Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

254. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, April 15, 1980, 12:45–2:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• The White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Hamilton Jordan
  • Jody Powell

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

Secretary Vance: It is a serious mistake to go ahead with the rescue because (1) the Red Cross visit has accounted for all hostages and all of them are OK;² (2) our allies are beginning to move—on April 21 they will plan to adopt sanctions. We should not go forward. There will be loss of lives (5–15 hostages); risk to other Americans and maybe Europeans; and our allies will not understand this.

Secretary Brown: When do you expect the hostages then to be released?

Secretary Vance: I don’t know—but maybe one-third of them will get killed in this. Maybe after the Majlis elections.

Secretary Brown: Majlis will be less amenable to release

Zbigniew Brzezinski: We have the problem of timing. If we do not now undertake the rescue, later may be too late. There is also a strategic issue here—Iran is drifting leftward, and we need to lance the boil (which is the hostage issue).

The President: Schmidt is deeply concerned over the negative effects of pressure in Iran,³ and I am also concerned over a failure to act. If the Majlis meets and nothing happens, we will be faced with lengthy detention. Lately the Iranian government has not been disavowing the threats to the lives of the hostages. I don’t think our rescue option will itself improve as time passes. If we are left with only the military option, the element of surprise will diminish, whereas now the economic sanctions are lulling the militants. On balance, it is better to go ahead. Delay will cause deterioration in the region. I will stick with the decision I made.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: (Summarizes questions for further discussion: nature of any additional punitive action? What governments to be informed, and when, about the rescue? What disinformation campaign? How to get Americans out of Iran? Possible foreign reactions, notably Soviet? Reaction to a possible failure? Updating the operational scenario?)

Secretary Vance: (Feels that it would be a mistake to consider any additional punitive actions.)

Zbigniew Brzezinski: It is important that we do not look as if we are acting out of desperation. Should examine carefully other options.

Secretary Brown: (Outlines possible strike at a TV-power station installation in Tehran.)

The President: It is important that all casualties be limited and that we do not engage in wanton killing.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: We should also avoid Kennedy’s mistake at the Bay of Pigs of so limiting the military operation that its chances of success were reduced.

General Jones: We will not engage in wanton killing—we will only do so if it is necessary to avoid U.S. casualties. We will stay in the compound for one hour and search thoroughly the four buildings. (Discussion between Turner, Vance, and Brzezinski about the compound—how it is fortified, how it is guarded.)

The President: My inclination is not to launch any other attacks. We need a clean operation. We should not blow up other buildings in Tehran and I am doubtful about taking prisoners.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: It may be desirable to have prisoners as counter-hostages in the event the Iranians take new ones. (Brown and Claytor agree.)

The President: I want it clean and simple.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: It is an asset. We can always send them back.

Warren Christopher: Taking prisoners would be more complicating than helpful.

Jody Powell: I agree with Christopher. What would we do with them ultimately?

Hamilton Jordan: I agree with the above. If we grab someone, it should be someone important.

General Jones: I would take prisoners only as far as Mansuriyah and then let them go. I would want the Commander to have the option.

Secretary Vance: This will simply complicate the situation.

The President: Talk this over with the Commander. Basically, I do not want the prisoners. If need be, take them to Mansuriyah and then release them.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: We should also consider what to do if the operation fails. We should consider retribution if things go badly or more hostages are taken. Our options are mining or an attack on a refinery.

Secretary Brown: (Favors more than that if the failure is large.) The question is, when to react if the operation fails?

Admiral Turner: We should react the same day so it looks like a single operation. Then it looks less like a failure.

Secretary Vance: What would be the consequences for other Westerners?

The President: We are going into our own compound to take our own people out. There is no additional purpose.

General Jones: We should let the gun ships hit some Tehran targets the same night if things go bad.

Jody Powell: It might be a good idea to do the TV station in in the same night.

The President: One thing bothers me. Our nation’s stature should be preserved. The Iranians have not killed anybody, and hence we should not kill innocent Iranians.

Secretary Brown: Then we should mine in that case.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: The President is right. We should only do these additional things if there is a failure and killing of hostages afterwards. Maybe we could take out the TV/communications tower. (Discussion of various diplomatic initiatives designed to provide a diversion to prevent speculation on a rescue mission.)

Jody Powell: We won’t be able to get all of the American press out. Maybe Ham could get his contact in Tehran to throw our people out. Alternatively we could warn the top TV people that our own media people have been targeted for attack and therefore they should leave.

(The President and Brown skeptical that the above would work.)

Admiral Turner: Major disinformation should have an overall theme. We particularly need to deceive Soviet/Cuban intelligence. We also need a cover story for a possible leak.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: We should hint that we are considering mining. (Further discussion about cover for the operation, insofar as Oman is concerned—a cover story emphasizing air drops to Afghanistan approved.)

General Jones: The operation will proceed unless the President disapproves next Thursday.⁴ If weather bad, we will postpone on a day by day basis.

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 7, Iran 4/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House. As he later recalled, Vance had voiced to Carter his objection to the rescue mission earlier in the morning and then again before the NSC meeting. After the meeting, Vance questioned his desire to remain in the administration. (Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 409–410) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Vance and Carter met from 12:10 until 12:47 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of their April 15 non-NSC meetings has been found.
2. On April 15, a Red Cross representative in Tehran visited all 50 hostages during a 7-hour visit. (Memorandum from Saunders to Vance, Christopher, and Newsom, April 15; Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update April 1980) Lang submitted a full description of the Red Cross visit. (“Visit to the Hostages,” April 15; ibid.)
3. See Document 253.
4. April 24.