might be helpful in some circumstances, although the UN is not equipped to deal with a purely civil war. The UN could be used to impose additional penalties on Iran, and it could provide the forum for an international signal to the Soviets not to intervene. However, judging from our experience over the past eight months, it would be unrealistic to expect the UN to play more than a hortatory role, which Iran is free to ignore. (S)

Otherwise, our options are essentially in the realm of self-help. How do we respond if we learn that a hostage has been killed? What if Iran ignores the warning signals and begins to hold a show trial of several hostages? What if Khomeini dies and/or public order collapses, leaving the hostages at the mercy of a small faction of fanatics? These and other contingencies may never occur, but it would be helpful to have a high-level and restrictive review of our options in advance to identify political, diplomatic, and military planning factors in the event we should be required to react on short notice. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 42, Subject File, Iran Papers 5/80–7/80. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information. A note at the top of the page reads: “ZB saw—rtnd Aug 18.”
2. An attached July 7 CIA paper, “Current Status of the Hostage Crisis and the implications of U.S. Policy Options,“ assessed the current U.S. low profile policy as contributing to reduced Iranian interest in the hostage issue, which allowed moderates to work diplomatically. The paper was submitted to Brzezinski under a covering attached but not printed July 7 memorandum from Turner. On this memorandum Brzezinski wrote: “GS. Comment? ZB. 7/11/80.”
3. See Document 137