301. Memorandum From the Commander of the Joint Task Force (Vaught) to the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pustay)1

SUBJECT

  • Hostage Rescue Mission (Operation SNOWBIRD)

1. (TS) Summary. Due to the lack of definitive intelligence, adequate force proficiency and available launch bases, development of a specific operational plan to rescue the American hostages held in Iran is not possible at this time. Force proficiency is expected to be realized by 15 July. Action is ongoing to produce an adequate intelligence base and some effort is being made to assure the availability of staging facilities near enough to Iran to enable the secure launch and recovery of the rescue force.

2. (TS) Intelligence. The location and security conditions of the hostages remain largely unknown. [4 lines not declassified] Several innovative technological approaches to improve intelligence gathering are being pursued. Despite the possible near-term future release of some of the hostages, it is expected that others will experience protracted detention and possibly trial.

3. (TS) Launch Bases. It is essential to at least obtain an indication that one or more of Iran’s neighbors would ignore our use of its soil for a rescue mission. No such indication is in hand. A survey is being made with a view towards the possible use of Turkey and Pakistan. [2½ lines not declassified]

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4. (TS) Cover. JTF procurement and training is being covered by project DOUBLESTAR. [2 lines not declassified] Although the security risks are greater than with the previous rescue operation, it is believed that security aspects of preparing and deploying another rescue force can be managed.

5. (TS) Force Selection. The ground element of the previous task force has been retained. The C–130s, MC–130s, AC–130s, and EC–130s remain with the force. The helicopter air element has been revised and expanded. A newly available Air Force helicopter unit with improved capabilities has replaced the Navy-USMC helicopter force. Additionally, a newly available Army helicopter unit is being trained for possible inclusion in the JTF force structure.

6. (TS) Training. The lack of definitive intelligence has forced the JTF to produce a variety of concept plans (see Tab B) as opposed to a precise operational plan. The attainment of several capabilities is being pursued so we can quickly adapt a selected, trained force to a set of known circumstances (hostage location and security) when those circumstances become known to the JTF. By mid-July, a trained and adaptable rescue force should be available.

7. (TS) Costs. Due to the expanded force and protracted training, SNOWBIRD costs are somewhat larger than those associated with the previous organization. Problems are being experienced by the Services in identifying sufficient funds for several categories of expenditures. By mid-July, costs incurred should total approximately 26 million dollars. Approximately two thirds of these expenditures would occur in any event to support routine programmed activities although they would be incurred over a more protracted period.

James B. Vaught2
Major General, USA
JTF Commander
  1. Source: Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 8, Iranian Hostage Crisis 1979–1984, J90–110 Operations. Top Secret. All tabs (A–G) are attached but not printed.
  2. Printed from a copy with this typed signature.