269. Editorial Note

On April 25, 1980, the White House issued a short statement on the failed hostage rescue attempt. President Jimmy Carter followed this with a longer address to the nation at 7 a.m. that morning. In his address, Carter briefly outlined the rescue mission and then explained that the rescue attempt, which had been months in the planning, was executed only when it became clear that Iranian authorities “could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative.” He also stated regarding the decision to attempt the rescue and the decision to cancel the mission: “The responsibility is fully my own.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 771–773)

The Carter administration then continued the process of dealing with the consequences of the failed rescue operation, including engaging in correspondence with U.S. allies and congressional leadership, debating among advisers a new rescue attempt, meeting with the wounded, holding a press conference, accepting the resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and attending the burial of the returned bodies of those who died at Desert One.

Carter personally apologized to Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, Prince Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt for using facilities on their territories as part of the rescue mission without giving them prior information. Carter assured Sultan Qaboos that he would provide “prompt assistance” if the security of Oman was jeopardized as a result of U.S. activities. And he assured Prince Fahd “of full U.S. support for the maintenance of the integrity of Saudi Arabia.” (Letters from Carter to Sultan Qaboos and to Prince Fahd, April 25; Carter Library, Plains File, Box 3 and Box 4, respectively; and telegram 109160 to Cairo, April 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2438) Qaboos was at first “angry,” then asked that the United States “do everything possible to avoid publicly linking Oman or Masirah Island to Iranian operation.” (Telegram 1151 from Muscat, April 25; Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran NODIS Cables Apr 1980) Sadat responded that while it was “well-known that Egypt had said it would provide facilities for such humanitarian purposes,” to avoid criticism, Egypt did not intend to say anything publicly, and if it did, any statement would be in the form of a denial. (Telegram 9284 from Cairo, April 25; ibid.)

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham Claytor, and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John S. Pustay briefed the representatives of the U.S. allies in Washington on April 25, providing a detailed [Page 734] explanation of the decision-making process. (Telegram 109502 to all NATO Capitals, et al., April 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880029–0131) That day Carter met with bipartisan congressional leadership from 10:35 until 11:53 a.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found. The next day, Carter wrote to Speaker of the House Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. and President Pro Tempore of the Senate Warren G. Magnuson, describing the operation and assuring them that he had acted within the War Powers Act. (Public Papers: Carter 1980–81, Book I, pages 777–779)

On April 26, from 10:30 to 11:34 a.m., Carter also met with senior advisers to consider the viability of another rescue mission. Attending were the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones, Commander of the Joint Task Force Major General James B. Vaught, Commander of Hunter Army Air Base. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) As Turner later recalled, the meeting was chaotic. Vaught, who Turner thought should have apologized for mission failure, instead lectured Carter on how well he himself had commanded. Carter didn’t respond. Turner described the discussion on ideas for a new rescue plan as unproductive. Suggestions escalated toward a full-scale invasion of Iran by several divisions, and Vaught interrupted everyone. At one point, Carter admonished “that if he could just be allowed to finish a thought,” some progress might be made. Eventually, Turner wrote, Carter simply terminated the meeting in frustration. (Turner, Terrorism and Democracy, pages 126–127) No other record of this meeting has been found.

On April 27, a personal message from Carter was read at the memorial services for those who died during the operation, although Carter himself did not attend. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 779–780) That day, Carter met with members of the Delta Team and five Iranians who had helped in the mission. (Carter, Keeping Faith, page 519) Carter’s remarks to the Delta Team are in Carter Library, Plains File, Box 7. On April 28, in San Antonio, Texas, he met with those wounded in action, telling reporters afterwards that he was “overwhelmed with emotion” and “filled with a sense of abhorrence and horror” over the Iranian willingness to exhibit the bodies of the dead Americans. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 786–787) His reference is to April 27 events in which the Revolutionary Guard, apparently acting under the guidance of Ayatollah Khalkhali, had moved the bodies of the U.S. servicemen to the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran. There, in front of journalists, the wrappings around the bodies were removed, revealing the charred remains. At one point, [Page 735] Khalkhali held up a limb to show a wristwatch. He vowed that the bodies would not be returned to the U.S. Government because it was “unworthy.” (William Branigin, “Pledge to Return Corpses in Doubt,” Washington Post, April 28, 1980, p. A1)

On April 28, Carter accepted the resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance “with regret.” Carter wrote to Vance: “Because you could not support my decision regarding the rescue operation in Iran, you have made the correct decision to resign.” Vance had submitted his resignation letter on April 21, prior to the rescue mission, due to differences over Iran. The exchange of letters is in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 781–782. Carter announced the appointment of Senator Edmund S. Muskie as Secretary of State on April 29. (Ibid., pages 791–792) On April 29, Carter gave a full press conference on the rescue mission from the East Room of the White House. (Ibid., pages 792–801)

Speaking for all the hostages, Chargé and hostage Bruce Laingen expressed “respect” for Carter’s “courage in the tough decisions that surrounded the rescue mission.” Laingen noted that Carter “has our total understanding in the disappointment we know he feels in its forced cancellation.” (Telegram 31 from Tehran to the Department of State, via the British Embassy, April 29; Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran NODIS Cables Apr 1980)

Iran eventually returned the bodies of the U.S. soldiers killed in Iran. Carter delivered the eulogy at their burials at Arlington National Cemetery on May 9. He stated:

“I speak for all Americans when I say to those who anonymously risk their lives each day to keep the peace and to maintain our military strength, and to the loved ones of those who died on the Iranian desert: Your risk, your suffering, your loss, are not in vain. I fervently pray that those who are still held hostage will be freed without more bloodshed, that all those who would use terror to impel innocent people will see the cruel futility of their criminal acts.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 864–865)