Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

247. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1980, 4:30–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Telephone Conversation with Giscard d’Estaing

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Valery Giscard d’Estaing, President of the French Republic

The President: It is good to hear from you.

Giscard: Hello, how are you? I am calling you because I got your message on the hostages in Iran.²

President Carter: Yes.

Giscard: I wanted to tell you what we are doing these days.

President Carter: Good.

Giscard: There is a meeting tomorrow morning in Lisbon of the European Foreign Ministers. And what we expect is that they will agree on a joint statement on that day from the EC governments.

Carter: Right.

Giscard: We would condemn the Iranian Government action concerning the hostages; say again that we support Waldheim’s action and that we expect positive action from the Iranian Government. We would condemn the detention of the hostages and instruct the ambassadors of the Nine to make a joint protest to the Iranians asking why the release of the hostages has been delayed. We will consider the Iranian Government answer and then take a joint position. The EC statement will probably be released tomorrow morning.³ Do you hear me?

Carter: Yes, I hear you fine.

Giscard: Yes, and then either we have a very negative answer from Iran which I think is probable. And then we have to decide what to do. I am just mentioning that I suspect that we will probably have to act on the diplomatic aspect (sic).

Carter: Yes.

Giscard: If on the other hand there is an indication of delay by Iran, then we can resort to take specific actions.

Carter: Allright, I understand. This is good information for me, Valery. I think you understand the difficult position we’re in.

Giscard: Yes, I understand very well. Of course we must not only work to release the hostages, but also consider the impact of our actions on Iran.

Carter: Absolutely.

Giscard: We must consider both.

Carter: Yes, I understand that.

Giscard: This is for your personal information and the statement will not say that we are proposing this.

Carter: I understand.

Giscard: But it will certainly be a firm and strong statement.

Carter: Valery, let me ask you to do one other thing for me which I think you already understand. We have had so many promises from them—either outright lies or failure to do what they say they will do. The only thing I would like to ask you all to do is not to let them equivocate and delay and delay and delay, as they have with us for the past five months. That’s their character and even if Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh make a flat, absolute promise, they then refer it to the Revolutionary Council. They insist upon a unanimous vote and in the last few days they have had all the Council members except two who approved the transfer of the hostages. Under those circumstances they referred it to Khomeini, who then says it must be a unanimous decision. I know you called me just for information purposes, but I think if you all could try to prevent that sort of deliberate postponement or delay in action, it would really be helpful.

Giscard: Yes. We will be very clear and precise about it. It will look like the European countries acting on their own. If the answer is negative, then we will take a decision at once.

Carter: That’s good. We want to avoid taking military action. And, I think we have a few days that we can wait, as you know, before we take any stronger action than we have taken. I think the outcome might very well be determined by how forceful you all act together. Well, I am very grateful to you for this information.

Giscard: One more point, Jimmy. We will also contact the Iraqis tomorrow. They can have also indirect pressure on Iran.

Carter: Yes. I think that’s true. Good luck and keep me informed if you will. Thank you Valery, very much.

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 1. Secret.
2. Presumably a reference to telegram 91816. See Document 246.
3. The April 10 communiqué issued by the EC–9 Foreign Ministers in Lisbon reaffirmed their commitment to universal respect for human rights and condemned the use of violence or terrorism as an instrument of policy. It also condemned the violation of these principles in Iran and appealed “urgently” to the Iranian authorities to liberate the U.S. hostages. (Telegram 2773 from Lisbon, April 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800180–0023) The EC–9 also agreed to send a démarche to Bani-Sadr, and to subsequently formulate a joint position on further action regarding Iran after results of the démarche were known. (Telegram 2771 from Lisbon, April 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800179–1244) The EC–9 démarche and meeting with Bani-Sadr are reported in telegram 9749 from Rome, April 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800184–0355)