Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

304. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) and the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (McMahon)¹

Washington, June 30, 1980

SUBJECT

• Iranian Successor Regime after Khomeini

1. Reviewed the prospects for Iranian political action with [name not declassified]. He feels both Bakhtiar and Oveisi are not good bets because they have become so public. Oveisi, for instance, has advertised that he is working with the Iraqis. This is not going to endear him to the Iranian population who can’t see much good coming for Iran out of working with Iraq. He felt the basic principle was that there had to be a religious element in whatever group succeeded Khomeini. He thinks Khomeini, however, cannot be challenged as long as he is alive. The overall conclusion from this discussion would be that if he is right that any new government cannot be secular only, Iran is in for an indefinite period of the same kind of struggle that Bazargan had between the secularists and the clerics and it has been going on ever since with Bani Sadr, etc. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to hostage crisis.]

Stansfield Turner²

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 82M00501R: Box 14, Folder 1, C–372 Iran 01 June–31 Jul 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. Gates signed for Turner above this typed signature.